COUNTERTERRORISM -- INDONESIA SHOWS RESULTS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000099 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, S/CT, DS INL FOR BOULDIN DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ DOJ/OPDAT FOR LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE/BERMAN DOJ/CTS FOR MULLANY/ST. HILLARE FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH TREASURY FOR PHILLIPP NSC FOR E. PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC ID SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM -- INDONESIA SHOWS RESULTS REF: A. JAKARTA 07 3375 ¶B. JAKARTA 07 3182 ¶C. JAKARTA 07 2852 ¶D. JAKARTA 07 1620 ¶E. JAKARTA 07 0194 ¶F. JAKARTA 06 7393 JAKARTA 00000099 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Three years into the Yudhoyono Administration, Jakarta remains stalwart in its commitment to put terrorists behind bars. Vigorous efforts by GOI law enforcement during the past year have dismantled several Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terror cells and further reduced the ability of radical groups to carry out attacks. Equally important, the GOI is improving the public's perception of its efforts to the point where violent, radical groups no longer receive the support from the larger Islamic community that they enjoyed a few years ago. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY (Con'd): The government is also keeping terrorists in prison longer and has instituted a selective de-radicalization effort which has yielded promising results. While there continue to be weak links in the GOI's efforts, the overall picture is highly positive. USG support is helping make a difference. END SUMMARY. POLICE EFFECTIVE IN SULAWESI -------------- ¶3. (S) Indonesia experienced a second consecutive year without a major terrorist incident in 2007. The Indonesian National Police (INP) scored major successes in breaking up terrorist cells linked to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other violent Islamic extremist organizations. As in past years, USG-trained INP Detachment 88 units (SD-88) led the charge, with significant support from the INP's so-called "Team Bomb." The first key breakthrough came in January, when the INP conducted two raids against a radical stronghold in Poso, Central Sulawesi. The second raid deployed 500 security force personnel against a large group of suspected terrorists and their supporters, who were armed with small arms and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The raids netted 28 captured, and subsequent operations added five more. The raids spurred a dramatic improvement in the previously tense situation in Central Sulawesi as many of the remaining militants fled the region (ref E). ¶4. (SBU) In March, information gained from the Poso suspects helped INP to initiate a series of raids in Central and East Java which resulted in the arrest of several members of the so-called "military wing" of JI and the much-publicized seizure of a large cache of explosives in East Java. In June, INP's SD-88 in Central Java arrested several key JI terrorist operatives, including alleged JI Emir Ustad Syahroni (aka Zarkasih) and senior JI operative Abu Dujana (aka Ainal Bahri). The arrest of Afghanistan veteran Dujana was particularly valuable, as he had been actively overseeing the stockpiling and movement of weaponry and had been involved in several JI attacks in recent years (ref D). WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS -------------- ¶5. (C) The Yudhoyono administration also made substantial progress in the propaganda war against JI and its allies in ¶2007. January raids spurred criticism from radical Muslim leaders who accused the INP of being heavy-handed and persecuting Muslims. This argument was deflated when the GOI charged 17 Poso Christians with terrorism in the murder of two Muslims in 2006. (Note: all 17 were eventually JAKARTA 00000099 002.2 OF 004 convicted.) After the March and June raids, the INP invited the press to film seized weapons and explosives caches and to interview Dujana and other arrestees. The transparency of press reports undercut radicals' claims that the terrorists were "victims" of police aggression. Predictions that the police would become the target of attacks by militants failed to materialize. Moreover, lawsuits brought against the INP by Abu Dujana's wife and JI co-founder and spiritual leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir did not create the expected groundswell of public attention and were eventually thrown out of court. MILITARY ROLE IN CT -------------- ¶6. (C) After the October 2005 terrorist attacks in Bali (the last major one in Indonesia) Yudhoyono called for the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) to assist the INP in CT activities. With the INP's separation from the TNI in 2001, the TNI was removed from domestic law enforcement, but the INP's intelligence capabilities remain underdeveloped. The TNI's primary CT function continues to be intelligence collection and surveillance. The Department of State's Diplomatic Security Anti-terrorism Assistance Program (DS/ATA) plans to provide training in intelligence gathering techniques to SD-88 to bolster its capabilities and lessen its dependence on the TNI for CT intelligence. ¶7. (C) TNI Army Special Forces units (KOPASSUS) form the backbone of the TNI's crisis response capacity. The elite force possesses skills--such as anti-hijacking, hostage rescue and explosive ordnance disposal. All TNI units continue to have shortages of specialized equipment, training, funding and experience, and interagency rivalry with the INP is still common. As with the INP, targeted foreign assistance to fund essential training and equipment for TNI would improve its crisis response capacity and ability to assist the INP in CT operations. WINNING IN THE COURTROOM -------------- ¶8. (C) The GOI has also made efforts to ensure that arrested terrorists are successfully prosecuted. All of the key suspects arrested by the INP in 2007 were brought to Jakarta for trial, where prosecutors and judges are more experienced. This not only reduced the possibility for terrorists and their supporters to manipulate the judicial process, it also put the cases directly under the USG-supported Attorney General's Task Force on Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ref B). This elite group won convictions against all 13 JI-linked terrorists brought to trial in 2007, including Poso JI leader Hasanuddin, four men who participated in the 2005 schoolgirl beheadings, and four others who were involved in the 2005 Tentena market bombings (ref C). The AGO's office also won convictions against the 17 Poso Christians. Most of those convicted received sentences of between 14 and 19 years. Task Force prosecutors worked closely with SD-88 officials in reviewing the evidence and ensuring that key witnesses from other regions testified. The Task Force is currently prosecuting Abu Dujana, Zarkasih and approximately 10 other JI members arrested in the March and June raids. The Dujana trial has been a particular focus, and the Task Force's top prosecutors are handling the case. STAYING IN PRISON LONGER -------------- ¶9. (U) Other legal institutions are showing greater resolve against terrorists, reflecting the GOI's growing confidence in fighting terrorism. In September, the Supreme Court rejected the final appeals of three men on death row for carrying out the 2002 Bali bombings. The Court also upheld JAKARTA 00000099 003.2 OF 004 the life sentence imposed on JI trainer and recruiter Subur Sugiyarto. In October, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights announced that convicted terrorists would no longer be given automatic sentence remissions at major holidays, as other prisoners enjoy. DE-RADICALIZATION EFFORTS -------------- ¶10. (SBU) In 2007, the INP made greater use of selective efforts to "de-radicalize" convicted terrorists. The program identifies individuals who appear open to more moderate teachings. INP officials provide spiritual support to the men and modest financial support to their families. In some cases, notably those of Nasir Abbas and Ali Imron, the "reformed" terrorists are allowed to meet with recent arrestees to make theological arguments against violence. The program also aims to improve intelligence collection from those arrested, and to reduce opportunities for terrorist recruitment inside prisons. While the program has scored some successes--largely due to the efforts of individual INP officials--it has not become formalized and often ends the moment the terrorists move from police custody into the prison system. TERROR FINANCE - ASSET FREEZING -------------- ¶11. (C) Indonesia's implementation of asset freezing under UNSC resolutions such as UN 1267 (for Al Qaeda-related assets) remains weak. Although the GOI has not recently opposed any U.S.-initiated designations, it also has not undertaken measures to identify, seize or freeze terrorist-related assets. There are three major problems: a) an overly bureaucratic procedure involving three GOI agencies; b) understaffing at the Foreign Ministry's Directorate for International Security and Disarmament; and c) lack of technical capacity of the banking system to find and freeze assets. These problems are compounded by the high incidence of similar names in Indonesian society, a poorly functioning credit bureau, and slow delivery of information from the central bank. While the GOI acknowledges its obligations under the UN process, it has not made terrorist asset freezing a high priority. ¶12. (C) Our inquiries have verified that UN 1267 and similar UN asset-freezing designations either have not been issued in a timely manner by the GOI to the banking system, or have not been issued at all. Asset-freezing implementation takes days or weeks after a UN announcement, which allows the terrorist to shift funds without penalty. That said, we do not believe that many terrorist assets would be found in the formal banking sector here. There are multiple ways to move money and other assets within Indonesia and across borders which are difficult to trace. An effective asset-freezing procedure would hinder the terrorist's ability to transfer assets, but it is not clear when the GOI will dedicate sufficient resources to this important task. BREAKING CONNECTIONS -------------- ¶13. (C) While Indonesia's counterterrorism efforts have been impressive, more could be done in some areas. Despite INP successes in Sulawesi and Central Java, JI networks and sleeper cells likely remain intact and have the capacity to go operational with little warning. Moreover, Malaysian JI operative and recruiter Noordin Mohammed Top, suspected of involvement in nearly every major terrorist attack in Indonesia since 2002, remains at large. GOI's CT Coordinating Desk remains hamstrung by limited funding and a reluctance to grant it too much public visibility. Most JAKARTA 00000099 004.2 OF 004 importantly, the GOI needs to address weaknesses in the prison system, where convicted terrorists are often able to maintain ties to their communities and to recruit new members into groups like JI. The problem is exacerbated by a lack of coordination between the INP and corrections officials. As more and more terrorists complete their sentences and are released into society, it will be important to ensure that former links among these terrorists do not re-establish themselves. USG SUPPORT MAKES A DIFFERENCE -------------- ¶14. (S) The DOS and DOD work together in Indonesia to assist the GOI with a variety of programs to promote awareness of counterterrorism issues and support a Rewards For Justice-style program (ref F). The DS/ATA continues to provide training and equipment to SD-88, while the Embassy's political section CT program uses DOD Military Information Support Team funds to help the GOI sponsor counterterrorism seminars, sports diplomacy events and television programs to educate the general public about the threat of terrorism and how the public can assist in stopping it. Regional 911-style police tip lines will begin in early 2008, and a national line is planned for the end of 2008. State/INL support for the AGO's Task Force has been vital to improving both the expertise and the morale of the prosecutors handling terrorist cases. ¶15. (C) A few years ago, the GOI seemed daunted by the challenge of counterterrorism. Over the past three years, President Yudhoyono's cautious but resolute engagement on counterterrorism has won the support of most Indonesians, the overwhelming majority of whom reject terrorism. Concerted leadership, sustained effort and foreign assistance have all played roles in the GOI's success. JI and its radical associates remain a security threat to both Western and domestic targets, but that threat has been severely weakened. ¶16. (U) One other positive note, which confirms the success of Indonesia's CT efforts, is the rising number of tourists who are again coming to Bali. Almost 1.7 million foreign tourists visited the island in 2007, including nearly 50,000 U.S. citizens. This figure is up considerably from the 1.25 million who visited in 2006. HUME