NATO SECGEN VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN, NOVEMBER 26 -

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 003175

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV NATO AF
SUBJECT: NATO SECGEN VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN, NOVEMBER 26 -
27, 2008

Classified By: ACTING DCM VALERIE C. FOWLER FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. (SBU) Summary: NATO Secretary General (SYG) Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer followed a shortened schedule during his November
26-27 visit to Afghanistan but achieved his substantive
purposes. He met with President Karzai and other senior
Afghan leaders, UNAMA head Kai Eide, and a visiting UN
Security Council delegation. He also visited the U.S.-le PRT
in Jalalabad and the Khyber Border Coordination Center. The
NATO SecGen delivered a strong private message to Afghan
officials on the importance of the 2009 presidential
elections. End Summary.


2. (SBU) On December 1, Ambassador Gentilini, the NATO Senior
Civilian Representative (SCR),briefed the NATO Caucus in
Kabul on the November 26-27 visit to Afghanistan of NATO
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. The SCR said that
the SYG returned early to Brussels to chair the NAC and
regretted that he was unable to keep his planned meetings at
the Lithuanian PRT in Chaghcharan, the U.S. PRT in Farah, and
the French FOB Tora. Nevertheless, the SYG met with President
Karzai, Speaker of the Lower House Qanooni, UN Special
Representative Kai Eide, and a visiting UN Security Council
delegation. The SYG believed that those exchanges, several
briefings and press opportunities, and trips to the U.S. PRT
in Jalalabad and the Khyber Border Coordination Center
(KBCC),had allowed him to meet his goals on substance.


3. (C) The day before the SYG's November 26 one-on-one
meeting and a wider dinner with the President, President
Karzai had publicly called for a "timeline for withdrawal" in
the presence of a UNSC delegation. Karzai shifted away from
this demand with de Hoop Scheffer by explaining he had only
meant a timeline for "success or victory." Other topics in
their conversation included the need for better international
cooperation and Karzai's sense that some PRTs were
unhelpfully engaged in "parallel governance." The SYG advised
Karzai to put things in the context that with a new U.S.
administration, this was the time to build new relations, not
to level sharp criticism at friends and allies. On elections,
Karzai reportedly told de Hoop Scheffer that he was under
pressure because of difficult circumstances in Helmand and
Ghazni, but remained committed to hold elections in 2009. At
their joint press conference, however, Karzai continued with
criticisms of the international community effort and
especially sent a tough message on civilian casualties.


4. (C) The SYG's meeting with Speaker Qanooni focused on
elections. Qanooni said that the usual debate over whether
the Constitution requires Spring elections was a false one.
He said the reality was that many senior Afghans in
Parliament do not want early elections and are looking for
excuses to postpone them. He suggested that one way to
manage them would be a Karzai gesture, perhaps a visit by the
President to Parliament, or an initiative seeking a
Constitutional amendment on the election timing. The SYG,
who publicly stuck to the line that the elections timing was
up to the Afghans to decide, privately took a more direct
position. He reportedly made it clear to Qanooni (and
Karzai) that the best choice for elections was "shortly after
summer." De Hoop Scheffer described presidential elections
as a "must" for 2009, the most important objective ahead.
NATO publics would not understand why elections could be held
in 2004 and not in 2009. Besides, elections would serve to
legitimize the victor and turn around a sour public mood.
Qanooni replied that he understood perfectly and would remain
flexible.


5. (SBU) In a brief meeting with Interior Minister Atmar, the
SYG discussed police reform and development. Atmar pressed
for more "Afghanization" of the process and a greater
investment in the intelligence capacity of the Afghan
National Police (ANP). The SYG explained NATO's Oplan in
support of the ANP. He also invited Atmar to NATO to meet
with the NAC on the morning of December 10, 2008.


6. (SBU) The SYG reportedly was very impressed at seeing
Afghans and Pakistanis working closely together to monitor
border activity at the Khyber Border Coordination Center
(KBCC).


7. (SBU) De Hoop Scheffer also met with the UN Security
Council delegation. Reportedly they emphasized their desire
for a UN-led effort in Afghanistan and pledged to provide the
UNAMA Mission and UNSR Kai Eide with the resources to

coordinate the civilian aspects of international activities
here. The SYG held a separate meeting with Kai Eide, about
which Ambassador Gentilini said only that it was "as usual,
frank and open."
DELL