Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08JAKARTA866
2008-04-30 08:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:
SYRIAN CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR PROGRAM -- REVIEWING
how-toVZCZCXRO1775 OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHJA #0866 1210856 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 300856Z APR 08 FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8879 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4998 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2431 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0085 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4554 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0225 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1909 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2604 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0183 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0878 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000866
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP, T, PM, ISN, VCI, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/K,
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR E.PHU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ID SY KN
SUBJECT: SYRIAN CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR PROGRAM -- REVIEWING
POINTS WITH GOI
REF: STATE 43817
Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000866
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP, T, PM, ISN, VCI, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/K,
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR E.PHU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ID SY KN
SUBJECT: SYRIAN CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR PROGRAM -- REVIEWING
POINTS WITH GOI
REF: STATE 43817
Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Mission reviewed reftel points regarding
Syria's clandestine nuclear facilities with the Department of
Foreign Affairs. GOI contact basically took our points on
board, but expressed concerns about Israeli actions. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) On April 29, Poloff reviewed reftel points regarding
Syria's clandestine nuclear facilities with Andy Rachmianto,
Deputy Director for International Security and Disarmament at
the Department of Foreign Affairs. Providing a copy of U.S.
points as a nonpaper, poloff said U.S. intelligence
corroborated Israeli conclusions that the reactor was
designed for military purposes and had been kept wholly
outside the scope of Syria's cooperation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
3. (C) Rachmianto said an airstrike against a foreign
country's facilities was a "very dangerous act." Poloff
noted that ISRAEL had acted in its own defense against what
it considered a potential threat to its security. Rachmianto
noted that the USG had protested the Israeli attack against
the Iraqi reactor at Osirak in 1981 but had issued no such
protest in this case, implying support for the attack.
Poloff said U.S. intelligence agreed with Israeli conclusions
about the nature of the facility, but the attack on the
facility was Israel's sovereign decision.
4. (C) Turning to the NPT, Rachmianto said North Korea's
withdrawal from the treaty gave it the same status as ISRAEL
as nonparties. In this situation, there was nothing the NPT
could do. It was therefore important to continue the
Six-Party Talks to try to induce North Korea to return to the
NPT.
5. (C) Regarding the reference to the need to prevent
nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of dangerous
regimes, Rachmianto said the government of Indonesia regarded
all nuclear weapons as dangerous and therefore continued to
emphasize the importance of disarmament by all parties.
HUME
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP, T, PM, ISN, VCI, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/K,
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR E.PHU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ID SY KN
SUBJECT: SYRIAN CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR PROGRAM -- REVIEWING
POINTS WITH GOI
REF: STATE 43817
Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Mission reviewed reftel points regarding
Syria's clandestine nuclear facilities with the Department of
Foreign Affairs. GOI contact basically took our points on
board, but expressed concerns about Israeli actions. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) On April 29, Poloff reviewed reftel points regarding
Syria's clandestine nuclear facilities with Andy Rachmianto,
Deputy Director for International Security and Disarmament at
the Department of Foreign Affairs. Providing a copy of U.S.
points as a nonpaper, poloff said U.S. intelligence
corroborated Israeli conclusions that the reactor was
designed for military purposes and had been kept wholly
outside the scope of Syria's cooperation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
3. (C) Rachmianto said an airstrike against a foreign
country's facilities was a "very dangerous act." Poloff
noted that ISRAEL had acted in its own defense against what
it considered a potential threat to its security. Rachmianto
noted that the USG had protested the Israeli attack against
the Iraqi reactor at Osirak in 1981 but had issued no such
protest in this case, implying support for the attack.
Poloff said U.S. intelligence agreed with Israeli conclusions
about the nature of the facility, but the attack on the
facility was Israel's sovereign decision.
4. (C) Turning to the NPT, Rachmianto said North Korea's
withdrawal from the treaty gave it the same status as ISRAEL
as nonparties. In this situation, there was nothing the NPT
could do. It was therefore important to continue the
Six-Party Talks to try to induce North Korea to return to the
NPT.
5. (C) Regarding the reference to the need to prevent
nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of dangerous
regimes, Rachmianto said the government of Indonesia regarded
all nuclear weapons as dangerous and therefore continued to
emphasize the importance of disarmament by all parties.
HUME