BUILDING AFGHANISTAN'S AIR CORPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001449 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA FOR A/S BOUCHER AND PMOON STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG NSC FOR JWOOD OSD FOR WILKES CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-101 AND POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR SNAR PGOV AF SUBJECT: BUILDING AFGHANISTAN'S AIR CORPS Classified By: Acting DCM Brent Hartley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C/REL ISAF) SUMMARY and COMMENT: Since September 2007, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan,s (CSTC-A) Combined Air Power Transition Force (CAPTF) has made significant progress in developing an appropriately sized, sustainable, and effects-capable Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) that also matches the demands of a rugged terrain, high altitude, and extended counterinsurgency fight. Despite CAPTF,s careful planning and resourcing, however, the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) remains concerned that the proposed timescale over which the ANA will acquire air mobility, reconnaissance, and ground attack capabilities is inconsistent with what Defense Minister Wardak believes is the international community,s aim to transfer the lead in security operations to the ANA as quickly as possible. Despite Minister Wardak,s ambitions for a large, sophisticated air force, and his misgivings about CAPTF,s plans for the ANAAC, CSTC-A has a solid and realistic plan for developing Afghanistan,s Army Air Corps. Under this plan, Afghanistan will have an appropriately sized and sustainable Air Corps that is capable of independently supporting ANA operations beyond 2016. It is a key enabler for the ANA to reach its goal of becoming a self-sustaining, fully-independent national military force. A Focus on Improving Operational Capability -------------- ¶2. (U) Since 2006, CSTC-A,s primary mission has been to train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces. Now that the Afghan army,s tactical abilities have gradually matured, CSTC-A has begun to focus more attention and resources to train and equip the Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC). CAPTF,s concept for building the ANAAC is centered on the belief that the ANA does not need an extraordinarily large number of aircraft, but instead needs a smaller Air Corps with centralized control and decentralized execution. The Air Corps,s current inventory consists of 26 aircraft: 15 Mi-17 and four Mi-35 rotary wing, and five An-32, and two An-26 fixed wing. While gradually retiring the An-32 and An-26, CAPTF will boost the Air Corps, inventory with 17 more aircraft expected in the next six months, mostly U.S. or joint U.S./NATO-funded refurbishments of Soviet-origin aircraft from Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Based on the current talent pool of ANAAC pilots, maintenance, and logistic support personnel, CAPTF has determined that refurbished and less sophisticated, yet rugged aircraft best suit the Afghan army,s operational needs. CAPTF,s campaign plan seeks to build a fully self-sustaining and operationally capable ANAAC by 2016, focusing on air mobility, Presidential/VIP lift, casualty evacuation, and close air support. Current ANAAC growth projections and fielding plans include two air wings, three forward operating locations, 100 aircraft (51 helicopters and 62 airplanes) and over 7,200 personnel, to be completed in three separate phases over the next eight years. ¶3. (U) In Phase I, from FY 08-10, CAPTF will seek to meet the ANAAC,s most critical need by completing initial infrastructure development; developing a logistics sustainment system; and most importantly, acquiring air mobility by purchasing C-27A fixed-wing aircraft. The C-27A is a rugged, medium-size transport, twin turboprop engine aircraft designed to move troops, logistics, food, water and other supplies to remote areas. It has a short take-off-and-landing capability, allowing it access to airstrips unreachable by other fixed-wing aircraft. In Phase II, from FY 11 ) 15, CAPTF will continue to develop air mobility capability; build a sustainable pilot training program centered on the turboprop trainer; and develop light attack, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities with the same turboprop attack/reconnaissance platform. (Note: Using the same turboprop airframe for both training and attack/recon roles allows for faster and less expensive pilot training cycles, as well as a more sustainable aircraft maintenance and logistics chain. End KABUL 00001449 002 OF 003 note.) In Phase III, in FY 16 and beyond, CAPTF will continue to develop and expand Air Corps capabilities, but expects it to be a fully operational, capable, and self-sufficient force. ¶4. (U) CAPTF expects Air Corps pilots to be able to perform all their own missions independently by 2016, although by 2011, ANAAC aircraft and crews will be able to independently perform medium lift and medical evacuation missions for the Afghan National Army. Today ANAAC pilots are performing primarily passenger airlift missions. March of this year was a record-setting month for Air Corps lift as they carried more than 4,500 passengers and 30,000 kilograms of cargo while flying in excess of 200 sorties to numerous locations across Afghanistan. Particularly noteworthy was their first successful mission flown directly into a point of injury site to evacuate six severely)injured Afghan citizens. Aging Pilot Force and Lack of Flight Experience Inhibit Growth of Talent Base -------------- ¶5. (U) The aging pilot force is one of the greatest challenges to developing capacity within the ANAAC. Although the Army Air Corps is made up of 180 pilots, some of whom have a wealth of previous flying experience under Soviet tutelage, the average age of these pilots is 43. In Afghanistan, where the average life expectancy is 45, and the retirement age is 52, it is difficult for CSTC-A to justify investing in a substantial program of training for the current pool of pilots. ¶6. (U) Moreover, many of these 180 pilots have not flown in the past 15 years, resulting in numerous expired flight certifications, which requires these pilots to be re-qualified. Most current Afghan pilots were last trained in 1992. Of those pilots who have had the opportunity to fly within the past year, roughly 23 percent of those who fly fixed-wing aircraft and 43 percent of those who fly rotary-wing aircraft have not flown enough hours to maintain proficiency. In addition to these pilots, lack of flight experience, none of these 180 pilots are Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) qualified and generally do not fly at night. Due to their Soviet-style training, CAPTF has assessed that many pilots are incapable of making independent decisions at the tactical level. ¶7. (U) Based on the limitations of the current pool of ANAAC pilots, CAPTF aims to recruit 48 new pilots each year from the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA), universities, and officers recruited from within the Army. Accounting for 25 percent attrition, CAPTF expects to build the ANAAC by 36 pilots each year, for a projected ANAAC pilot force of approximately 285 by 2016. CAPTF requires that pilot candidates be university graduates and no more than 27 years of age, while all non-commissioned officers must at a minimum be literate. While initial training in FY 09)10 will be U.S.-based, CAPTF projects that Afghan-based training in FY 11 will yield the desired number of pilots. Air Corps-specific training is accomplished at the newly established Kabul Air Corps Training Center (KACTC),which currently provides basic certification courses, logistics, and mission support training for the ANAAC. ¶8. (SBU) One of the greatest limitations to Air Corps training is the lack of adequate English language skills. Beginning in Spring 2009, CAPTF will require that cadets from the NMAA, along with officer candidates from Afghan universities, study English intensively so that they can understand Western-style air operations. These young, English-speaking, Western-trained pilot officers will then become the instructors for future Afghan pilots. Too Little, Too Late: The Ministry of Defense,s Perspective -------------- ¶9. (C/REL ISAF) Minister of Defense Wardak has succeeded in KABUL 00001449 003 OF 003 convincing President Karzai of the need to more rapidly grow the ANAAC, both in terms of trained personnel and tactical aircraft inventory. Not only has Karzai brought up this topic with USG officials in the past, but more recently, on Afghan Air Power Day, 17 January 2008, President Karzai complained that CAPTF had not included modern tactical jet fighters like F-16,s in the ANAAC aircraft inventory. According to CAPTF, the required training for pilots to fly such jet fighters is too technical, takes too long, and is too expensive for the Afghan government to sustain. Furthermore, advanced tactical jets are not required for Afghanistan,s counterinsurgency environment, which is better served by slower aircraft that are capable of lingering over targets and delivering ground-support munitions * roles for which turboprop aircraft are comparatively well-suited. ¶10. (C/REL ISAF) While Afghan Air Power Day is just once a year, Embassy Kabul believes that Minister of Defense Wardak will continue to raise his concerns in the coming months regarding the pace and scale of Air Corps development. Wardak,s major concern is based on his perception that CSTC-A has placed artificial constraints on developing capacity among Air Corps pilots. CAPTF,s campaign plan stipulates that all ANAAC pilots must be trained in accordance with U.S. Air Force standards of instruction and at training facilities in the United States. Due to limited capacity for foreign trainees in the U.S. flight training system, CAPTF,s plan expects to produce 36 pilots per year, which Wardak believes is too few to support ANA,s future operations. Because U.S. training facilities cannot accommodate extra pilots, Wardak wants to see additional ANAAC pilots trained at facilities in other partner nations, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands. Wardak has discussed and sought to solicit support for pilot training from these partner nations at the Ministerial level. Arguing that NATO intends for the ANA to take the lead in military operations and become capable of independent operations as soon as possible, Wardak believes that CAPTF,s plan will only provide limited Air Corps capacity by 2011 and a minor improvement by 2016. In addition to the lack of trained Afghan pilots, Minister Wardak is particularly concerned about the low number of rotary-wing airlift in the current CAPTF plan: 38 Mi-17s by 2011 and 51 by 2016. DELL