PAKTIKA: COMPLAINTS ABOUT ANP MANPOWER ALLOCATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 002627 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA NSC FOR WOOD OSD FOR WILKES CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2013 TAGS: PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: PAKTIKA: COMPLAINTS ABOUT ANP MANPOWER ALLOCATION IN FOCUSED DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS Classified By: Acting DCM Alan Yu for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Citizens and government officials in Paktika's two Focused District Development (FDD) districts, Mata Khan and Sar Hawza, complain about problems with manpower allocation created by Paktika's ANP commander. Due in a large part to diversion of manpower resources, citizens and officials say the program is failing to meet their expectations. On the positive side, Sar Hawza District leaders say that after FDD, the officers are better trained and equipped than their predecessors and demonstrate superior policing and investigative skills. MG Mullah Khel, Paktika's ANP commander, directed approximately 35 police officers to Sharana instead of allowing them to take their posts alongside their FDD-trained colleagues. Authorities have deployed those officers to their original postings but a number of other factors have caused chronic understaffing. -------------- DISCUSSION -------------- ¶2. (C) District leaders in Sar Hawza stated that the new police officers, many of whom hail from Kunduz Province, are indeed better-trained and better-equipped than their predecessors. They clearly demonstrate superior policing and investigative skills than the force in place prior to FDD training. However, these gains are offset in the minds of the people when they observe the police charging illegal tolls or harassing local vendors and citizens. The District Administrator suggested that FDD training should include additional ethics modules to address these issues. Currently, the FDD includes 10 hours of training on police officers' ethical and moral responsibilities. In Mata Khan, District leaders were less negative in their assessment, though the fact that many police officers were not serving at their duty station severely limited the force's ability to patrol and react to incidents within the district. ¶3. (C) In turn, ANP officers from both districts complain that too many of their colleagues have been siphoned off to Sharana and elsewhere. MG Mullah Khel initially resisted efforts by Police Mentoring Teams (PMT) to return the full complement of FDD-trained officers to their respective districts. Even after he acquiesced, following a tense conversation with Governor Khpalwak, he delayed action for several weeks before finally agreeing to return the officers and equipment that had been diverted to Sharana. It is not known at this time if the Provincial Chief of Police diverted manpower resources, for political or security reasons. ¶4. (C) The Sar Hawza ANP team, which suffered a crippling blow on August 8 when an IED killed five officers and the District Chief of Police, complained that it was unable to respond to the IED attack or pursue the Anti-Afghan Forces that planted it because its numbers had been cut to 36, half of the normal ANP contingent assigned to the district. At present, Mata Khan has even fewer officers, just 28. PMTs confirm that neither district has enjoyed full staffing due to significant security threats along the main highway between Ghazni and Sharana that prevent officers returning from leave. The removal of some officers due to drug use, and the diversion of officers to Sharana mentioned above also contribute to the staffing shortage. DELL