IRAN-IAEA -- ENGAGING INDONESIA ON IRAN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000404

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, ISN, ISN/RA (NEPHEW),
IO, IO/UNP
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IAEA ID IR
SUBJECT: IRAN-IAEA -- ENGAGING INDONESIA ON IRAN'S
CONTINUED NONCOMPLIANCE

REF: A. STATE 19694

B. JAKARTA 403

C. JAKARTA 400

D. JAKARTA 392

Classified By: Dep/Pol/C Daniel Turnbull for reasons 1.4 (b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Mission delivered ref a demarche and
underscored that Iran continues to defy international calls
to meet all its nonproliferation obligations. Indonesian
officials have still not decided how they will vote on the
next UNSCR on Iran and remain worried that a new resolution
would disrupt Iran's cooperation with the IAEA. They are
also weighing domestic political factors and President
Yudhoyono's planned trip to Iran as they deliberate how to
vote on the resolution. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) MORE PRESSURE NEEDED ON IRAN: POLOFF delivered ref a
demarche and nonpaper to Fikri Cassidy, Deputy Director for
International Security and Disarmament Affairs at the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU). POLOFF explained that
the IAEA report and technical briefing documented Iran's
continued failure to comply with its international
nonproliferation obligations. Iran continued to conduct
enrichment-related activities, refused to implement the IAEA
Additional Protocol and refused to provide a complete account
of its past weapons-related development activities. For
these reasons, it was important that Indonesian support an
additional UNSCR on Iran's nuclear program.


3. (C) INDONESIA STILL CAUTIOUS: Cassidy said the Indonesian
government had not yet decided how it would vote on the next
UNSCR but would carefully consider USG views as it
deliberated on the matter. He reaffirmed that Indonesia
fully supported the objective of the resolution: compelling
Iran to meet all its international nonproliferation
obligations. He added, however, that Indonesia was still not
convinced that the time was right for a new resolution.


4. (C) Cassidy acknowledged that the latest IAEA Director
General's report documented continued Iranian noncompliance,
particularly with regard to accounting for all past
weapons-development activities. Nevertheless, he asserted,
the report showed a "positive trajectory" of steadily
increasing Iranian cooperation with the IAEA. Indonesian
officials remained concerned that another resolution could
disrupt this progress. POLOFF countered that Iran's limited
and incomplete cooperation with the IAEA had only come about
through international pressure. The international community
must increase the pressure on Tehran to bring Iran into full
compliance with all its nonproliferation obligations.


5. (C) DOMESTIC CONTEXT WEIGHS HEAVILY: Cassidy also
stressed that Indonesian leaders were sensitive to domestic
opposition to a yes vote on another Iran resolution. They
were especially keen to avoid a repeat of the "fiasco" that
accompanied Indonesia's yes vote on resolution 1747. (Note:
The Yudhoyono administration faced a storm of criticism from
the legislature (DPR) and media for supporting UNSCR 1747.)
According to Cassidy, FM Wirajuda had already met with some
key legislators to discuss the matter. However, GOI
officials were not yet convinced that DPR leaders would
support another yes vote.


6. (C) IRAN TRIP WILL AFFECT GOI THINKING: Cassidy also said
that President Yudhoyono's planned trip to Iran in early
March (ref c) would affect Indonesian government thinking
regarding the Iran resolution. He reported that senior GOI
officials were scheduled to meet at the Presidential Palace
on Friday, February 29, to discuss the trip. The outcome of
that discussion would likely influence Indonesia's decision
on how to vote on the resolution. (Note: Mission reported
ref b Ambassador Hume's discussion of the trip with
Presidential Advisor Dino Djalal on February 28.)

HUME