DEPUTY SECRETARY DISCUSSES GOVERNANCE WITH IDLG DIRECTOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003208 DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA NSC FOR WOOD OSD FOR WILKES CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR AF SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY DISCUSSES GOVERNANCE WITH IDLG DIRECTOR ¶1. (SBU) Summary. At their December 11 meeting, Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) Director General Jelani Popal outlined to the Deputy Secretary the country's key sub-national governance challenges: governance capacity-building at the sub-national level, providing sub-national governments with greater control over funding decisions, and security. End summary. -------------- IDLG's Governance Objectives -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Popal said the IDLG is focused both on empowering provincial governors and on making them more accountable to their constituencies through mechanisms such as the Provincial Councils (PCs). This effort will be strengthened when the sub-national governance policy is completed and when laws are crafted to establish and enforce that policy. Popal acknowledged the limited capacity of government officials at the sub-national level, as well as the inability of provincial governors to fire line directors in their provinces. He praised IDLG training for PC members that served to clarify their roles and responsibilities vis-`-vis the other provincial-level government institutions. Popal noted that some PC members mistakenly believed that they possessed auditing authority. ¶3. (SBU) The IDLG has pushed for 25% of provincial budgets to be controlled by provincial governors and Provincial Councils. Popal spoke of the need to establish block funding that would allow District Councils to identify projects to be approved by the provincial government and implemented by the line directorates without requiring national-level authorization for each project. -------------- Security: The Bad and the Good -------------- ¶4. (SBU) On security, Popal estimated approximately 50 districts (out of a total of 364) have security problems, of which 10 districts have "serious" enough problems that district governors are unable to leave their compounds or do not reside in their districts for fear of attack. These 10 districts are located primarily in Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul provinces. In these areas, insecurity has manifested itself in dramatic drops in school attendance. In Kandahar, for example, school attendance has dropped from 140,000 to 40,000 in the past few years. In contrast to national figures, which show rising school attendance, Popal feared that reduced schooling in these provinces would lead to greater numbers of young people who could become susceptible to recruitment by Taliban and criminal elements because they lacked education and economic opportunity. ¶5. (SBU) Popal lauded the improvements in Uruzgan province. A recent Jirga, attended by 1,500 persons, agreed to unite and act against the presence of the Taliban, attacks on schools and development projects, poppy cultivation, and the use of foreign currencies. In addition, the Jirga identified 3,000 recruits from the province for the Afghan National Army (ANA),which currently has minimal representation from the province. ¶6. (SBU) Popal lamented the inability of provincial and district governments to support what he termed as "very bold" community initiatives to improve security. The Afghan government loses face with the local community if it loses trust in the government's ability to protect the community. Popal assessed the majority of the Afghan population as "on the fence" with respect to support for GIRoA, and looking for reasons to jump on the government's side. -------------- Security: Some Possible Approaches -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Popal explained that the fight against the Taliban and the provision of security requires four levels: local community action, Afghan National Police, ANA and the Special Forces. Popal forcefully argued that money spent on security would be most efficiently spent if it enabled the Ministry of Interior and the National Directorate of Security to gather intelligence and those agencies received authority to undertake targeted operations, as KABUL 00003208 002 OF 002 they would see fit, against the Taliban. Popal believed that conventional forces, whether from the ANA, ISAF, or otherwise, would not be able to neutralize Taliban members and that military action only undermined civilian support for GIRoA and the international community. Popal's formula for success combined good intelligence to penetrate the symptoms of the insurgency and good governance to eliminate the root causes of support for the insurgency. ¶8. (SBU) On reconciliation, Popal distinguished between the leadership and core of the Taliban, with whom he said reconciliation was neither possible nor desired, and those that have taken up ARMS because of "our (i.e., GIRoA) own mistakes." Popal believed the GIRoA should make it possible for this latter group to return to society, to reintegrate into their villages and communities, and to have choices for their own futures. This process of reintegration, Popal emphasized, requires that the government engage from a position of strength. Afghanistan's current relative weakness resulted from the Taliban enjoying sanctuary in Pakistan. ¶9. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary's party cleared this cable. WOOD