BURMA -- GAMBARI OUTLINES STRATEGY AND NEXT STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000373 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS (COPE),IO, IO/UNP NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ID BM UN SUBJECT: BURMA -- GAMBARI OUTLINES STRATEGY AND NEXT STEPS REF: A. CENZER-GLICK 02/22/2008 TELCON ¶B. MARCIEL-HUME 02/21/2008 EMAIL ¶C. JAKARTA 294 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a discussion hosted by Ambassador Hume on February 22, UN Special Envoy for Burma Ibrahim Gambari said he would press the regime to include the democratic opposition in the upcoming referendum. Indonesian interlocutors outlined their plans for enhanced regional efforts that would support Gambari's mission. Gambari pressed for a "time out" on sanctions to allow these efforts more time to produce results. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On February 22, Ambassador Hume hosted a dinner at the Residence for UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari. Key Indonesian interlocutors on Burma--including current and former GOI officials and outside experts involved in formulating a new Indonesian strategy on Burma (ref c)--also participated in the dinner. (Note: After traveling to Beijing, Gambari was in Jakarta from February 20-23. He left for Singapore and Tokyo.) REFERENDUM AND ELECTIONS: YES, BUT... ¶3. (C) The Ambassador outlined USG views on the Burmese regime's planned referendum (ref b). He explained that the United States did not support the referendum because the regime had essentially excluded the democratic opposition and ethnic minority groups from participating. The referendum was also problematic because the constitution was drafted in secret and did not include input from key stakeholders SIPDIS outside of the regime. ¶4. (C) Gambari agreed that the referendum was imperfect and clarified his recent comment that it was "a significant step." The fact that the regime had set a specific timetable for reform--elections in 2010--was a step forward, according to Gambari. He added, however, that the democratic opposition--including Aung San Suu Kyi--must be allowed to participate. The regime should also allow the democratic opposition and ethnic minority groups to contribute to the draft constitution. Gambari promised to press the regime on these points when he was able to return to Burma, hopefully in early March. UN ROLE? ¶5. (C) Ambassador Hume said that if the regime went ahead with the referendum, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) did not boycott the vote, the international community must work to make the process as credible as possible. He urged Gambari to mobilize UN resources, such as election monitors and the UNDP's Electoral Assistance Division, to make the referendum meet international standards of credibility. ¶6. (C) Gambari responded that the UN itself could not initiate monitoring of or assistance to the Burmese referendum. He explained that under UN rules, Burma would have to request UN assistance. The UNGA would then have to approve that request before the UN could take any action. REGIONAL PLAYERS SEEKING A ROLE ¶7. (C) Gambari commented that based on his meetings with President Yudhoyono and FM Wirajuda, he was optimistic that Indonesia would play "a cautiously proactive" role on Burma. He also sensed that frustration over the lack of progress in Burma was rising within ASEAN. ASEAN members, he thought, were ready to play a more active role on this issue. ¶8. (C) Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, who currently co-chairs a working group developing a new Indonesian strategy on Burma, noted the difficulties with ASEAN collective action on Burma. ASEAN members were not united re Burma and the regime has repeatedly spurned ASEAN envoys, such as Malaysian FM Hamid's effort. As a result, Indonesia was prepared to move ahead with the support of a JAKARTA 00000373 002 OF 002 subset of ASEAN members. ¶9. (C) Former FM Alatas elaborated further on Indonesia's evolving approach. He said that Indonesia was developing an approach modeled on the 1988 "Cocktail Party Talks" that Jakarta hosted to try to end the Cambodia-Vietnam conflict. (Note: Mission has previously reported on this evolving Indonesian approach--see ref b.) Key to this approach, according to Alatas, will be for regional states to take the lead. Gambari added that the UNSYG's Group of Friends on Burma allowed the United States and other P-5 countries to remain involved. ¶10. (C) Alatas stressed that any future Indonesian effort would cooperate fully with Gambari's mission. Gambari, he said, was "the only game in town" because he was the only international actor who has successfully talked to all sides in Burma and within the international community. SANCTIONS--A TIME OUT IS REQUESTED ¶11. (C) The Ambassador told Gambari that the United States would soon announce a new round of sanctions targeted at the Burmese regime. He underscored the need to pressure the regime to take concrete positive action on reform. ¶12. (C) While firmly agreeing that the regime must take needed steps, Gambari replied that it was time for the major powers to take a "time out" on sanctions. This, he said, was necessary "to create space" for his mission, and the efforts of regional powers, to make progress. He also noted that the regime points to sanctions to explain Burma's economic problems in an effort to rally support against external enemies. Gambari said that EU officials suggested to him that the EU would back away from further sanctions if his mission produced some tangible progress on reform in Burma. ¶13. (C) Djoko Susilo, chairman of the Myanmar Caucus in the Indonesian legislature (DPR),endorsed sanctions that targeted key regime leaders. He noted that existing sanctions did not affect the junta directly. He pointed to efforts to sanction the financial activities of North Korean leadership, such as shutting down DPRK accounts at Macao's Banco Delta Asia, as a model for more effective sanctions on the Burmese regime. ¶14. (C) In a conversation on the margins of the dinner, Erwan Pouchous, Gambari's Political Advisor, asserted to Pol/C that USG actions have made Gambari's mission more difficult. Pouchous said that "dramatic" U.S. announcements of sanctions were not effectively coordinated with the UN to support Gambari's good offices mission. He also criticized what he characterized as the USG's "propensity" for issuing statements seemingly critical of Gambari's failure to achieve certain objectives at the end of each of his missions to Burma. These actions, Pouchous asserted, made it easier for the Burmese regime to dismiss Gambari as a tool of the United States and others rather than a representative of a much broader international constituency for change. HUME