COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS AND THE FUTURE OF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000398 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV AF SUBJECT: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS AND THE FUTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN AFGHANISTAN KABUL 00000398 001.2 OF 004 Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development's (MRRD) National Solidarity Program (NSP) is an Afghan success story, fostering local development through Community Development Councils (CDCs),including in some of the most insecure parts of the country. The Ministry proposed transitioning the CDCs from a civil society role to become the constitutionally-mandated governing body at the local level, but the government decided not to do so. The CDCs will remain informal consultative groups as part of civil society, while the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) led by Jelani Popal implements the Constitution's provision for formal district and village councils. CDCs will depend largely on donor support and are vulnerable to other, expanding local initiatives under the IDLG. Until elected councils are established some time after 2010, effective counter-insurgency in Afghanistan requires both the community-based development delivered by the NSP, as well as engagement of local leaders through representative councils. The efforts of both the IDLG and NSP merit the full support of donors to help the Afghan government succeed in this critical and coherent local governance agenda. The NSP Program and Community Development Councils -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development's (MRRD) National Solidarity Program (NSP) is an Afghan development success story. Working through 24 NGO facilitating partners, the program has established over 20,000 Community Development Councils (CDCs) in every province and most districts. The first phase of the program (NSP I) established the first 17,000 Councils, each of which was elected informally from communities of at least 25 families and received a block grant of up to $200 per family for small-scale, community planned and managed development projects. The second phase (NSP II),currently underway, is expanding the number of Councils to 24,000, covering 95 percent of Afghan villages by the end of 2009 (some Councils span several villages). The Rural Development Ministry and the World Bank are currently planning the third phase (NSP III),which will focus on sustainability by providing second round block grants to established Councils able to demonstrate that they used their first-round funds effectively, thereby helping them sink deeper and more permanent institutional roots in their communities. (Through the end of 2007, donors to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) have earmarked $349 million for the NSP, including $50 million from the United States. USAID plans to allocate $10 million to the NSP from its regular 2008 budget and an additional $40 million from the 2008 budget supplemental.) ¶3. (SBU) Solid data on CDC performance have not been collected, according to the World Bank, but substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that they perform well, even in some highly insecure areas. The Councils foster community ownership, which tends toward higher quality projects that are better tailored to local needs, less prone to corruption, and less vulnerable to insurgents. According to NSP executive director Wais Barmak, only one of the approximately 2,350 schools built by NSP has burned down. CDCs are also popular; only six communities approached to form a Council have declined. ¶4. (SBU) The Councils face several operational challenges. Their community scope is a strength as well as a weakness, fostering ownership but also limiting the scale of projects. The NSP's district level analogue, the National Area-based Development Program (NABDP),is working to cluster CDCs into District Development Assemblies (DDAs) to help them leverage funds toward larger-scale projects, but brokering these cross-community collaborations has proven difficult and KABUL 00000398 002.4 OF 004 resource intensive. As the CDCs extend into new communities, the World Bank and NSP continue to develop models for working in highly insecure areas. As of September 2007, due to insecurity the NSP had suspended its program in over 700 communities, including much of Helmand and parts of Kandahar. (They recently established CDCs in Musa Qala district.) However, the program has also shown that the Councils can be effective in some of the most dangerous areas that are inaccessible to NGOs and other programs, often because local traditional leaders (including Taliban sympathizers) allow the programs to continue. Better at Development than Representation -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The government formalized the Councils' development project facilitation role through a bylaw enacted by presidential decree in November 2006. CDCs have functioned as informal consultative groups, but the government has considered expanding their role. The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) Secretariat has reached out to the CDCs to play a limited development planning role, making some efforts to include the CDCs' local development priorities in the Provincial Development Plans (PDPs). The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development has also proposed that the CDCs play a political representational role analogous to elected provincial councils, which triggered reactions from several quarters within the government. ¶6. (SBU) While Afghans appreciate the Councils' development role, they do not regard them as representative bodies. Research by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) in six provinces found that communities tend to have little awareness of the Councils except as a means to access NSP funds. When the funds run out the Councils no longer meet. The Councils are not well known or understood outside their membership, since only those serving on the Councils have received training about their purpose. There is also historic skepticism about community councils, as the last government-sanctioned local councils set up under the Mohammad Daud Khan regime (1973-78) evolved into propaganda tools under the Communists, prompting local Afghans to rely even more on their traditional leaders. Afghans continue to rely on community leaders such as maliks, who address problems within the communities, help the government collect taxes, and connect citizens to government services. AREU found that these traditional leaders rarely serve on the Councils, which often span areas that do not correspond with natural political units. These are the leaders that Local Governance Director Popal is deliberately working to engage. CDCs to Remain Civil Society, Not Government -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The funding requirements of NSP III and the creation last August of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) forced the government to confront the question of the future of its NSP program and the CDCs it created. IDLG director Popal inherited from the Ministry of Interior policy oversight and administrative authority over the provincial councils, and ultimately over the elected district, municipal, and village councils required by the Constitution. The IDLG's strategy documents call for a legislative framework by 2010, and for elections to take place soon thereafter. (Rumors that the government plans to hold municipal, district, and village council elections in 2009/10, are probably not accurate.) ¶8. (SBU) Popal understands the Councils better than most Afghans and is sympathetic to their goals. He served as a Deputy Minister of Finance under Ashraf Ghani, who originally invited the World Bank in 2002 to set up the NSP. Immediately prior to his appointment as Local Governance director, Popal had spent several years running a large NGO in Southern Afghanistan that worked with the Rural KABUL 00000398 003.4 OF 004 Development Ministry as one of the facilitating partners for the Councils. His deputy Barna Karimi shared on several occasions that while they support the Councils' development work, Popal's first-hand experience is that the Councils are not representative of local power dynamics. Karimi stressed that the IDLG can learn valuable lessons from the CDCs and draw from their membership for district and village councils, but that they are not composed of the local political leaders that Afghans regard as legitimate and with whom the IDLG needs to work to advance the government's counter-insurgency goals. ¶9. (SBU) Keen to preserve and institutionalize the CDCs, Rural Development Minister Mohammad Zia proposed to the Cabinet last fall that the CDCs transition from civil society entities to formal parts of the government. He proposed that the government develop the CDC bylaws into legislation designating the CDCs -- and their district level counterparts, District Development Assemblies -- as the formal village and district councils required by the Constitution. Zia held a conference from November 11-15 of about 500 CDC members from across Afghanistan ostensibly to share best practices, but also as a show of public support. Popal attended the conference, but withdrew his support as a co-sponsor, and asked President Karzai to refer the issue to the Cabinet Legislative Committee for a decision in late November. With the sole exception of Zia, the rest of the committee -- including its chair, Second Vice President Khalili, and its other members Independent Election Chairman Ludin, Finance Minister Ahady, and Justice Minister Danish -- decided against designating the Councils as government entities, but rather to remain as informal consultative bodies (i.e. part of civil society, not government). Concerns with the integrity of the informal elections that established the Councils, the financial sustainability of future block grants, and a strict interpretation of the Constitution reportedly figured into these ministers' positions. (Popal's ability to prevail in this important internal policy debate also speaks to his clout within the Karzai administration.) Future of NSP Open to Debate, Exposed to Opponents -------------- -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The CDCs will continue in their current role as informal consultative bodies that work with the government on rural development (like NGOs) under the authority of the Ministry of Rural Development. Popal's IDLG plans to implement the Constitution's local governance provisions in a staged approach, first by establishing appointed district councils to engage local leaders in the government's counter-insurgency efforts, and later to replace the appointed councils with elected district, village, and municipal councils as required by the Constitution. ¶11. (SBU) The decision exposes the NSP to those in the government who oppose further funding for the Councils and makes them dependent upon continued donor support. Finance Minister Ahady remains the staunchest opponent to further funding for the CDCs. As Finance Minister, his instinct is to tame the large, donor-driven program in the interest of fiscal sustainability, other spending priorities, and a unified Afghan National Development (ANDS) planning process. Politically, the massive program, which funnels development funds to projects chosen by 20,000 communities across the country, offers little to Ahady and his Afghan Millat party's power base among urban Pashtuns. (Popal is Ahady's deputy in the party, but the two are reportedly rivals for party leadership.) ¶12. (SBU) President Karzai and much of his Cabinet reportedly support the NSP, as does most of the international community. A World Bank representative suggested that donors could help fend off Ahady's opposition by making clear that NSP funding is not fungible; the unique program's success KABUL 00000398 004.4 OF 004 merits funds that would otherwise not be available for other purposes. Failing that, the World Bank representative suggested that Ahady could be given a larger political stake in the program by setting up urban CDCs, but cautioned that urban Councils could draw funds away from NSP III and replicate the role of municipalities, which have clear revenue raising authority and service delivery roles. (Municipal revenue is raised and spent locally, making it the only government revenue that does not flow through the Finance Ministry, providing Ahady with another reason to assert control.) Local Governance deputy Karimi is working with USAID to develop a program to strengthen municipal operations and oversight, and to expand services to urban Afghans. Apart from NSP funds, USAID's Local Governance and Community Development program continues to consult CDCs and support their development priorities. NSP and IDLG Set The Local Governance Agenda -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The dynamics between the Rural Rehabilitation and Development Ministry's efforts to use the Community Development Councils to continue delivering local development while sinking more permanent institutional roots, and Popal's efforts to fully implement the Constitution's local governance provisions, will shape the local governance debate in the Afghan government for the near future. Until Constitutionally mandated district and village councils supplant the CDCs (not likely until well past 2010),an effective Afghan counter-insurgency requires both the community-based development best delivered by the NSP as well as stronger bonds between the central government and local leaders through the appointed representative bodies being set up by Popal. Success depends upon a strategic commitment by the donors. NSP III should be funded. The IDLG also merits financial and political support for its appointed councils, as well as its efforts to increase service delivery through municipalities and other strategic opportunities like its role coordinating the government's follow-up to the military success in Musa Qala. These efforts collectively constitute a coherent local governance agenda and a critical component of the Afghan government's counter-insurgency strategy. ¶14. (SBU) The National Solidarity Program poses an interesting dilemma for the government. It is a successful governmental program that is run largely by non-governmental entities. It enfranchises local leaders but does not connect directly to local government. It is a national development program, but separate from the national development strategy. And it works. We expect that it will continue to work, and that the government will continue to wrestle with the ambiguities of its structure. WOOD