SHARANA PRT SIX MONTH UPDATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002129 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM NSC FOR WOOD OSD FOR WILKES CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF 101 POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON AF SUBJECT: SHARANA PRT SIX MONTH UPDATE ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Paktika experienced a difficult spring; violence was up and the government did not uniformly provide services. The long term outlook, however, remains positive, led by economic expansion. Anti-government activities, particularly indirect attacks and IED events increased. Several incidents strengthened residents, perceptions of deteriorating security. Coalition efforts to counter security problems, including increased kinetic operations and the roll out of Focused District Development (FDD),remain too new to be judged. Further, despite Governor Khpalwak's efforts, provision of government services was uneven and Paktika's tribes believe the provincial government is weak. In spite of these setbacks, advances in development and governance bode well for Paktika's future. Notably two of Paktika's largest bazaars expanded significantly, new roads connected Paktika's commercial centers, and the PRT and taskforces began to focus their assistance through the Provincial Development Council (PDC),shoring up the institution's credibility. Security -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Several key issues compromised Afghan National Police (ANP) effectiveness in Paktika, including recruitment difficulties, fuel shortages and the lack of a coherent maintenance or replacement plan for police vehicles. Resulting ANP immobility, particularly in Paktika's western districts, allowed anti-government elements freedom of movement, which was connected to the increase in IED attacks and ambushes. Significant acts of violence doubled compared to spring 2007. Some of these attacks were more sophisticated, coordinated and complex than attacks last year. Several high profile killings strengthened residents' perception of deteriorating provincial security, including the murders of a former tribal shura leader and a school principal. ¶3. (SBU) Coalition efforts, including increased kinetic operations and the launch of Focused District Development (FDD) in Mata Khan and Sar Hawza districts, will take time to evaluate. Initially, district leaders were cautious about FDD, especially in Sar Hawza where the District Administrator complained the relief force of ANCOP officers was reluctant to patrol more than five kilometers from the district center. Police Mentor Teams continue to work with the ANP to promote recruiting efforts and enhance police capabilities. Small groups protested military operations in Mata Khan and Sharana districts, meeting with Governor Khpulwak and Provincial Chief of Police MG Mullah Khel to discuss claims that innocent people had been arrested or killed. To date, Paktika provincial leaders continue to mollify these complainants. Governance -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Paktika Governor Khpalwak returned from his April International Visitors' program to the U.S. enamored of localized planning and ready to push Karzai for additional support. Despite Khpalwak's efforts, the provincial government failed to deliver some key services. Khpalwak remarked on the degree to which planning in the U.S. occurs locally and sought ways to press Kabul for greater administrative decentralization. Following his trip, he met with President Karzai and seven key Ministers, insisting that Paktika become a staffing and budgeting priority. The majority of the Ministers rebuffed the request, arguing provinces such as Paktika with US-led PRTs are not a budget priority. Meanwhile, the provincial education director did not pay most teachers for the first few months of the year and as a result, over a third of the schools in the province closed. ¶5. (SBU) Paktika residents' perceptions of government ineffectiveness have empowered tribal leaders who remain the most powerful group in the province. Tribal leaders continue to call for a more active and muscular response to anti-government infiltrators, but will not motivate popular opposition, saying they are not confident Kabul will support KABUL 00002129 002 OF 002 their efforts. Tribes point to the lack of ANP or ANA patrols and checkpoints as well as the government's inability to hold arrested insurgents as evidence of government ineffectiveness. The Paktika Provincial Council is neither well known nor active in the Province. Further, not all residents consider it representative as it does not have a member from the Kharoti tribe, the second largest provincial sub-tribe. ¶5. (SBU) The PRT and task forces working in Paktika shifted to using the PDC to define new projects. Development project proposals must now pass through district leaders to line directors and then the PDC for approval; without PDC approval, the task force and PRT will not begin project execution. Within the PDC, line directors are required to secure Kabul approval for all projects requiring additional staffing or increased operational budgets prior to submission to the PRT for execution. PDC members were satisfied with the new procedure as it gives them visibility on and authority over provincial development activities. It also forces tribal and district leaders to work through the council. Even security related projects will be reported to the PDC, though these will not require PDC approval prior to their execution. Development -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Commerce in Paktika continued to expand at a vigorous pace. Some merchants recently complained to National Assembly members that the Sharana bazaar lacks sufficient shops, even though it more than doubled in size over the previous two years. Two factors fed growth of the Sharana and Orgun bazaars: the proximity of Coalition forces and the development of paved roads linking these cities to larger commercial centers. Two cell phone providers, Roshan and AWCC, and at least two satellite TV installers, both of whom report business is brisk, have set up shop in the Sharana bazaar. WOOD