CODEL REED'S JULY 20 DISCUSSIONS WITH KARZAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001898

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR SCTC-A, CG CJTF-101, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SNAR MOPS AFIN IR PK
SUBJECT: CODEL REED'S JULY 20 DISCUSSIONS WITH KARZAI

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During the CODEL,s July 20 office call and
subsequent working lunch with President Karzai, Senator Obama
reaffirmed both major American political parties, long-term
commitment to Afghanistan. He emphasized the Afghan
leadership,s obligation to demonstrate determination in
fighting corruption and stemming narcotics production. He
stressed the USG,s interest in re-establishing a working
relationship between the IRoA and the Pakistani government.
Karzai promised that, if Pakistan were to abandon the
practice of "using Islamic radicalism as an instrument of
policy," it would find "a true friend and ally" in
Afghanistan. Karzai spoke well of the Pakistan Peoples Party
(PPP),but complained the Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISI) and military are not granting Prime
Minister Gilani latitude to govern. He argued USG pressure
is essential to establishing Pakistani civilian control over
ISI and the military.

Karzai,s Pakistan Problem
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2. (C) After noting his recent visit to a village in
Nangarhar to address a civilian casualty controversy, Karzai
painted Pakistan as the source of increasing instability in
Afghanistan. He revisited that theme throughout the meeting
and lunch, twice urging U.S. military operations in Pakistan.
Obama expressed his concern but also encouraged Karzai to
work with the Pakistani government to curb lawlessness along
the common border. Karzai claimed Musharraf had apologized
for Pakistan,s mistakes in its Afghanistan policy during
their initial February 2002 meeting; however, to Karzai,s
surprise, in their next meeting, Musharraf demanded
Afghanistan close India,s consulates and downgrade ties.
Karzai refused, but promised Musharraf no one would ever use
Afghanistan as a base against Pakistan.


3. (C) Karzai described as "very disappointing" Pakistani
Prime Minister Gilani,s televised address of the night
before to his people on terrorism. Karzai attributed the
"bad speech" to the ISI and Pakistani military, which, he
explained, are not granting Gilani the latitude to govern.
Both, Karzai said, must be brought under civilian control.
Senator Hagel asked if the Pakistani government had the
ability to assert its authority over the military and
intelligence services. Karzai replied: "No, not without the
help of the U.S." The Saudis might also have some influence,
he mused, but "we believe you are the key." Hagel inquired
about specific steps. Karzai specified three: The USG
should inform the Pakistanis that it is aware of their
meddling in Afghanistan; insist the Pakistanis cease "using
radical Islam as an instrument of policy," and; deliver an
ultimatum "as you did in 2001," that the Pakistanis can be
either with the United States or against it. ",Softly,
softly, won,t work," Karzai concluded. Hagel asked if the
USG should condition its aid to Pakistan. Karzai replied
"yes," but advised that the USG make clear simultaneously its
support for the PPP. Obama asked if the PPP,s problem is
"lack of capacity." Karzai did not relent: "The problem is
the ISI and the military, which runs the country" and its
nuclear program and its destabilization effort in
Afghanistan.


4. (C) Obama asked if Afghans are susceptible to Islamists,
anti-Western messages. Karzai implied that, absent
Pakistan,s intervention, the Taliban message would not have
gained traction with Afghanistan,s Pashtuns. "Over three
decades," he charged, "thousands of Afghan boys were
indoctrinated into hatefulness disguised as Islam." Obama
asked what counter-message is being delivered in Afghan
mosque sermons? "Terrorism is the enemy of the people,"
Karzai replied. He noted that the Taliban are killing older
Afghan clergy who are being replaced by younger,
Pakistani-trained mullahs.

The Progress We,ve Achieved Promises More
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5. (SBU) Karzai lamented that Americans are not hearing more

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about the success of their investment in Afghanistan. He
recited a list of accomplishments since the ouster of the
Taliban: six million children now enrolled in school, 30
percent of those girls; Afghan hospitals now capable of
performing heart and brain surgeries; development projects in
over half of 38,000 villages; sharply reduced infant and
child mortality rates. "The Army is doing well," he said,
though the police force is inadequate. "We should focus on
electricity."


6. (SBU) Obama agreed the partnership between the world
community and the Afghan people had achieved a great deal,
but said, "We still have a lot of work to do." He promised
that, regardless of the outcome of the November elections,
"both parties are making a long-term commitment" to
Afghanistan. The key to locking in that support, he
emphasized, is a clear indication of the Afghan government,s
determination to fight corruption and narcotics. I know,
Obama said, "it,s tough to change cultures," but leadership
is obliged to send "a signal from the top" that these
activities will not be tolerated.


7. (SBU) Karzai said suppression of the poppy economy
required three things: a well-conceived eradication plan;
alternative livelihoods and "hope for the future."
Elaborating on the last, he said, "poppies are the result of
desperation." During the war, people had uprooted their
orchards and replaced them with poppies because opium yields
a more reliable income. Obama interjected: "I,d add we
need enforcement, prosecution of traffickers."


8. (SBU) Turning to corruption, Karzai admitted that, for a
long time, his government had not understood corruption. A
governmental inquiry, led by the chief justice, had studied
the phenomenon in all its manifestations from counterfeit
medicines to petty bribes. That inquiry had yielded a bill
Karzai would send to the parliament seeking the creation of
an FBI-like office with the authority to investigate and
arrest suspected corrupt officials.

Elections Security; Get It and They Will Come
--------------


9. (SBU) Obama inquired about preparations for the autumn
2009 presidential elections. Karzai reviewed the decision on
splitting parliamentary and presidential elections. He said
the Afghan Independent Election Commission (IEC) had begun to
assemble infrastructure to support elections. His only
reservation is security: "We need security." If we have it,
he said, the voters "will come in their millions." Obama
relayed his belief that deployed U.S. military are committed
to securing the elections in cooperation with the Afghan
National Security Forces and ISAF.

Iran; Not the Best of Neighbors
--------------


10. (C) Obama and Hagel solicited Karzai,s opinion of
Afghanistan,s western neighbor. Karzai began his reply by
saying we try to engage them, talk to them; however, the
current Iranian regime "suspects our relationship with you."
Obama asked if the Iranians had caused problems for
Afghanistan. "Yes," Karzai replied, "we,ve confirmed
reports they supplied weapons to the Taliban." National
Directorate for Security (NDS) chief Saleh added that, three
weeks ago, NDS had arrested "an agent of the Iranian
consulate in Kandahar" who had been training the Taliban in
the use of landmines.

Attendees
--------------


11. (U) American side:

Senator Jack Reed
Senator Chuck Hagel
Senator Barack Obama
Ambassador Wood
Deputy Chief of Mission Christopher Dell
Anthony Blinken, Staff Director - SFRC

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Elizabeth King, Military Legislative Assistant
Rexon Ryu, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor
Mark Lippert, Foreign Policy Advisor
Jeremiah Howard, A/Political Counselor (Note-taker)

Afghan side:

President Karzai
Ahmad Zia Massoud, First Vice President
Mohammad Karim Khalili, Second Vice President
Hedayat Amin Arsala, Senior Advisor to the President
Rangin Dadfur Spanta, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Abdul Rahim Wardak, Minister of Defense
Zalmai Rassoul, National Security Advisor
Amrullah Saleh, General Director National Security
Taj Ayubi, Minister Advisor of International Relations
Humira Itemade, Deputy Chief of Staff
Humayon Hamidzada, Presidential Spokesman
Nazar Hasin Rahimi, Special Secretary


12. (U) The CODEL did not have an opportunity to clear this
cable.
WOOD