IRAN-IAEA -- ENGAGING INDONESIA ON IRAN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000404 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, ISN, ISN/RA (NEPHEW), IO, IO/UNP NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018 TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IAEA ID IR SUBJECT: IRAN-IAEA -- ENGAGING INDONESIA ON IRAN'S CONTINUED NONCOMPLIANCE REF: A. STATE 19694 ¶B. JAKARTA 403 ¶C. JAKARTA 400 ¶D. JAKARTA 392 Classified By: Dep/Pol/C Daniel Turnbull for reasons 1.4 (b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Mission delivered ref a demarche and underscored that Iran continues to defy international calls to meet all its nonproliferation obligations. Indonesian officials have still not decided how they will vote on the next UNSCR on Iran and remain worried that a new resolution would disrupt Iran's cooperation with the IAEA. They are also weighing domestic political factors and President Yudhoyono's planned trip to Iran as they deliberate how to vote on the resolution. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) MORE PRESSURE NEEDED ON IRAN: Poloff delivered ref a demarche and nonpaper to Fikri Cassidy, Deputy Director for International Security and Disarmament Affairs at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU). Poloff explained that the IAEA report and technical briefing documented Iran's continued failure to comply with its international nonproliferation obligations. Iran continued to conduct enrichment-related activities, refused to implement the IAEA Additional Protocol and refused to provide a complete account of its past weapons-related development activities. For these reasons, it was important that Indonesian support an additional UNSCR on Iran's nuclear program. ¶3. (C) INDONESIA STILL CAUTIOUS: Cassidy said the Indonesian government had not yet decided how it would vote on the next UNSCR but would carefully consider USG views as it deliberated on the matter. He reaffirmed that Indonesia fully supported the objective of the resolution: compelling Iran to meet all its international nonproliferation obligations. He added, however, that Indonesia was still not convinced that the time was right for a new resolution. ¶4. (C) Cassidy acknowledged that the latest IAEA Director General's report documented continued Iranian noncompliance, particularly with regard to accounting for all past weapons-development activities. Nevertheless, he asserted, the report showed a "positive trajectory" of steadily increasing Iranian cooperation with the IAEA. Indonesian officials remained concerned that another resolution could disrupt this progress. Poloff countered that Iran's limited and incomplete cooperation with the IAEA had only come about through international pressure. The international community must increase the pressure on Tehran to bring Iran into full compliance with all its nonproliferation obligations. ¶5. (C) DOMESTIC CONTEXT WEIGHS HEAVILY: Cassidy also stressed that Indonesian leaders were sensitive to domestic opposition to a yes vote on another Iran resolution. They were especially keen to avoid a repeat of the "fiasco" that accompanied Indonesia's yes vote on resolution 1747. (Note: The Yudhoyono administration faced a storm of criticism from the legislature (DPR) and media for supporting UNSCR 1747.) According to Cassidy, FM Wirajuda had already met with some key legislators to discuss the matter. However, GOI officials were not yet convinced that DPR leaders would support another yes vote. ¶6. (C) IRAN TRIP WILL AFFECT GOI THINKING: Cassidy also said that President Yudhoyono's planned trip to Iran in early March (ref c) would affect Indonesian government thinking regarding the Iran resolution. He reported that senior GOI officials were scheduled to meet at the Presidential Palace on Friday, February 29, to discuss the trip. The outcome of that discussion would likely influence Indonesia's decision on how to vote on the resolution. (Note: Mission reported ref b Ambassador Hume's discussion of the trip with Presidential Advisor Dino Djalal on February 28.) HUME