FM WIRAJUDA OUTLINES BILATERAL AND REGIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000060 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS SECDEF FOR USAP/ISA/AP P.IPSEN NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MASS ID SUBJECT: FM WIRAJUDA OUTLINES BILATERAL AND REGIONAL PRIORITIES Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a wide-ranging discussion with the Ambassador, Foreign Minister Wirajuda discussed regional developments and outlined bilateral priorities. Wirajuda looked forward to increased security cooperation with the United States as Indonesia made progress on human rights. He worried about increasing Chinese "aggressiveness" in Asia and agreed with the Ambassador that strong bilateral ties were essential in order to be prepared for future developments. Wirajuda reiterated Indonesia's commitment to promoting democracy and human rights in ASEAN and described President Yudhoyono's promotion of democratic reforms in Burma. Wirajuda undertook to press the Indonesian navy to resolve outstanding funding issues in order to preserve $20 million in U.S. maritime security assistance under Section 1206 before the January 16 deadline. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On January 9 Ambassador Hume and Foreign Minister Wirajuda met for over an hour in a one-on-one discussion of the bilateral relationship and regional issues. The Ambassador welcomed the opportunity to have a frank, wide-ranging discussion. Since arriving in Jakarta six months ago, he had come to appreciate the depth of change in Indonesia, particularly in the establishment of democratic institutions. The reformed police force was respecting human rights and effectively countering the risks of terrorism, as shown by the management of the recent environment conference in Bali. The new team of military commanders had a record of commitment to human rights. Not all problems from the past had been solved, but change was in the right direction. ¶3. (C) Referring to the Minister's press comment the previous day on the conditioning of a portion of FMF funding on a SecState report, the Ambassador commented that the increased funding level in fact showed that Washington's perceptions of conditions in Indonesia was slowly changing for the better. It was important to resolve the issues from the past and move on to build the kind of bilateral relationship that would serve both sides well in the future. He then cited several steps that the embassy was taking to resolve pending commercial disputes, encourage greater interest by business and NGOs in Indonesia, and draw attention to the positive changes. The two sides could increase cooperation on a range of issues, of which Burma was a good example. Although the two governments might approach the Burma issue differently, they shared the same democratic values and concern for stability in the region. The Ambassador thanked Wirajuda for the GOI's constructive role in the Middle East, including Wirajuda's participation in the recent Annapolis Middle East conference and GOI plans to reopen its Baghdad embassy. ¶4. (C) Foreign Minister Wirajuda spoke at length regarding change in Indonesia, changing security relations in East Asia, democracy and the development of ASEAN, and Burma. Indonesia was in the process of fundamental change from an authoritarian system to a democracy; much had been done, but much remained to be done. Elections were now free and fair; the police and military were trained to respect human rights of the citizens; and power had been devolved from the center to regional governments and municipalities. The FM had lived in the United States for over five years and he admired the values associated with American democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. Although Indonesians lived in a different culture, in his view, they held the same values. The changes in Indonesia reflected those values and should form the basis for a stronger, closer bilateral relationship. The Ambassador and the FM agreed that strong bilateral ties were needed in order to be prepared for future developments in the region. ASEAN ¶5. (C) Wirajuda described the regional context. Ten years ago, Malaysia had promoted the idea that discussions of security issues should be limited to ASEAN members plus China, Japan, and Korea. Indonesia had opposed this view, arguing for the inclusion of India, Australia, and New JAKARTA 00000060 002 OF 002 Zealand. China's power and influence were rising, and the more limited grouping risked being dominated by China. At the current rate of growth, how great would China's power be in ten years? China was "already assertive, in fact, aggressive" in dealing with other countries in the region. (During this phase of the conversation, Wirajuda did not mention the U.S. security role in the region.) ¶6. (C) Wirajuda described his efforts to secure a prominent position for human rights in the new ASEAN charter. He stressed that, for Indonesia, democracy and respect for human rights had to be an integral part of the new ASEAN, if it were not to remain a weak organization. Initially, other ASEAN members had objected, but gradually they had come around. Many other ASEAN countries, especially the newer members, had not had the same experiences and needed to be prodded in the right direction. But Indonesia was a good example of the truth that authoritarian systems could, and, in his view, must change. ¶7. (C) Wirajuda then recalled discussions which he had had with the Secretary during last year's APEC meeting. The FM believed the countries in the region must take the lead on human rights; the most productive role for countries such as the United States, Australia, or Canada, was to support that regional lead. Although he was not satisfied with the pace of change, that was the best way ahead. If the United States claimed the leadership role on these issues, progress would in fact be more difficult. BURMA ¶8. (C) Wirajuda said the situation in Burma was unacceptable and had had a negative impact on the region. He thought the issue had been poorly managed at the recent ASEAN summit in November, when the Burmese Foreign Minister had said merely that he would report the views of his counterparts to his authorities at home. The Burmese government had since then not delivered on any of its commitments. By itself, ASEAN as an institution was too weak to promote change in Burma. ¶9. (C) Indonesia wanted to do better, and it was preparing for the visit of the Burmese Prime Minister on January 14-15. President Yudhoyono had corresponded with Than Shwe to urge him to take steps to engage in domestic dialogue and to open up to the international community. He assured the Ambassador that the GOI would again use the visit to promote change. Wirajuda said that China also had a critical role and that in late January he would travel to Beijing to discuss Burma again. ¶10. (C) Wirajuda said he expected any progress to be incremental. Burma was far more militarized than Indonesia had ever been; it had regional conflicts and risks of separatism; and its economy was poor. If progress was to be achieved, all of these aspects would have to be addressed in one way or another. 1206 FUNDS ¶11. (C) At the end of the discussion, the Ambassador mentioned the issue of Section 1206 maritime security funding, explaining that unless the Embassy received a commitment from the Indonesian Navy by COB January 16, the $20 million of funding for the FY 2006 program would be withdrawn. The Embassy needed a similar commitment for the FY 2007 program by January 27 or that money would be transferred to another regional program. Wirajuda thanked the Ambassador for this information and said he would follow up. HEFFERN