ADMIRAL KEATING'S VISIT TO INDONESIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000692 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MTS, EAP/RSP, T, PM, ISN SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/AP P.IPSEN JOINT STAFF FOR P.CLEMMONS NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS ID SUBJECT: ADMIRAL KEATING'S VISIT TO INDONESIA Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Admiral Keating's April 9-11 visit to Jakarta offers an opportunity to move the bilateral mil-mil relationship forward. The visit should focus on further defining the long-term partnership and our shared regional security objectives. We should also review the robust bilateral agenda of mil-to-mil activities and underscore U.S. support for Indonesia's peacekeeping contributions. Indonesia also plans to purchase F-16's, which is positive. At the same time, we should alert Indonesian policymakers that Jakarta's failure to take further steps toward TNI accountability continues to stifle expansion of our mil-mil ties. END SUMMARY. A VITAL PARTNER ¶2. (C) Indonesia is helping to advance the regional security agenda and should be encouraged to do more. Indonesia will host the Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference in August 2008. In 2009, Indonesia will host the GARUDA SHIELD multilateral peacekeeping training exercise as a Capstone event. Other important events taking place in Indonesia this year include a Unified Engagement Air Force Exercise, a Tendon Valiant Medical Readiness Exercise, an annual Maritime Tri-border Security Conference and a Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS). These events give Indonesia the opportunity to deepen its security cooperation with the United States and Indonesia's neighbors. ¶3. (C) Indonesia has finally agreed to our proposal for maritime surveillance systems in the Strait of Malacca and the Sulawesi Sea using Section 1206 funding. We should commend Indonesian interlocutors, particularly Defense Minister Sudarsono, TNI Commander Santoso and Navy Chief Sumaryono, for taking the necessary steps to ensure Indonesia's support for this assistance. Over the next few years this project will improve Indonesia's ability to monitor maritime activity in these strategic waters, to the benefit of Indonesia and the United States. We will look for opportunities in future funding to expand this capability to other maritime areas as well. PLANNED F-16 PURCHASE ¶4. (C) Indonesian plans to purchase U.S. aircraft continue to move forward. Deputy Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsuddin told DAO on April 3 that Indonesia intended to buy new F-16 fighters beginning in 2010. This is the firmest statement yet from the Department of Defense on this purchase. Indonesia will also begin this year to refurbish its fleet of 23 C-130s, according to Sjamsuddin, four of them in 2008 and five of them in 2009. How all of this would be funded is not yet clear. But the clear message, particularly of the F-16 plans, is that Indonesia increasingly regards the United States as a reliable arms supplier. KEY MESSAGES ¶5. (C) These developments are all evidence of the importance of Indonesia for the United States (and vice versa) in Southeast Asia and of the growing bilateral military cooperation between our two countries. We expect that cooperation to continue to grow. Over the past year, the relationship has matured further, and we continue to work to develop a strategic center of identified shared interests and common objectives. We suggest the following key messages for use with Indonesian interlocutors: ¶6. (C) ACCOUNTABILITY: As part of our calibrated strategy of re-engagement with the Army Special Forces (Kopassus), Mission had approved a Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) between USPACOM and Kopassus for April. However, the Department of State decided it was unable to approve the proposed Kopassus participants whom Mission had vetted for the event. After consultations with Congress, the Department JAKARTA 00000692 002 OF 003 decided that there would be no engagement with Kopassus until the accountability issues regarding past Kopassus human rights abuses were resolved. Mission continues to believe that engagement offers the best way forward. ¶7. (C) The United States remains committed to enhanced military-to-military engagement with Indonesia. In discussions with Indonesian officials, however, it is important to emphasize that until Indonesia demonstrates some measure of accountability for past human rights abuses, the road to engagement will be rocky. The government of Indonesia can have a positive influence on Washington's concerns regarding Kopassus by taking visible actions. The Supreme Court's recent acquittal of East Timor militia leader Enrico Guterres would appear to be a step backward in this regard, although human rights groups are looking to the soon-to-be-released report of the Indonesia-Timor Leste Truth and Friendship Commission to make recommendations on how to move forward. ¶8. (C) GROWING ENGAGEMENT: That said, there are many positive elements in the relationship and we want to preserve and build upon those elements. We will move forward wherever we can. The annual Strategic Dialogue and the Defense Discussions have improved steadily each year and now entail serious, substantive exchanges as partners with a common goal. The Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) is robust yet focused and reflects a purposeful plan of development. Our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Indonesia in FY2008 stands at $13 million, up considerably from FY2007, and IMET has held steady at about $1 million. (Note: Indonesia will likely lose the $2.7 million "bonus" FMF funding over lack of accountability.) These programs represent the U.S. commitment to help transform the TNI into a modern, professional force. ¶9. (C) MARITIME SECURITY: Indonesia is an important partner in maritime security. Indonesia's needs are still vast and its resources are still limited, and we want to help where we can. The maritime surveillance systems that we are installing in the Malacca Strait and the Sulawesi Sea are a start. We will look for other areas of common interest where we can help as well. As this capability grows, Indonesia should think about how it will exercise its jurisdiction over its waters and what objectives it wishes to accomplish. ¶10. (C) Improved maritime capability will allow the government of Indonesia to regain control of its waterways against misuse. One potential area involves transnational crime, including terrorism, illegal logging and fishing, trafficking in humans and endangered species. Another involves proliferation, particularly of weapons of mass destruction. With capability in hand, Indonesia can begin to take a more realistic look at how the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Global Initiative (GI) can help Indonesia to meet its nonproliferation commitments, obligations and policy goals. We continue to stress that PSI and GI can serve Indonesia's interests. ¶11. (C) PEACEKEEPING: The United States welcomes Indonesia's contributions to international peacekeeping missions, exemplified in the Garuda XXIII battalion within UNIFIL in Lebanon, now in its second year, and the Formed Police Unit (FPU) now in training for deployment to Darfur, Sudan as part of the UN-African Union forces there. We were glad to be able to provide transport for the initial Garuda XXIII deployment and stand ready to assist again where possible. ¶12. (C) One potential opportunity would be Indonesia's plans to establish a peacekeeping training center. We understand various sites are being considered, including Bandung and Tangerang (a city near Jakarta). If this will be a military-only training facility, we may be able to provide assistance under the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). (Note: Funds were available for that purpose JAKARTA 00000692 003 OF 003 previously, but they disappeared because Indonesia was not ready to use them.) If Indonesia is ready to move ahead, we will try to secure funding. HUME