KOSOVO -- SEEKING INDONESIAN RECOGNITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000293 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EUR, EUR/SCE (SHIRATORI) NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNMIK ID YI KV SUBJECT: KOSOVO -- SEEKING INDONESIAN RECOGNITION REF: STATE 14626 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires John A. Heffern, reasons 1.4 (b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A senior GOI official told the Charge on February 13 that it would be very difficult for Indonesia to recognize Kosovo anytime soon. He left open the possibility that Indonesia might extend recognition after enough other countries had done so. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) URGING INDONESIAN RECOGNITION: Charge delivered reftel demarche to Secretary General Imron Cotan, the number-two official in the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU),and urged Indonesia to recognize Kosovo's upcoming declaration of independence. Charge underscored that the independence of Kosovo was the last step in the long process of Yugoslavia's break-up. He stressed that attempts to reach a negotiated settlement had run their course and that international recognition of Kosovo's independence was the best way to ensure peace and security in the region. Charge also emphasized that the recognition of Kosovo's independence did not set any sort of precedent. ¶3. (C) GOI IN A TOUGH SPOT: Cotan responded that Indonesia had not yet made a decision re recognizing Kosovo but said that a unilateral declaration of independence would put his country in a very difficult position. He explained that Indonesia had faced secessionist movements, particularly in Aceh and Papua. Many in Indonesia would see recognition of Kosovo's independence as opening the door to secessionist forces within Indonesian borders, according to Cotan. ¶4. (C) PERHAPS EVENTUALLY: Charge stressed that most EU states would join the United States in recognizing Kosovo and noted that Indonesia had already recognized the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia without creating an evident precedent or spawning domestic secessionist movements in Indonesia. Cotan said that the lack of a P-5 consensus, and particularly the intransigence of Russia and China, made it more difficult for Indonesia to offer early recognition of Kosovo. He conceded, however, that as more countries recognized Kosovo, Indonesia might find it possible to slip quietly in among the pack. HEFFERN