INDONESIAN COUNTERTERRORISM AND DERADICALIZATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000247 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ID PK SUBJECT: INDONESIAN COUNTERTERRORISM AND DERADICALIZATION INITIATIVES REF: JAKARTA 0099 Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: DCM met Indonesia's chief counterterrorism coordinator, Inspector General Ansyaad Mbai, on January 30. Mbai reviewed Indonesia's CT cooperation with Pakistan, and expressed frustration over what he considered a lack of cooperation from other Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Mbai expressed appreciation for U.S. CT assistance and solicited assistance for several new deradicalization initiatives. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) DCM met (Police retired) Inspector General Ansyaad Mbai, Chief Counterterrorrism Coordinator for the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, January 30. Mbai heads the CT Desk in the Ministry, which was created in the wake of the 2002 Bali terrorist attacks (while SBY was serving as Coordinating Minister under then-President Megawati) for the purpose of coordinating Indonesia's CT efforts nationally. Mbai was accompanied by Ambassador (retired) Rousdy Soeriaatmadja, Mission's direct contact on CT assistance programs. INDONESIA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION ¶3. (C) Mbai said a joint Indonesia-Pakistan working group had met in Islamabad in June 2007 to explore cooperation on counterterrorism, law enforcement and immigration. They had discussed a possible exchange of officers to formalize the cooperation. Mbai said a terrorism "hotline" was in operation between the two governments, and noted Pakistan had arrested the younger brother of Indonesian terrorist Hambali and had returned him to Indonesia to face trial. COOPERATION WITH SOME ISLAMIC COUNTRIES FALLS SHORT ¶4. (C) Mbai described his efforts to exchange moderate religious scholars with other leading Islamic countries as a way to spread moderate messages in both countries and counteract similar collaboration among more radical groups. Mbai expressed frustration that influential Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt acknowledged the potential benefits of such an exchange but seldom followed through. DCM said the United States would be willing to help by weighing in with the Saudi Arabian and Egyptian governments. Mbai mentioned several specific scholars whom he would like to bring to Indonesia and asked if USG assistance were available to do this. DCM said it would be best if an Indonesian organization like NU sponsored such a visit. DERADICALIZATION INITIATIVES ¶5. (S) Mbai expressed appreciation for Embassy's funding of GOI efforts to counteract terrorist recruitment through traditional Indonesia media, such as wayang (puppet) shows, youth soccer clinics and CT workshops. Stressing the negative impact if the general public learned of the U.S. sponsorship of the programs, he urged continued care that the collaboration not be discussed publicly. ¶6. (C) Mbai described his ideas for deradicalizing former terrorists. He mentioned one alleged terrorist, for example, who had not conducted terrorist activities himself but who had associated with terrorist circles, teaching infantry tactics to JI in Afghanistan in the 1990's. From direct and indirect discussions with this individual, Mbai believed the individual could be enlisted to propagate moderate Islam among terrorists, in addition to providing intelligence on JI operatives and activities. ¶7. (S) Mbai said INP General Surya Dharma had a list of about 100 terrorists currently in prison who potentially could be converted to more moderate views and possibly enlisted for de-radicalization efforts. Most such convicts lacked any financial means in the outside world and would respond positively if provided an income upon their release from prison. The equivalent of $100 would suffice to set them up in business with a roadside food stall or a cigarette stand, and the gainful employment would be enough to keep them away from terrorism. Mbai said he would welcome any JAKARTA 00000247 002 OF 002 U.S. assistance that were available for such purposes. TRIAL TARGETS JEMA'AH ISLAMIYAH AS ORGANIZATION ¶8. (C) Mbai said Abu Dujana's trial, currently under way in South Jakarta, was the Attorney General Office's first attempt to implicate JI as a terrorist group. Previously, terror suspects had always been tried individually. As the case targeted Jema'ah Islamiyah, a conviction could open the way for the banning of JI. Mbai said that, effective as the AGO's Task Force had been, it needed to become more assertive against JI and other terrorist groups. The strategy was important, because the Administration needed a firm legal basis in order to ban the organization. (Note: The prosecution strategy in this case is largely Mbai's; although the AGO appears to be on board, it is not clear how much support he has within Indonesian judicial circles. Ultimately, any decision to ban JI would be a largely political decision of major proportions and would not come easily.) BACKGROUND AND BIO INFORMATION ¶9. (C) The CT Desk has yet to be elevated to its originally intended level as a cabinet agency. Since it is not a separate agency, it lacks the formal authority and funding to do what it is tasked to do. Mbai relies on his personal connections with police colleagues to conduct selected initiatives like de-radicalization of captured terrorists. ¶10. (S) Mbai's colleague, Amb. (ret.) Soeriaatmadja, administers the various anti-terror/violence programs and has helped facilitate CT workshops for local government employees. Joint programs currently include promotion of non-violence and counterterrorism awareness via various media, including traditional puppet shows both on television and on the road, and sports diplomacy, through youth soccer clinics. HUME