U.S. MILITARY TRAINING OF INDONESIAN POLICE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000734 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INL SINGAPORE FOR R. HOLSKE - DEA NSC FOR E.PHU INL FOR C.BOULDIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM SMAR ID SUBJECT: U.S. MILITARY TRAINING OF INDONESIAN POLICE IN JEOPARDY Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Indonesian National Police (INP) have sent mixed signals regarding USG counterdrug training slated for early May -- first canceling it then seeming to reverse that decision. The Indonesian military has long opposed U.S. military training of Indonesian police. The matter has been complicated by the recent U.S. cancellation of USG training of KOPASSUS (Army Special Forces) personnel. MinDef Sudarsono told USPACOM Admiral Keating in Jakarta on April 10 that military training of the INP was an "anomaly" to Indonesia's reforms. Mission proposes to discuss this further with Indonesian officials at the Indonesia-U.S. Strategic Dialogue (IUSSD) talks in Washington on April 15-16. END SUMMARY. CANCELING A TRAINING OPPORTUNITY? ¶2. (C) Background: The U.S. military, particularly Special Operation Forces, has ongoing training relationships with the INP in three distinct areas of law enforcement. The INP's elite counterterrorism unit, Special Detachment 88 (SD-88), is scheduled to receive training in late July on field medical skills, heliborne medical evacuations and human rights. The INP's Marine Police are receiving two types of training: 1) basic boat handling and boarding techniques; and 2) Small Craft Maintenance Training Team (SCMTT) that teaches the INP mechanics how to maintain the 15 USG-funded patrols boats in their inventory. The INP's counterdrug force (BNN) has received marijuana eradication training and information technology equipment, and training that supports ongoing intelligence gathering operations. ¶3. (C) We understand, however, that the Indonesian National Police (INP) may cancel the USG marijuana interdiction training planned to begin in early May. The story is a bit complex, but Brigadier General Indradi Thanos, Director of the INP's counterdrug force (BNN),told Mission's Joint Inter-agency Taskforce West (JIATF-West) representative on April 4 that the long planned training exercise was canceled. The planned training exercise has been a regular event the last few years. On April 8, Indradi changed his tune and told us that if the Regional Police Chief (KAPOLDA) in Sumatra approved of the training he would also approve it. Given this communication, JIATF-West will contact the Sumatra Police Chief and ask for permission to hold the training next month. AN "ANOMALY" TO THE MIL-MIL FRAMEWORK ¶4. (C) A senior Indonesian defense official has now confirmed that more fundamental concerns exist. In a meeting with USPACOM Admiral Keating in Jakarta on April 10, MinDef Sudarsono said the government of Indonesia strongly preferred that the training of police not be done by military forces. (NOTE: A high-level Indonesian MFA official also made this point to the Ambassador in an April 9 meeting -- see septel.) Military training of a civilian force, he said, was an "anomaly" to the military-to-military framework of U.S.-Indonesian defense cooperation. The distinction was particularly important in light of Indonesia's past, where police forces had been part of the military. In the wake of Indonesia's reforms separating the INP from the Indonesian military, the INP should not receive training from military forces, Sudarsono stressed. ¶5. (C) Based on our soundings, the Indonesian military has long resented the fact that our military Special Forces train the INP. The resentment is particularly strong in view of the fact that, for human rights reasons, U.S. Special Forces are not permitted to train KOPASSUS, their natural counterpart. The recent U.S. cancellation of training for KOPASSUS appears to have brought this issue to the surface. The TNI has reluctantly accepted small-scale training of the JAKARTA 00000734 002 OF 002 INP in the past but they have balked at larger, more frequent training events. ¶6. (C) The message appears to be emerging on the INP side as well, with potentially negative implications for our work with SD-88 and the Marine Police. On March 25 the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Widodo A.S. (uses first name only),spoke with the Director of the Marine Police, Brigadier General Nengah Sutisna, questioning what type of training U.S. forces would be providing and if any tactical shooting was involved. Sutisna told Widodo that the training was all non-lethal and regularly done with the U.S. NEXT STEPS ¶7. (C) Mission has been able to work around TNI resistance in the past. That may no longer be possible. U.S. restrictions on KOPASSUS are making such work-arounds less acceptable to the Indonesians. This may affect a whole range of assistance currently provided by U.S. Special Forces. ¶8. (C) Mission will propose next steps after U.S. and Indonesian defense officials discuss the issue further at the Indonesia-U.S. Strategic Dialogue (IUSSD) talks in Washington April 15-16. HUME