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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
08JAKARTA323 2008-02-19 07:40:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

MGKV01 -- URGING INDONESIA TO RECOGNIZE KOSOVO

Tags:   PREL PGOV UN ID YI 
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RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHJA #0323/01 0500740
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 190740Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8022
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0798
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
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					  C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000323 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EUR, EUR/SCA, IO, IO/UNP
S/ES-O FOR KOSOVO MONITORING GROUP
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN ID YI
SUBJECT: MGKV01 -- URGING INDONESIA TO RECOGNIZE KOSOVO

REF: A. STATE 16319

B. JAKARTA 319 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b+d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: Mission delivered latest Kosovo points to
GOI contacts on February 19. Pol/C underscored the need for
states to support Kosovo's independence publicly and in
international fora. GOI contacts noted that Indonesia
planned to continue its "wait and see" approach (see Para 7
for the official GOI statement on the matter). In the
meantime, the government has come under some pressure
domestically to recognize Kosovo. Our guess is that the GOI
will continue to take it slow and see how the situation
develops. END SUMMARY.

UNDERLINING USG POINTS



2. (C) On February 19, Pol/C delivered Ref A demarche to
Denny Abdi, Special Assistant to Secretary General Imron
Cotan, the number two official at the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DEPLU). (Note: High-level DEPLU officials were out
of pocket on February 19. Mission will seek further
opportunities to reach out to them.) Pol/C encouraged
Indonesia to recognize Kosovo as soon as possible. Prompt
recognition would signal global solidarity in responding to
this security challenge. The USG and its European allies
believed strongly that Kosovo was a special case and should
not be seen as a precedent for other issues, and should
properly be seen in the context of Yugoslavia's 15-year old
break-up.



3. (C) Abdi said Indonesia had no plans to recognize Kosovo
right away and he pointed to DEPLU's statement on the matter
(see Para 7). Indonesia wanted to see how developments
proceeded in Southeast Europe. The whole situation was too
controversial at this point, with Russia strongly opposed and
China not on board. As was noted by Ambassador Cotan to the
DCM last week (see Ref B), Abdi commented that it would
become easier for Indonesia to recognize Kosovo as more
countries did so. For example, if Indonesia heard from
enough countries in the Organization of Islamic Countries
(OIC), it might adjust its current position.



4. (U) Pol/C also reviewed USG points with contacts in the
Coordinating Ministry for Political, Security and Legal
Affairs, and in the Indonesian national legislature (DPR).

SOME DISSONANCE AT HOME



5. (C) The GOI might be taking a "wait and see" approach,
but that isn't totally popular at home. Key legislator Theo
Sambuaga, the Chair of the DPR's committee for foreign
affairs, publicly urged the government to support Kosovo's
independence, stating: "If other former Yugoslav territories
can separate, why can't Kosovo." In addition to Sambuaga (a
high-level official of the secular Golkar party), members of
several Islamic parties--including the PKS, PPP, and
PAN--urged Indonesian government recognition. Members of the
more nationalist-oriented Party of Democratic
Struggle-Indonesia (PDI-P), however, came out against
recognition, flagging long-standing Indonesian concerns about
separatist movements.

SOME MORE TIME NEEDED



6. (C) Our guess is that the GOI will continue to take it
slow and see how the situation develops. In general, the
Indonesian government takes time to read the tea leaves and
is very cautious. As mentioned above, however, the
government is coming under some pressure domestically and
President Yudhoyono's lone public statement on the matter was
pretty open-ended: "If Kosovo's independence is the best for
Kosovo and other nations in the world then we will be in
position to support it." If all proceeds well and other
countries climb on board, it is doubtful that Indonesia would
want to be seen as recalcitrant on this matter (and
associated with Serbia).

OFFICIAL STATEMENT



7. (U) DEPLU issued the following statement on February 18:


JAKARTA 00000323 002 OF 002


Begin text (of unofficial Embassy translation):

Statement of the Republic of Indonesia on Kosovo's Unilateral
Declaration of Independence

Regarding the unilateral declaration of independence of
Kosovo from Serbia on Sunday, February 17, 2008, the
Government of Indonesia states the following:

-- The Government of the Republic of Indonesia fully respects
the principle of National Sovereignty and Territorial
Integrity of each U.N. member, which is a principal of the
U.N. Charter, and International Law, as an important
principle that should be respected by countries, especially
developing countries that still face the challenge of
nation-building.

-- Nevertheless, the Government of Indonesia is also open to
seeing Kosovo's problems as part of a series of special
issues faced in the former State of Federal Yugoslavia during
the last 15 years, which have already resulted in new
independent states.

-- From the beginning, the Government of Indonesia has joined
in supporting the peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem
through dialogue and negotiation so that any agreement
achieved in the process would not cause more tension or new
conflicts in the Balkan region. The Government of Indonesia
regrets failure of efforts to solve Kosovo's problems through
dialogue and negotiation, which finally caused the unilateral
declaration of independence of Kosovo.

-- The Government of Indonesia will closely follow the
developments in Kosovo and is not yet in a position to
recognize the unilateral declaration of independence by
Kosovo. The Government of Indonesia hopes that this
declaration will not cause tension and open conflict,
especially with Serbia, considering that many have already
become victims in the Balkan region.

Jakarta, Indonesia, February 18, 2008.

End text.


HUME