Afghan Strategic Communications: Better Results by Design

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001100 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, PRM PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR JWOOD OSD FOR SHIVERS CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PAO AF SUBJECT: Afghan Strategic Communications: Better Results by Design ¶1. (SBU) The recent wave of positive and balanced U.S. and European media coverage of Afghanistan is the result of intense collaborative efforts by U.S. civilian and military personnel inside Afghanistan, at USNATO, and in Washington. Specifically, we have developed an effective strategy to identify key media representatives, brief them on current operations, take them to see successes inside Afghanistan wherever they are located (which most often is the U.S.-led RC-East),and then ensure that they receive high-level attention from the Embassy, ISAF, and other key Afghan and donor country officials to address remaining questions. -------------- An Afghan Fusion Team Established -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The communications campaign has been driven by about a dozen key public affairs officers at the Embassy, CSTC-A, USAID, the 101st Airborne Division at Bagram, INL, ISAF, State SCA/PPD and at USNATO, with support from many others. Over the space of several months this geographically dispersed group has established a de facto fusion team, with multiple daily contacts and close coordination. The effort has been assisted by the NSC, through weekly coordination conference calls, through regular face-to-face meetings in Kabul at the Embassy, ISAF and UNAMA, and through ad hoc gatherings. Information sharing has also been improved by our on-line Afghan Strategic Communication community which now includes some 300 interested experts and officials who regularly share advice and suggestions electronically. The result is a substantially enhanced media performance by USG civilian and military personnel, and improved understanding and increasing support for the Afghan mission in both Europe and the United States. -------------- -------------- Afghan Government Media Center to Launch in June -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The strategic communication plan includes two additional critical elements. Afghan government performance on message development and media outreach remains weak, despite some improvement in the performance of leading ministries including Defense and Interior. To address this, the U.S., U.K. and Canada have collaborated to establish the Afghan Government Media Center (GMC) which will be under the authority of the Office of the Afghan Presidential Spokesman. This project is moving along rapidly, and we anticipate a formal launch in June. The GMC will include Afghanistan's only state-of-the art press briefing room, facilities and staff to support visiting foreign journalists, a press office with desk officers linked to Afghan government ministries and provincial governments, an analysis and writing cell, a liaison function to connect with ISAF and UNAMA, and a support staff to provide and coordinate donor mentoring and training. The GMC will initially occupy interim facilities close to the Palace and diplomatic missions, and will transition into a new purpose-built facility in about two years. -------------- Bringing UNAMA into the Equation -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The third leg in the strategy involves integrating the civilian assistance efforts now being coordinated by United Nations Special Representative Kai Eide. Mr. Eide has already expressed his strong interest in improving our strategic communication effort and we intend to engage him shortly to introduce him more formally to efforts already underway and to discuss ways we can best mesh UNAMA capabilities into the larger ongoing efforts. -------------- The Way Forward -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Improvements in our media results reflect the efforts of the Afghan Strategic Communication team. The three-pronged approach outlined above addresses the main challenges we face: The U.S. side needs to up our communication game; the Afghans need to develop a communication plan and assert leadership; and our UNAMA civilian and Coalition military partners need to line up in support of the Afghan lead, once that is more clearly established. Recent policy-level KABUL 00001100 002 OF 002 discussions in Washington have highlighted the need for additional military and civilian personnel to run this strategy. There are a host of other practical issues, including higher priority for air mobility for visiting journalists and Afghan government officials and funds to sustain a steady stream of organized media tours along the lines of the successful recent NATO journalist tours. We are already reaching out to groups of Asian and Arab journalists to invite them for similar experiences. There is merit in the proposal to establish a senior U.S. military spokesman for Afghanistan. Our intention over the next months is to consolidate each of the three elements in our plan, and most importantly to establish a strong and visible Afghan lead in communications which all can support. WOOD