Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KABUL2746
2008-10-12 12:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

U.S., U.K., FRENCH AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS DISCUSS

Tags:  PREL PTER AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4418
OO RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2746/01 2861212
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121212Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5797
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002746 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: U.S., U.K., FRENCH AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS DISCUSS
SAUDI RECONCILIATION TALKS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002746

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: U.S., U.K., FRENCH AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS DISCUSS
SAUDI RECONCILIATION TALKS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. On October 9, French Ambassador Jean de
Ponton d'Amecourt met with U.S., British and German
Ambassadors to discuss his October 6 briefing by President
Karzai on the recent reconciliation meetings in Saudi Arabia.
The Ambassadors agreed that the publicity and lack of
clarity surrounding the Saudi talks may indicate this is at
best an embryonic reconciliation effort. The French
Ambassador implied his government is leaning forward on this
issue, adding that points drawn from this discussion would
strengthen his guidance to Paris to approach the Saudi
process with caution and skepticism.

KARZAI BRIEFING TO FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON SAUDI TALKS
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Karzai told the French Ambassador the Afghan
delegation to Saudi Arabia was led by his brother Qayum,
former Kandahar Governor Asadullah Khalid and Abdullah Anas.
(Anas has been working on this initiative for the past year.)
On the Saudi side, Dr. Mansour, advisor to King Abdullah,
and Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, Saudi Intelligence Chief, were the
point men. Karzai was quick to point out that the officials
on the respective delegations were not the key interlocutors
in the Saudi talks. Instead, a "group of mullahs" (both pro-
and anti-government) were chosen to engage in talks with
other mullahs and "Islamic scholars associated with the
mujahideen." Karzai emphasized the key potential role of
Saudi clerics: "If I ask these mullahs to travel a difficult
stony path, there would be little obedience, but if a Saudi
mullah asks them, they will go, no question." The timing of
the meetings had been planned to generate minimum notice;
many of those who participated did so while traveling to
Saudi Arabia as part of a traditional Ramadan pilgrimage.
Karzai added that the next meeting in Saudi Arabia will be
during the Haj.


3. (C) Karzai told the French that the Taliban had set no
conditions other than guarantees of safety for themselves and
their families. He said Pakistan opposition leader Nawaz

Sharif had not participated in the talks. According to the
French Ambassador, Karzai did not otherwise discuss the
content or structure of the talks, except to indicate that
the officials and the mullahs had engaged in separate tracks.
(New German Ambassador Werner Lauk reported that this
briefing was virtually the same one he received from Karzai.)


4. (C) The French Ambassador also noted that Karzai asked
that President Sarkozy weigh in with King Abdullah to
encourage the Saudis' engagement in this effort.
Reconciliation with the Taliban would be a lengthy process,
said Karzai, and the Saudis were inclined to move slowly.

RECONCILIATION EFFORT OR POLITICAL THEATER?
--------------


5. (C) The U.S., British and French Ambassadors questioned
the depth of both Afghan and Saudi commitment to this
process. According to Ponton d'Amecourt, the Saudis told the
French that King Abdullah did not want to associate himself
too closely with the Taliban talks. The Ambassadors also
agreed the high-profile media coverage, including public
comments by Qayum Karzai, undermined the idea that these are
serious negotiations. British Ambassador Sherard
Cowper-Cowles commented there was likely "less than meets the
eye" to the Saudi talks, that serious peace negotiations
would be held secretly. He speculated that Karzai's motives
in pushing the talks might have more to do with building his
pre-election political base than advancing reconciliation.


6. (C) Ambassador Wood pointed out that Karzai appeared more
enthusiastic about cultivating direct ties to Saudi Arabia
and the royal family than promoting reconciliation. Karzai
had also expressed interest in exploring how Saudi influence
could "restrain" Pakistan.

GERMAN AMBASSADOR: RECONCILIATION MUST START SOMEWHERE
-------------- --------------


7. (C) The German Ambassador suggested the Saudi talks could
potentially form the basis of successful reconciliation. He
argued that "80 percent of the Taliban just want decent
lives" and to return to mainstream society. Saudi Arabia had
the credibility to bring them to the negotiating table. He
agreed the current high-profile push might be motivated by

KABUL 00002746 002 OF 002


political competition between the Northern Alliance and
Karzai camps, but said that, at the moment, "there is no
other way forward." While skeptical of progress in the near
term, the British Ambassador agreed the Saudi channel should
be kept open as the participants were likely the same ones
who would one day engage in meaningful reconciliation
negotiations.

U.S. WILL NEITHER SUPPORT NOR OPPOSE
--------------


8. (C) The French Ambassador asked the other Ambassadors for
their positions; did they feel they could support the Saudi
talks in principle? Ambassador Wood said there was too
little information for the U.S. to endorse the process now,
but that did not mean the U.S. was opposed either - only that
more information is needed to develop an informed position.
The British Ambassador agreed, adding his concern that Karzai
might "give away the store" based on political motivations.


SAUDI PROCESS SHOULD BE VIEWED WITH SKEPTICISM - FOR NOW
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The Ambassadors agreed too little was known about the
talks in Saudi to merit support of the process at this time.
The French Ambassador confided that he appreciated the points
of caution and skepticism supplied by the other Ambassadors,
saying they would lend support to his own guidance to Paris.
(The clear implication was that the French government is
leaning forward in terms of supporting the Saudi process.)
The British Ambassador made a similar comment, noting that on
occasion he needed to moderate Foreign Secretary Miliband's
enthusiasm.

WOOD