UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR TAKES AIM AT THE COALITION

UNCLAS KABUL 001223 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, PRM PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR JWOOD OSD FOR SHIVERS CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM PREL AF SUBJECT: UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR TAKES AIM AT THE COALITION ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, concluded a 12-day fact-finding visit to Afghanistan May 15. The main themes of his preliminary REPORT are: increasing the transparency of international military forces' investigations of collateral casualty incidents; increasing the accountability of "campaign forces" responsible to intelligence agencies; reforming the Afghan police and the judicial system; curbing Taliban and other anti-government elements' abuses; and addressing the often-overlooked extrajudicial killing of women. His final REPORT will be released several months from now, after it is sent to the IRoA for comment and to the UN. Preliminary REPORT Summary -------------- ¶2. (U) Alston's preliminary REPORT notes no evidence that international forces commit widespread intentional extra-judicial killings. He confirms international forces' efforts to respect international human rights and humanitarian law. He focuses on accountability and transparency issues surrounding the estimated 200 unintentional civilian deaths associated with international forces' military operations in 2008. Alston complains that the many distinct chains of command, the continual rotation of troops and commanders, and the fact that prosecuting crimes of individual soldiers is the responsibility of their home country leads to a complicated, opaque system in which ordinary Afghans have little hope of identifying who may have killed an innocent family member. No one in Afghanistan, either at ISAF or in the government, tracks the outcome of investigations and prosecutions. Lack of accountability is especially pronounced, according to Alston, with regard to "campaign forces," which, he says, appear to be controlled by foreign intelligence services. ¶3. (U) The police are the face of the government to the people, Alston argues; therefore, legitimacy of the government depends on their behavior. Because the police are often drawn predominantly from one tribe, they tend to act to promote the interests of their kin at the expense of competing tribes. No one in the government has any interest in investigating, let alone prosecuting, police officers responsible for abuses, Alston charges. Elders in the 
south repeatedly told Alston that police abuses are causing people to support the Taliban. Senior IRoA and international officials told Alston that ensuring government security forces' respect for basic human rights is prerequisite to ensuring security and stability. ¶4. (U) According to Alston's preliminary report, the criminal justice system is deeply flawed with endemic corruption and is incapable of ensuring respect for due process rights. Carrying out death sentences on this basis clearly violates international legal standards, he says. The problems in the criminal justice system are multiplied exponentially for women. A roomful of women in Kandahar laughed when Alston asked with whom they could lodge a complaint if they encountered abuse within the home. They noted that even leaving the home would be difficult and complaining to the police would only lead to further punishment and imprisonment for running away. The often overlooked affect of armed conflict on women leads to disaster; when men are killed the women left behind are usually destitute. Many women are not even aware of the possibility of receiving monetary assistance from government or ISAF for their losses. While honor killings are very common, they are rarely reported or investigated. ¶5. (SBU) Alston's preliminary REPORT charges Taliban attacks on military targets with killing hundreds of civilians bystanders "unlawfully" in 2008. He is highly critical of the Taliban's targeted assassinations of civilians. Alston advocates contact between human rights actors and insurgents to impress upon the latter their responsibility to uphold international human rights standards. He acknowledged privately to us such contact risks conferring political legitimacy on the insurgents. Preliminary Recommendations -------------- ¶7. (U) International Forces: Ensure that any directly affected person can go to a military base and promptly receive answers to such questions as who was responsible for a particular operation and what the status is of any investigation or prosecution. Police: Recognize that training alone will not prevent abuses that are driven by the links between police officers and particular tribes, commanders, and politicians. These links must be broken. All efforts to supplement the police by establishing or legitimizing local militias should be abandoned. The police must play both a law enforcement and paramilitary role; continued debate on this is counterproductive. Establish a strong national police investigative task force. Strengthen the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission's (AIHRC) investigative powers; impose an obligation on the government to respond to AIHRC findings within a set time limit. Judicial Reform: Establish an independent anti-corruption agency and endow it with the necessary powers and resources to prosecute important cases at all levels. Make the criminal justice system accessible to women, including through support to initiatives such as the Jalalabad and Parwan women's referral centers. Have the Attorney General establish a special office for female victims. Treat honor killings as murders. Taliban and other armed groups: Serious efforts should be made to pressure and persuade the Taliban and other armed groups to respect human rights and humanitarian law, even at the risk of conferring political legitimacy on them. ¶8. (U) We expect Alston's nine-page preliminary REPORT to be posted on the UN webpage shortly. Once it is posted we will provide the Department with the Internet address. WOOD