Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08KABUL1816 | 2008-07-19 11:52:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO1574 OO RUEHPW DE RUEHBUL #1816/01 2011152 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 191152Z JUL 08 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4741 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY |
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001816 |
1. (SBU) Afghanistan remains a complex counterinsurgency environment, in which maintaining strong U.S. support for the Afghan government and robust U.S. leadership of international community assistance efforts is critical to ensuring that momentum for victory remains with us. Press reporting emphasizes dramatic attacks, extremist atrocities, and security threats from increased infiltration from Pakistan but frequently passes over genuine advances in our counter-insurgency and nation-building strategy as we build Afghan security forces, improve local governance, broaden access to social services (e.g., public health, education), and advance economic development and infrastructure projects. Seven years into this fight, we have rediscovered counterinsurgency lessons learned from past conflicts. Now, where the U.S. is present, we are putting in the necessary levels of security, development and governance resources, and, as a result of an Afghan Government restructuring in 2007, we are getting real traction by partnering with more effective provincial governors. The U.S. has a strategy (grounded on an even better understanding of the human and political terrain here), and it works. 2. (SBU) The challenge remains that the extremists have a vote on the issue. They discovered over the last two years that they cannot win a straight-up fight with either Afghan army or Coalition forces. Effective counterinsurgency practices, especially in the U.S.-led Regional Command-East (RC-East), over the last couple of years succeeded in separating insurgents from the people, permitting the application of U.S. development and governance assistance to begin to build, in close concert with provincial and local Afghan officials, new connections between the people and the government. The extremists have adjusted their tactics to avoid direct confrontations with Afghan army and Coalition forces, resorting (with some exceptions) to improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks and to direct attacks on development and governance targets, including local officials who cooperate with the Government and the international community. 3. (SBU) We will not win by focusing on defeating the extremists, although security operations remain critical. Rather, we need to focus on strengthening the Government,s capacity to deliver security and services to the people. After thirty years of invasion and civil war, however, Afghanistan does not have an educated middle class and its leadership has been depleted. This is compounded by pervasive corruption, fed by the opium trade, which in turn reinforces the weakness of government structures. In addition, Karzai is perceived by some to be more focused on reviving a traditional tribally-based approach than in building up an established government structure. Progress is being made in some institutions ) the army, more recently the police, sub-national governance ) and some ministries have advanced under strong leadership. The international community signaled its commitment to Afghanistan,s stability when it pledged more than $20 billion at the June Paris Conference, and a new UN Special Representative is bring new energy and idea to improve coordination among international donors and the Government. But as the largest military and development contributor, the international community and the Afghans will continue to the look to the U.S. to lead. Politics and Governance -------------------------- 4. (SBU) Maneuvering among politicians is already well underway for the fall 2009 presidential election, with parliamentary elections to follow in 2010. As a result, legislative debate and ministerial decisions are increasingly complicated by political calculus. Driving that calculus in part are endemic ethnic rivalries among Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, (among others) and a effort to tap (or for incumbents, to deflect) the frustrations many Afghans express resulting from unrealized (and in many cases unrealistic) expectations for security and economic prosperity. KABUL 00001816 002 OF 004 5. (SBU) President Karzai's cabinet represents a cross-section of Afghanistan, but ministries vary in effectiveness. Strong leadership in key ministries (Education, Health, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and Finance) has produced significant achievements in some sectors, while other ministries continue to suffer from weak leadership and capacity as well as corruption. USAID's Capacity Development Program works with several ministries, and we support the World Bank's work with the Civil Service Commission to develop a national network of training institutes. 6. (SBU) A positive development of the last year is the new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). IDLG Director Popal has instituted a more rigorous review process for gubernatorial candidates, to include (e.g.) technical competence and personal probity. The growing numbers of IDLG-vetted governors are becoming the focal points for reconstructing provincial institutions to deliver government services. An ambitious program is underway to review local governance policy, and redraft the laws that that define roles and responsibilities at the provincial, district and municipal levels. Security -------------------------- 7. (SBU) Fed by increased cross-border incursions from Pakistan of both Taliban and foreign fighters, engagement with insurgents is up overall, but the increased number of &troops in contact8 also reflects growing numbers of Afghan and Coalition forces in the field taking the initiative to extend security and governance into areas where the Afghan government and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) presence had been minimal or non-existent. As a result of the pounding they took last year, insurgents largely avoid large-scale operations ) with some notable exceptions in Helmand and Konar provinces ) in favor of improvised explosive devices, suicide attacks and small unit ambushes. 8. (SBU) RC-East remains focused on a balanced COIN approach synchronizing operations to protect the populace and push the insurgents out while pursuing mutually reinforcing efforts in development and governance assistance; the Embassy, USAID and CJTF-101 are coordinating more closely than ever USG efforts in RC-East. The Commanders, Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding is critical to delivering quick, effective assistance projects, which, in coordination with USAID and local officials, supports both locally identified needs and longer term development goals. 9. (SBU) In RC-South, the number and lethality of IED attacks is up dramatically; significantly, in some areas the number of IEDs reported by the public to Afghan or ISAF forces is also up, reflecting public support for the Government. The approximately 2300 Marines of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) have carried out successful operations in the Garmsir District in Helmand and their mission has been extended to consolidate the resulting governance and development opportunities. RC-West and RC-North remain relatively quiet. Building Afghan Security Forces -------------------------- 10. (SBU) Using FY 2007 supplemental funding (about $4.9 billion for the army, and $2.5 billion for the police), the U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has re-made the Afghan army and is concentrating now on the police. The army is already the most respected national institution in Afghanistan and is increasingly capable and confident. We are on track to fill the currently authorized force structure of 86,000 (which includes a 6,000-troop &float8) by fall 2009. Four Afghan battalions are now certified to carry out independent operations, and additional units are expected to achieve similar certification over the course of 2008. The Afghan army responded impressively to the June Taliban incursion into the KABUL 00001816 003 OF 004 Arghandab District in Kandahar, using Afghan Army Air Corps assets to move roughly 50% of the approximately 1000 Afghan army reinforcements to Kandahar from Kabul and taking the lead in planning and executing a successful joint combat operation, with ISAF support, against the Taliban. The Afghan Ministry of Defense has just launched an effort to win international community support for a force structure increase to 134,000 (which also includes a 12,000-troop &float8) which the U.S. supports. The army will continue to depend for some years on Coalition enablers such as close air support and intelligence assets. 11. (SBU) We have had less success re-building Afghanistan,s weak, corrupt police force. However, in December 2007, CSTC-A launched the Focused District Development (FDD) Program, a district-by-district program to retrain and reequip the police. The first FDD cycle began in December with seven districts; 55 districts are scheduled to be retrained by December 2008. FDD will take between 4-5 years to reach all 364 districts of Afghanistan. Once back in their respective districts, the ANP are gaining respect for the first time from local residents for carrying out their missions. Beyond its immediate relevance to the police, FDD is becoming the focal point around which the U.S. is advancing its coordinated counterinsurgency strategy. Continued FDD coordination with the Afghan government, ISAF, USAID and the international community will ensure that sustainable security improvements in the most critical districts in the country will be linked to enhanced local governance, rule of law, and reconstruction and development projects. Development and Economic Growth -------------------------- 12. (SBU) The Afghan economy grew by 11.5 percent in Afghan fiscal year 2007 (which ended March 20, 2008), thanks largely to greater agricultural production. While annual GDP growth rates averaged over 12 percent for the past five years, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. With poor agricultural growth and higher inflation this year, the IMF estimates that GDP growth will drop to 7.5 percent for fiscal year 2008 (which ends March 20, 2009), forcing the government to make two food aid appeals this year. The United States has already responded by donating 30,000 MT of wheat through the World Food Program, and additional assistance is being planned. Afghanistan,s IMF program remains on track, however, despite the government,s recent challenges in meeting IMF revenue collection benchmarks. 13. (SBU) U.S. economic development priorities are energy, roads, agriculture, and private sector development. In the power sector, USAID is now funding four major electricity projects, including the strategic Kajaki Dam in Helmand and the North East Power System to import cheap power from northern neighbors. USAID is also constructing hundreds of kilometers of strategic roads while employing Afghan workers to create jobs, cut costs, and train the workforce. To help with the food supply, USAID is supporting increased production of food crops and agricultural exports. Counter-Narcotics -------------------------- 14. (SBU) In its 2007 report, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that Afghanistan's poppy crop reached record levels, with some 193,000 hectares under cultivation. Favorable weather compounded the problem, resulting in Afghanistan alone producing 8,200 tons, or 93 percent of the world's opium. In its Rapid Assessment Survey, released in February 2008, the UNODC is predicting 2008 will see nation-wide cultivation levels similar to or slightly lower than 2007. 15. (SBU) Successes in reducing production in the east and north, and the links between the insurgency and continuing high levels of production in the south, are reflected in a growing segmentation of Afghan poppy production as well as a growing nexus between drugs and insurgents. We are seeing KABUL 00001816 004 OF 004 positive results by committed governors where security allows for effective counter-narcotics campaigns. For example, the UNODC and the U.S. predict poppy cultivation has been slashed in Nangarhr Province, where cultivation had increased by 85 percent in 2007. Kabul plans to hold govenors accountable for poppy production in their provinces. The Government has also committed to support stronger eradication measures, including army-provided force protection for polce eradication efforts. President Karzai, on the advice of his cabinet, decided against the use of chemical spray for eradication in 2008. Regional Dynamics -------------------------- 16. (SBU) Afghanistan's effort to build a secure and stable state is complicated by its relationships with its neighbors. Karzai, who is already predisposed against Pakistan for its perceived manipulation and radicalization of Pashtun tribes in the border area, has renewed his public attacks on the Pakistani military and intelligence services over increased cross-border infiltration of extremists and allegation of a Pakistani hand behind recent events such as the June jailbreak in Kandahar and the July bombing of the Indian Embassy. 17. (SBU) Mre than half of all Afghans speak Dari, which is closely related to Farsi. Many Afghans along the border in the west look towards Iran for news, entertainment, jobs, education, medical care and, among Afghanistan,s more than three million-strong Shia population, religious guidance. Afghans fear that tensions over Iran,s nuclear ambitions could erupt into a war that would embroil them. WOOD |