Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08JAKARTA866
2008-04-30 08:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

SYRIAN CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR PROGRAM -- REVIEWING

Tags:  PREL PGOV KNNP ID SY KN 
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VZCZCXRO1775
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0866 1210856
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 300856Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8879
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4998
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2431
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0085
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4554
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0225
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1909
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2604
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0183
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0878
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000866 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, T, PM, ISN, VCI, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/K,
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ID SY KN
SUBJECT: SYRIAN CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR PROGRAM -- REVIEWING
POINTS WITH GOI

REF: STATE 43817

Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000866 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, T, PM, ISN, VCI, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/K, NEA/ELA NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ID SY KN SUBJECT: SYRIAN CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR PROGRAM -- REVIEWING POINTS WITH GOI REF: STATE 43817 Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Mission reviewed reftel points regarding Syria's clandestine nuclear facilities with the Department of Foreign Affairs. GOI contact basically took our points on board, but expressed concerns about Israeli actions. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On April 29, Poloff reviewed reftel points regarding Syria's clandestine nuclear facilities with Andy Rachmianto, Deputy Director for International Security and Disarmament at the Department of Foreign Affairs. Providing a copy of U.S. points as a nonpaper, poloff said U.S. intelligence corroborated Israeli conclusions that the reactor was designed for military purposes and had been kept wholly outside the scope of Syria's cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ¶3. (C) Rachmianto said an airstrike against a foreign country's facilities was a "very dangerous act." Poloff noted that Israel had acted in its own defense against what it considered a potential threat to its security. Rachmianto noted that the USG had protested the Israeli attack against the Iraqi reactor at Osirak in 1981 but had issued no such protest in this case, implying support for the attack. Poloff said U.S. intelligence agreed with Israeli conclusions about the nature of the facility, but the attack on the facility was Israel's sovereign decision. ¶4. (C) Turning to the NPT, Rachmianto said North Korea's withdrawal from the treaty gave it the same status as Israel as nonparties. In this situation, there was nothing the NPT could do. It was therefore important to continue the Six-Party Talks to try to induce North Korea to return to the NPT. ¶5. (C) Regarding the reference to the need to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of dangerous regimes, Rachmianto said the government of Indonesia regarded all nuclear weapons as dangerous and therefore continued to emphasize the importance of disarmament by all parties. HUME

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