INSURGENTS THWART WFP'S AID DELIVERY TO JAWAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002821

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
MADRID FOR POL
ROME FODAG
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2013
TAGS: EFIN ETRD PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: INSURGENTS THWART WFP'S AID DELIVERY TO JAWAND
DISTRICT IN BADGHIS PROVINCE

Classified By: PRT Director Valerie Fowler for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. From October 10 to October 13, Spanish ISAF
soldiers from PRT Qal-e-Now, along with Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF),escorted a 25-truck convoy with
approximately 300 tons of World Food Program (WFP) and
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) food aid over mountainous and
insecure terrain destined for the remote western district of
Jawand. Although Spanish and Afghan forces successfully
defended the convoy from significant small arms attacks, with
at least 26 insurgents killed, WFP representatives from Kabul
called off the mission on October 12, with the convoy stopped
approximately 25 km outside of Jawand's district center.
Without the much-anticipated aid, Jawand's population, the
majority already suffering the effects of this year's
devastating drought, face an uncertain future as winter
approaches. End Summary.

--------------
World Food Program Convoy Turns Back
--------------


2. (C) Extensive meetings with Badghis provincial officials
over a three-week period culminated in UNAMA's confirmation
that the WFP in Herat would transfer approximately 260 tons
of food to Qal-e-Now for distribution throughout Jawand
district. The Ministry of Agriculture, through its
provincial line ministry, contributed approximately 40 tons
of wheat to the Jawand convoy. In addition, the Ministry of
Education contributed one truck with school supplies, the PRT
another with humanitarian aid, and the Afghan National Police
(ANP) another with food and police provisions for their
officers in the district.


3. (C) On October 10 approximately 100 Spanish ISAF troops
from PRT Qal-e-Now, Afghan National Army (ANA) and ANP forces
provided security for a 25-truck food convoy that departed
Qal-e-Naw for the 105 km trip to Jawand district center. On
October 11 a group of insurgents attacked the convoy's
security escorts and two insurgents were killed in the
subsequent exchange of fire. Insurgents mounted a larger and
more sustained attack on the security forces the following
day after the convoy passed through Gulchin and slowly headed
towards the notoriously insecure Darzack Pass. This attack
resulted in the deaths of twenty-four insurgents, six killed
by combat air support (CAS) and eighteen by attack
helicopters. The Darzack area is particularly treacherous
for convoys because of the need to negotiate extremely high
mountains and a narrow bottleneck above the Murghab River,
with no possible escape route if attacked.


4. (C) In light of mounting insurgent attacks, and given the
anticipated dangers associated with crossing the Darzack
Pass, WFP requested the convoy return to Qal-e-Now. On
October 13 the provincial Deputy Governor and Jawand district
administrator, as well as the NDS and the ANP Chiefs,
attempted to negotiate an agreement with locals in Darzack to
guarantee the convoy's safe passage to Jawand district
center. Unable to reach an agreement, it was necessary for
Badghis provincial officials and Spanish ISAF forces to
accept the WFP's petition to terminate the mission to Jawand.
The convoy and security forces turned back just 25 km short
of Jawand's district center.

--------------
WFP and ISAF Offer Differing Accounts
--------------


5. (C) WFP,s official account of the events surrounding the
humanitarian assistance convoy differs vastly from ISAF,s.
A statement issued by ISAF on October 11 read, "(i)nsurgents
attacked a World Food Programme convoy in Jawand District,
Badghis, this morning. Escorting ISAF forces defended the
convoy... The insurgents attacked the convoy of trucks
contracted by WFP with the aim of disrupting food aid

KABUL 00002821 002 OF 002


deliveries." A WFP spokesperson from WFP,s information
office in Kabul, however, rejected ISAF,s account of the
events, stating "the WFP convoy in Badghis was not attacked."
The WFP spokesperson maintained that the organization had
not requested a security escort from ISAF and that no ISAF
escort had been with the convoy. (Note: The USAID
representative to the Spanish PRT accompanied the convoy to
Jawand and confirmed that Spanish forces did provide a
security escort and that the convoy was attacked repeatedly
during the mission to Jawand.)

--------------
Potential Humanitarian Crisis Looms
--------------


6. (C) The convoy's failure to reach Jawand district center
threatens to undermine the provincial government's and the
PRT's credibility in carrying out their mission in Badghis.
Although ISAF and provincial security forces successfully
defended the convoy from insurgent attacks, the convoy's
inability to reach Jawand district center will likely be
viewed by many as further evidence of the provincial
government's weak influence in outlying districts and proof
of growing support for the insurgency among the local
population.


7. (C) The threat posed to ISAF's and the provincial
government's future effort in Badghis is overshadowed by the
potentially devastating effect the mission's failure will
likely have on the impoverished and isolated people of Jawand
district. Already suffering severe food shortages due to an
unusually harsh drought, the local population faces even
greater isolation and food insecurity as winter approaches.
Given the district's extreme remoteness, the provincial
government faces a potential humanitarian crisis in Jawand,
one that it is ill-equipped to handle.

--------------
Ramifications of the WFP Decision
--------------


8. (C) The mission's failure represents an opportune public
relations moment for insurgents throughout Badghis. While
Spanish ISAF forces preferred to press on, mindful of the
potential casualties such an effort posed, they and
provincial authorities were obligated to terminate the
mission at the behest of the WFP, which strongly argued that
its neutrality would be compromised among local Afghans if
further gunfights ensued between security forces and
insurgents en route to Jawand's district center. What WFP
failed to consider, perhaps, is the negative long-term effect
this decision is likely to have, not just on Jawand's
population, but also on the mission of ISAF and the
provincial government.
WOOD