KARZAI URGES DEPUTY SECRETARY TO SUPPORT ZARDARI,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003198

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D, SCA/FO, SCA/A
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-101 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR ECON AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI URGES DEPUTY SECRETARY TO SUPPORT ZARDARI,
UPBEAT ABOUT INCOMING US FORCES

Classified By: DCM Christopher Dell, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C). In his 12/10 meeting with the Deputy Secretary,
President Karzai urged the United States to give Pakistani
President Zardari more political and economic backing to
strengthen his hand in reforming the Pakistani military and
intelligence services. Karzai welcomed the upcoming increase
in U.S. troops, urged us to deploy them mostly to the South
(particularly Helmand),and made little mention of civilian
casualties. Karzai was optimistic about economic
developments in Afghanistan, particularly on reconstruction
outside of Kabul. On reconciliation, he said Iran may be
trying to undermine the Saudi initiative, though there were
no new developments to undermine. He agreed fall elections
would be in the best interests of the country.

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Pakistan: US needs to help Zardari
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2. (C) Karzai told the Deputy that Zardari needed more help
from the United States. &He feels left alone.8 Zardari
was a leader willing to take risks ) he was a &gutsy
fellow8 ) but needed greater political and financial
backing from the United States. Karzai urged the United
States to &make Pakistan,s bank full,8 both to attract
foreign investment and to strengthen Zardari,s hand to
reform the military and ISI. Karzai believed Zardari was
starting to get labeled &anti-Pakistan8 by some in the
Pakistani media because he was going against the army.


3. (C) Karzai characterized his relations with both Zardari
and PM Gilani as excellent, and said that tone was carrying
through to relations between the countries, respective
foreign ministers and national security advisors. He would
take a &wait and see8 posture on relations between
intelligence agencies, though he noted that NDS Director
Saleh had met ISI Director General Pasha in November.


4. (C) The Deputy and Karzai condemned the Mumbai terrorist
incident. Karzai did not believe ISI had ceased support for
Lashkar-e-Tabiya. If ISI were telling the truth, however, he
was troubled over how it could be blind to such sophisticated
training occurring in Pakistan. Karzai said Zardari and
Gilani both sought improved ties to India. The Deputy agreed
improved ties were in Pakistan,s interest, particularly
given Pakistan,s economic problems. Karzai was unhappy the
Saudis were not providing any economic help to Pakistan and
asserted the PRC was withholding financial support because
Zardari had spoken publicly about improving ties with India.

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Karzai welcomes U.S. troop increase ) send them to Helmand
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5. (C) Karzai called 2008 a difficult year in the fight
against the Taliban. The Deputy told Karzai that our planned
troop increase in the coming year affirmed the U.S.
commitment to continue working with Afghanistan on the
security front. Karzai urged the United States to deploy the
troops to the South, where the insecurity was the worst, with
a particular emphasis on Helmand. Karzai asserted that the
United States should never have left Helmand or Kandahar.


6. (C) The Deputy affirmed that Washington had the funding to
support expansion of the Afghan army, the two countries had a
plan, and the plan was working. Karzai welcomed U.S.
assistance on training, and hoped we could accelerate the
training timeline. Karzai agreed with the Deputy,s
suggestion that a larger Afghan force could reduce the risk
of civilian casualties. Karzai recommended the two countries
concentrate on strengthening the police. Reform of the
judiciary, on the other hand, would take time.


7. (C) The Deputy welcomed the troop increases for both the
United States and the Afghan army. He hoped the strengthened
security forces would enable Afghanistan to give some more
energy to the counter-narcotics effort. Karzai contended
that Afghanistan had done well last year in areas where it
exercised control, citing Nangarhar and Badakshan. He stated
that Helmand was the center of the disease. Cure things
there and Afghanistan would be in perfect shape, Karzai
claimed.

KABUL 00003198 002 OF 002



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Karzai upbeat on economic situation
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8. (U) Karzai was enthusiastic about economic developments in
the country, particularly outside of Kabul. Many rural
Afghans had told him they were happy with new infrastructure
) roads, schools, clinics. To measure commercial
developments, he regularly asked local officials about
numbers of small shops in their districts. He cited one
Paktya district that went from 400 shops in 2002 to 1600 in

2005. A village in Kapisa went from zero shops in 2004 to
380 this year.


9. (SBU) Karzai pointed to an increase in annual government
revenues from USD 120 million in 2003 to USD 800 million in

2008. He also claimed Afghanistan had USD 3.4 billion in
reserves, more than Pakistan had.

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Reconciliation: Minimal activity
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10. (C) Karzai told the Deputy there had been no new
developments on reconciliation since the 9/14 trilateral
meeting among King Abdullah, Zardari and Karzai. He
characterized the Saudi-led effort as his own initiative. He
welcomed the Saudis, role, given their influence over the
Taliban, and was pleased with improved Saudi-Afghan ties. He
believed those strengthened relations had resulted in
increased contact with others in the Arab world, including
Egypt, as well as cooler ties with Iran. Karzai told the
Deputy about reports that Iran was trying to meet with
Pakistan in Dubai to conceive a plan to undermine the Saudi
reconciliation effort.


11. (C) Karzai said progress on the Saudi initiative was slow
because the King was cautious. Karzai sensed the United
States was not fully backing the Saudi effort. He urged the
United States not only to back the Saudis, but also to become
more involved (nfi).


12. (C) Karzai reaffirmed that Afghanistan would undertake
reconciliation only within the country,s constitutional
framework. He raised his public pledge to protect Mullah
Omar if he agreed to talks. Karzai interpreted the absence
of a response as a sign that Omar had no authority to
respond, and therefore the Taliban was a leaderless movement.
Who was then directing the movement? Karzai asserted the
trail led back to the Pakistani ISI.

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Fall election date better on security grounds
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13. (C) Karzai informed the Deputy that he had given the
Independent Election Commission full authority to set the
election date. The constitution called for a spring date,
but there had been a political agreement last April to set
the date for fall 2009. Karzai argued that a spring date
would be better for him, as there would be no question over
expired executive authorities if the election were held after
his term (according to the constitution) expired in May. For
security of the election and stability of the country,
however, a fall date would be in the best interest of the
country.


14. The Deputy Secretary's party cleared this cable.
DELL