SOUTH AFRICA: WITS UNIVERSITY SOCIOLOGIST COMMENTS ON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JOHANNESBURG 000040 SIPDIS SIPDIS DOL FOR ILAB E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ELAB PREL SF SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA: WITS UNIVERSITY SOCIOLOGIST COMMENTS ON POLOKWANE JOHANNESBU 00000040 001.2 OF 002 Summary -------------- ¶1. Professor Eddie Webster, head of the Sociology of Work Unit at Wits University in Johannesburg and colleague/wife Luli Cullinicos, presented a sociological assessment of the Polokwane conference at a February 29 breakfast seminar. Webster said the 1996 introduction of GEAR without Parliamentary or NEDLAC oversight was the "original sin" that created a split between within the tripartite alliance of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, but that the selection of Jacob Zuma as the standard-bearer did not come until later. Webster presented data that indicated 62 pQent of ANC members were either members of COSATU, the SACP or the ANC Youth League, and the 42 percent of ANC delegates in wealthy Gauteng Province were unemployed. He described COSATU and the SACP as the "elephants in the room" at Polokwane, but urged that the labor movement remain a separate force outside of government. End Summary. Demographics of ANC Delegates at Polokwane -------------- -------------- ¶2. Webster, who had attended Polokwane as an SABC observer, provided an overview of the demographics of the ANC in the run-up to Polokwane. His statistics showed that membership in the ANC increased from 416,869 paid up members in 2002 to the 621,231 members in 2007, with ONE in four of all members in 2007 coming from the Eastern Cape, where ANC membership doubled during this period. Webster noted that membership fees were R12 a year (or less than $2) and it took just 100 members to form a new ANC branch. He thought that much of the growth of branches was due to an "amoeba" theory, in which those who felt excluded in ONE branch simply split off and started their own branch. Many of the leaders of ANC branches were deployed in the public service, legislature or private business, essentially leaving a vacuum, which was then filled by grassroots activists. Webster said that these activists capitalized on resentment of how ANC insiders had used party membership to promote their careers and fortunes, capturing "the resentment engendered by a simultaneous growth of opportunity and inequality." ¶3. Webster also had statistics about poverty within the ANC membership. A 2006 study commissioned by the ANC in Gauteng province showed that 42 percent of its delegates were unemployed; that 30 percent lived in informal settlements; 44 percent lived without access to water in their homes; 47 percent had not completed matric (Note: roughly equivalent to a high school diploma. End Note) and 25 percent had less than R1000 a month in disposable incomes. (Comment: Since Gauteng province is the third largest economy in Africa, and, together with Western Cape, has the lowest unemployment in South Africa, these rates may underestimate the overall poverty of ANC delegates on a national basis. As Webster pointed out, the rates of unemployment for ANC members appear to be higher than the national unemployment rate. End Comment.) ¶4. Webster added that the differentiation between those in power and the common run of delegates in Polokwane was pronounced. Those in power arrived in 4x4s, and dined in air-conditioned "network" rooms, while regular delegates came by bus and ate in tents or cafeterias. Dense informal networks were built up, such as among rural women present. Polokwane became a national theater that allowed a "coalition of the aggrieved" to "frame their resentments in a sense of moral indignation that enabled Jacob Zuma to seize the mantle of Tambo." Original Sin and Macroeconomic Policy -------------- -------------- ¶5. The adoption of the Mbeki government's neo-liberal GEAR (Growth Employment And Redistribution) macroeconomic strategy in 1996, without consultation with COSATU and the SACP and bypassing NEDLAC, the National Education Development and Labor Advisory Council, which has a statutory mandate to disQ economic and labor policies among tripartite constituencies and civil society, was the turning point in the Alliance. Webster characterized this "bypassing of democratic structures" as post-apartheid government's "original sin." Neither COSATU nor the SACP, though both alliance members, were able to influence this policy, developing a set of common grievances against the "hegemony" of the Mbeki government. COSATU then-President Willie Madisha told Webster in 2003 that the labor federation resolved in 1998 to "recapture" the ANC and "ensure that the bourgeoisie does not run away with the revolution." ¶6. Webster noted although there were divergences, Zuma's selection as a standard-bearer for the "coalition of the aggrieved" was not made until sometime in 2000, when it first JOHANNESBU 00000040 002.2 OF 002 became known that Zuma was under investigation by the Scorpions for alleged corruption. COSATU was outraged at the perceived use of state resources to eliminate a rival, according to Webster. Although neither COSATU nor the SACP were officially voting at Polokwane, the organizations were the "elephant in the room". Webster said that 62 percent of paid-up ANC members were either members of COSATU, the SACP or the ANC Youth League. Polokwane as Warning and Opportunity -------------- --- ¶7. The typology of leadership styles in post-colonial Africa varied along a grid of "authoritarian populism" and "popular democracy" either of which could be characterized as using state resources for private accumulation/corruption or for a commitment to public service. Webster questioned where along that grid Polokwane would take South Africa. He noted that too close an alignment of labor with the policy process would not be healthy, and warned that having labor be captive to state power could be dangerous. However, Webster believed that COSATU was aware of this danger, as its February 28 press conference showed. (Note: COSATU Central Executive Committee took issue with public statements made by ANC President Zuma on labor market flexibility. End Note.) Implications for Policy -------------- ¶8. Despite the "recapturing" of the ANC by COSATU and the SACP, Webster doubted that national policies will change significantly. Jacob Zuma is a politically ambiguous leader who represents multiple constituencies, including rural traditionalists, Webster said. In addition, a shift in economic policy has already taken place in the form of increased social spending and the adoption of industrial policy. This shift took place two or three years ago and will simply be continued by Zuma, Webster said. Comment -------------- ¶9. The demographic data presented by Professor Webster indicate the deep economic divisions still present in South African society, creating a fertile field for nuturing populist economic policies. Webster was encouraging COSATU's membership, many of whom were in the audience, to Qtinue on the labor federation's path of policy independence from government. In a follow-on conversation, he noted potentials parallels for COSATU with the experiences of other African state, where trade unions had become "clearly subservient clients of governments until the inevitable fallout". COSATU's General Secretary Vavi, who recently implicitly criticized Zuma in a radio interview, at any rate seems unwilling to cut even his political allies any slack. If politics is the art of compromise, then his personal unwillingness to do so, as much as any views on labor's policy independence, may result in COSATU remaining an independent -- and critical -- force in Alliance politics. End Comment. COFFMAN