The Details of Evolving the PRT Model in Afghanistan

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002970 DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA AGRICULTURE FOR EATON NSC FOR WOOD OSD FOR WILKES CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD EFIN AF MOPS KDEM PINS SUBJECT: The Details of Evolving the PRT Model in Afghanistan REF: KABUL 2784 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Reftel lays out the Mission's ideas for evolving the PRT model in Afghanistan and expanding our civilian support for Operation Enduring Freedom. This message provides a more in-depth look at the structures outlined in Kabul 2784, detailing the new initiatives and tailored growth we propose, and the accompanying policy issues. As part of this proposal, we advocate evolving our presence at the Italian-led PRT in Herat into a Regional Embassy Office. This message establishes the staffing we need to help create transformational effects; decisions on the geographical placement of new civilians will be made in consultation with the military. A key concept behind this proposal is devolving authority and financial resources downrange to enable the new personnel to implement strategic programs in support of Mission objectives. ¶2. (SBU) We recommend expanding our civilian presence with particular emphasis in the provinces and districts. In addition to existing PRTs with U.S. representation, we propose to: ensure all existing PRTs have State, USAID and USDA representation; establish Provincial Governance and Development Offices with economic, development, and agriculture experts in three of the more stable provinces of RC-East; enhance U.S. civilian representation at current U.S. Brigade Task Forces and provide U.S. civilian staff to new U.S. Brigade Task Forces as they are stood up; establish four new U.S. PRTs in priority locations; establish regional platforms for USAID technical offices at the Regional Command headquarters; create District Reconstruction Teams (DRTs) to provide capacity-building support to district-level governance and stabilization; form Fly-Away Teams to seize counterinsurgency (COIN) windows of opportunity; and establish specialized Tribal Engagement Teams. The total number of new American positions proposed is 215, comprised of 82 State, 105 USAID and 28 USDA positions. End summary. -------------- New Initiatives -------------- ¶3. (SBU) New PRTs. This proposal incorporates support for civilian PRT staffing in three provinces where the U.S. military (or coalition forces) may establish a presence, including Dai Kundi and Nimroz. Currently, the Parwan/Kapisa PRT exists as a combined PRT based at Bagram Air Field, with permanent USAID and USDA positions; CJTF-101 anticipates splitting the responsibilities to create PRTs in each province, and we propose to support each PRT with State, USAID and USDA positions. Finally, we recommend creating a PRT in Kabul city: USAID is reviewing its Mission Strategy, and a Kabul PRT would enable USAID to enhance its Kabul-based urban services programs and initiatives in the world's fastest growing city. ¶4. (SBU) REO Herat. We advocate evolving our presence at the Italian-led PRT in Herat into a Regional Embassy Office (REO),led by a Principal Officer (re-hatting the State PRT Officer) with two political/economic positions and one each for consular, public diplomacy, diplomatic security, rule of law, and USAID. These eight positions would all be FSOs. The USAID representative would complement the work of the eight USAID representatives we propose locating at RC-West, also in Herat. ¶5. (SBU) Community/tribal engagement. In addition to the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) described in reftel, we recommend adding tribal/cultural engagement experts to extend and deepen our understanding of and engagement with tribal and traditional leadership structures. These experts would also play supportive roles in conflict transformation, peace building efforts and improving essential linkages between the tribes and local formal government institutions. We would build six Tribal Engagement Teams, with a total staffing of six State and 12 USAID American positions. We would anticipate using these experts principally in the Pashtun areas of RC-East and RC-South, and foresee the need to be flexible about their locations to respond to changing needs over time. They would operate out of existing U.S. platforms (such as brigade headquarters, PRTs, DRTs, etc.) as circumstances warrant. KABUL 00002970 002 OF 003 ¶6. (SBU) District Reconstruction Teams. We recommend creating 20 DRTs, each with an American and Afghan representative for State and USAID. DRTs would provide localized platforms for civilians to engage and mentor sub-provincial GIRoA governance structures as well as local and community leaders. The DRTs would be located in "tipping point" districts in provinces with multiple population centers requiring consistent attention, or where a critical window of opportunity exists for the DRT to effectively target attention on a population center. As such, the locations of the DRTs will depend largely on joint assessment and consultation among U.S. provincial-level civilian, military and GIRoA leadership. Each DRT would be established after a joint decision by the Ambassador and COMUSFOR-A, or their designees, based on consultations with Bagram. ¶7. (SBU) Fly-Away Teams. We would establish four Fly-Away Teams, each with State and USAID representatives; USDA would staff as required from in-country staff. Drawing on the experience of OTI with quick impact, rapid disbursing and limited time on site, Fly-Away Teams would be modeled after USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (DART) Teams. These specialty Teams would closely follow on military operations after areas are cleared and moving into the "hold" phase. These teams would rapidly assess needs and organize community programs to provide essential services and community action programs to forward COIN efforts and foster stability in communities. Fly-Away Teams would have access to rapid program development and implementation mechanisms in order to have immediate POSITIVE impact. ¶8. (SBU) Rule of Law. An important component of increased American civilian support should be rule of law (ROL) expertise. We see inherent value in creating sub-national positions with responsibilities for shaping and implementing U.S. and international efforts for ROL comprehensively throughout the country to advance our strategic goals. These officers could, for example, mentor Afghan provincial officials on the importance of ROL, help the military design ROL components into CERP building efforts (e.g., include a courthouse with district center "green zones") and support "circuit rider" judges for provinces with inadequate numbers of judicial officials. We propose placing ROL expertise at targeted U.S.-led PRTs, at each of the current U.S. brigades, and in Bamyan, Herat, Kandahar, Kunduz, and Mazar-e Sharif to support key non-U.S. led PRTs located near Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism (PJCM) offices. ROL experts may be INL or Department of Justice staff, FSOs, or LNAs. -------------- Staffing -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Kabul. We propose adding State, USAID and USDA PRT positions at both the embassy and the Kabul PRT. In addition, we would need to incorporate new Mission support and management positions into existing Mission ICASS structures in order to support the civilian surge in the field, including an increase in RSO staffing. As mentioned in reftel, we would also need added housing and office space and an increase in air assets. ¶10. (SBU) RC-Headquarters and U.S. Brigades. At each of the four Regional Commands, USAID proposes establishing eight-person platforms consisting of technical office representatives, a supervisor and a support position. In addition to current State positions, we propose supporting current U.S. Brigades with a rule of law expert, a USAID representative and a USDA position. And we propose supporting each incoming U.S. Brigade with four State positions and four USAID Technical Advisors. As is the case with coalition-led PRTs (see para 13 below),we will need to reach an understanding with allies regarding support for additional positions at coalition-led Regional Commands. ¶11. (SBU) Provincial Level. We would ensure all existing PRTs have State, USAID and USDA representation. In Nangarhar, Bamyan and Panjshir, we would boost our American presence and establish Provincial Governance and Development Offices to ensure that greater economic/development focus is brought to bear on these more stable provinces (this would supplement, not replace, the PRTs, which KABUL 00002970 003 OF 003 continue to have important security, civil affairs, ADT and other related functions). At targeted non-U.S.-led PRTs, State would add a second American position. State, USAID and USDA would each create one American position at each of the potential new PRTs in Dai Kundi, Nimroz and Parwan. The Kabul PRT would consist of one State and two USAID positions. ¶12. (SBU) Staffing Mechanisms. In terms of FSO vice LNA positions, State and USAID would like to integrate FSOs throughout the country to mentor/supervise/manage LNA hires. Our proposal calls for approximately 56% FSOs for State, and approximately 30% FSOs for USAID. The total number of new positions proposed is 82 for State, 105 for USAID and 28 for USDA. We are forwarding to SCA a detailed breakdown of our staffing proposal, including locally-engaged staff (LES) positions. -------------- Policy Issues -------------- ¶13. (SBU) MOU with coalition allies. In order to take full advantage of the additional U.S. investment in PRTs, we will need to pin down the responsibilities of host governments at coalition-led PRTs. Absent codification of issues including force protection and life support, our allies may not be prepared to support an increased civilian presence. As a matter of policy, we have recommended against creating bilateral MOUs. To establish an increased civilian presence on a sound, regularized footing, we recommend that Washington establish a standard MOU with our coalition partners, detailing payment for specific services at PRTs. We request Washington advise on the way ahead for an MOU. ¶14. (SBU) In order for our civilian representatives in the field to be most effective, we will need additional resources for these positions. We will devolve authority and financial resources downrange to enable the new personnel to implement strategic programs in support of Mission objectives. ¶15. (SBU) We recognize that these proposals entail significant force and infrastructure implications for the military. Nonetheless, we believe these proposals are consistent with the level of effort to which we are committed in Afghanistan and are key to conducting a successful counter-insurgency campaign. WOOD