SUBJECT: URUZGAN STRONGMAN ACCEPTS KABUL OFFER TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002449

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: URUZGAN STRONGMAN ACCEPTS KABUL OFFER TO
COMMAND HIGHWAY PATROL KANDAK

Classified By: Acting DCM James Van Laningham for reasons 1.4 (B) and (
D)


1. (C) Summary: Former Provincial highway police (then known
as Kandak Amniat-e Uruzgan (KAU)) commander Matiullah Khan
said in an August 23 meeting that he accepted the recent
offer by Karzai and Ministry of the Interior (MOI) head
Moqbel to lead a police patrol kandak responsible for highway
security in Uruzgan Province of 640 patrolmen that would
report directly to the Regional Chief of Police. After the
disbandment of KAU, Khan operated as the de facto highway
security force, but his official status was unclear. Khan
and approximately 350 of his patrolmen were registered as
part of Provincial Chief of Police Ghul,s ANP tashkil, but
Ghul admitted that Khan was a subordinate in name only. Khan
said the new configuration &tracked8 more closely with the
situation on the ground. However, Khan,s unparalleled
wealth and reputation as an effective counterinsurgent have
made him an even more valuable target for the Taliban and,
ironically, may have put serious strains on his relationship
with uncle and former mentor, Jan Mohammad Khan (JMK). The
relatively young Khan has grown as an undeniable force in
Uruzgan, but even his supporters acknowledge that strongmen
like Khan cannot and should not figure in a stable and
democratic Afghanistan. End summary.

Highway Police Matiullah Khan Gets Promoted (
--------------


2. (C) In an August 23 meeting with PRTOFF, highway security
commander Matiullah Khan confirmed that Kabul authorized
Uruzgan a police patrol kandak responsible for highway
security of 640 patrolmen that would report directly to the
Regional Chief of Police (RCoP) General Wahdat. Following
the dissolution of the Afghan Highway Police (KAU),the MOI
nominally placed Khan and 350 MOI-registered highway
patrolmen in Uruzgan under the authority of Provincial Chief
of Police (PCoP) Jumma Ghul. (Note: Khan reportedly has at
least 1,000 more patrolmen working for him but are not
registered or paid by MOI.) Khan admitted ) and Ghul
confirmed ) that the chain of command was ambiguous at best
and suggested that the new configuration &tracked8 more
closely with reality and was recognition of &the fact that
he is the only effective security force in the province.8


3. (C) Prior to Khan,s recent promotion, President Karzai
and MOI Minister Moqbel had summoned Khan, Governor Hamdam,
Ghul, ANA Provincial Commander General Hafizuddin, and former
Uruzgan governor and de facto power broker Jan Mohammad Khan
(JMK) to discuss Matiullah Khan,s future. Governor Hamdam
and Ghul told PRT Tarin Kowt in separate conversations that
Karzai and MOI were making a last-ditch effort to exert some
control over Khan,s operations, while acknowledging his
&elevation in stature and penchant for independence.8 The
provincial security leaders all cast serious doubt on Khan,s
willingness to submit to the RCoP,s command. The consensus
here is that Khan, who is widely respected for his operations
against insurgents and his strong support for Karzai, will
continue to be viewed in Kabul as a &force for good,8 in
spite of his reputation as a ruthless thief and killer. Khan
is by far the wealthiest man in the province, reportedly
earning USD 500,000 - 650,000 per month for providing
security on the Tarin Kowt-Kandahar highway to businesses and
NGOs, and will continue to operate outside the MOI chain of
command.

(But at What Price?
--------------


4. (C) Khan,s meteoric rise in prominence and stature has
not come without cost. Taliban attacks against Khan have
intensified in recent days. Khan excused himself from the
August 23 meeting when he had received a tip that a suicide
bomber was planning to kill him and/or members of his family
that same evening. Only one hour after our meeting, Khan
told us that the suicide bomber approached his compound
(located 1000 meters away from the PRT),but his security
forces shot the attacker before he reached the compound gate.
The attacker managed to detonate the bomb but was not within

KABUL 00002449 002 OF 002


blast range of the compound; there were no reported
casualties other than the attacker.


5. (C) Moreover, Khan,s wealth and political independence
have possibly created fissures in his relationship with his
uncle and mentor JMK. Hamdam, who maintains contact with JMK
and Khan, told the PRT that 38 year-old Khan no longer
considers himself a follower of JMK; they are now equals.
Khan also told Hamdam that he believes JMK in the past took
advantage of Khan,s &youth and immaturity8 to wage war
against JMK,s enemies in the Ghilzai tribe (JMK and Khan are
Populzai). As a result, Hamdam claimed, Khan has put some
distance between JMK and himself.


6. (C) PCoP Ghul, who continues to follow JMK,s lead, also
claimed that Khan and JMK are no longer as close as they used
to be, but Ghul blamed Khan,s greed and intent on
strengthening his direct ties to Karzai and other national
leaders in an effort to usurp JMK as the sole de facto leader
of Uruzgan. For example, Ghul reported that only days ago
Khan received directly from the MOI ten RPG launchers, 308
RPG rounds, and 27 Ford Ranger trucks, while Ghul received
only ten RPG launchers, 54 RPG rounds, and eight Ranger
trucks for the entire province.


7. (C) Ghul reminded us that Khan had been offered several
key positions in the province, including ANA kandak
commander, but he turned them all down. Although Khan has
given his consent to this latest offer, Ghul predicted that
Khan ultimately would continue to operate outside the law.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Most political and security leaders in the province
applaud Kabul,s effort to establish greater control over
Khan,s illegal highway patrol, but few doubt that Khan will
drop his loyalty to Kabul if and when his business and
political interests diverge from those of Kabul. Khan is
clearly a shrewd (if not unscrupulous) businessman and works
closely with Coalition Forces to disrupt Taliban operations.
However, even Khan,s supporters, such as Hamdam, acknowledge
that such strongmen (including JMK) cannot and should not
play a prominent role in Afghanistan,s political future.
WOOD