Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KABUL2429
2008-09-04 12:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
AMBASSADOR AND SRSG EIDE AGREE ON NEXT STEPS ON
how-toVZCZCXRO5245 OO RUEHPW DE RUEHBUL #2429 2481241 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 041241Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5405 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 002429
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-101 POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2028
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS AF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND SRSG EIDE AGREE ON NEXT STEPS ON
SHINDAND
Classified By: Ambassador William Wood, for reasons 1.4(a),(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 002429
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-101 POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2028
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS AF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND SRSG EIDE AGREE ON NEXT STEPS ON
SHINDAND
Classified By: Ambassador William Wood, for reasons 1.4(a),(b) and (d)
1. (C) In their September 2 meeting, SRSG Eide told the
Ambassador that he had concluded that a joint investigation
would end in the parties not agreeing on conclusions. A
joint investigation without an agreed conclusion would be
more harmful than no investigation at all. The
internationals and the Afghan government had to focus on the
future. Eide had spoken to NATO SYG de Hoop Schaefer, who
concurred with Eide,s assessment and recommendation against
a joint investigation. Eide would confer with Karzai later
that day.
2. (C) The Ambassador told Eide the United States agreed a
focus on the future was important, but a decision not to
conduct the joint inquiry would leave a number of challenges
for all parties to address. The Afghan government, the UN
and the Coalition Forces cannot operate independently if/when
the next such incident occurs. The separate and different
responses on Shindand locked people in antagonistic
positions, in a public way.
3. (C) The Ambassador suggested the three parties share
information, outside a formal, joint investigation, with no
requirement to achieve a joint conclusion. Later that day,
Eide sent his military advisor and several human rights
workers to a previously scheduled information exchange
session involving ISAF, Afghan officials and the UN.
4. (C) On improving coordination, the Ambassador and Eide
agreed to try to accelerate consultations and eventually
conclusions, while preventing premature assertions. The
Ambassador told Eide that a US-GOA dialogue on civilian
casualties would begin during an upcoming Secretary of
Defense visit and the Strategic Partnership talks. The
United States would resist any formal discussion of the
authority and responsibility of international forces, and
would instead focus on practical cooperation. The Ambassador
recommended to Eide that he stay away from this issue,
including any thoughts of a &code of conduct.8 Eide
agreed.
WOOD
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-101 POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2028
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS AF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND SRSG EIDE AGREE ON NEXT STEPS ON
SHINDAND
Classified By: Ambassador William Wood, for reasons 1.4(a),(b) and (d)
1. (C) In their September 2 meeting, SRSG Eide told the
Ambassador that he had concluded that a joint investigation
would end in the parties not agreeing on conclusions. A
joint investigation without an agreed conclusion would be
more harmful than no investigation at all. The
internationals and the Afghan government had to focus on the
future. Eide had spoken to NATO SYG de Hoop Schaefer, who
concurred with Eide,s assessment and recommendation against
a joint investigation. Eide would confer with Karzai later
that day.
2. (C) The Ambassador told Eide the United States agreed a
focus on the future was important, but a decision not to
conduct the joint inquiry would leave a number of challenges
for all parties to address. The Afghan government, the UN
and the Coalition Forces cannot operate independently if/when
the next such incident occurs. The separate and different
responses on Shindand locked people in antagonistic
positions, in a public way.
3. (C) The Ambassador suggested the three parties share
information, outside a formal, joint investigation, with no
requirement to achieve a joint conclusion. Later that day,
Eide sent his military advisor and several human rights
workers to a previously scheduled information exchange
session involving ISAF, Afghan officials and the UN.
4. (C) On improving coordination, the Ambassador and Eide
agreed to try to accelerate consultations and eventually
conclusions, while preventing premature assertions. The
Ambassador told Eide that a US-GOA dialogue on civilian
casualties would begin during an upcoming Secretary of
Defense visit and the Strategic Partnership talks. The
United States would resist any formal discussion of the
authority and responsibility of international forces, and
would instead focus on practical cooperation. The Ambassador
recommended to Eide that he stay away from this issue,
including any thoughts of a &code of conduct.8 Eide
agreed.
WOOD