LEBANON -- SEEKING INDONESIAN SUPPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000232 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, NEA, NEA/ELA (SOMERSET, IRWIN AND MONZ) NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM LE SY ID SUBJECT: LEBANON -- SEEKING INDONESIAN SUPPORT REF: STATE 10786 Classified By: DCM John A. Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 8. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: The DCM delivered reftel demarche to key GOI official Desra Percaya on February 5, underscored the importance of international support for the Lebanese government and urged Indonesia to strengthen its support for that country. Percaya emphasized Indonesia's support for PM Siniora's government and agreed that Syrian interference in Lebanon was unhelpful. However, he questioned the Special Tribunal's relationship to the broader process of national reconciliation in Lebanon. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) LEBANON--SUPPORT URGENTLY NEEDED: On February 5, the DCM delivered reftel demarche to Desra Percaya, Director for International Security and Disarmament Affairs at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU),and urged Indonesia to support the Lebanese government. DCM provided Percaya with a copy of reftel note verbale, which Mission had already conveyed to FM Wirajuda's office. The DCM underscored the importance of public expressions of support for the legitimate elected government of PM Siniora. ¶4. (C) Percaya stressed Indonesia's support for the Lebanese government and said he would convey USG concerns directly with FM Wirajuda. Percaya noted Indonesia had contributed troops to UNIFIL and pledged the troops would stay as long as they were needed. Having troops on the ground heightened GOI interest in peace and security in Lebanon, Percaya emphasized. ¶5. (C) SYRIA UNHELPFUL: The DCM said Syrian interference was destabilizing Lebanon and urged Indonesia to press Damascus. Percaya agreed Syria was a destabilizing force but asserted "other neighbors, including Israel" were also interfering in Lebanon. He explained that FM Wirajuda had urged the Syrian government to support the legitimately elected government of Lebanon, most recently when he had met President Assad on the margins of the UNGA in September 2007. Percaya asked how Washington had pursued this issue in its discussions with the Syrian government. ¶6. (C) TRIBUNAL'S ROLE UNCLEAR: Percaya explained why Indonesia had abstained on the resolution to establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. He pointed to differences within the Lebanese government over the Tribunal's role and noted that PM Siniora and President Lahud had sent "quite different letters" on the issue to the UNSC. This GOL division had resulted in Indonesia's decision to abstain on UNSCR 1757 authorizing the Tribunal, Percaya explained. ¶7. (C) The DCM responded that the Tribunal would play the critical role of bringing to justice those involved in the murder of former PM Hariri. Percaya agreed this was an important issue and emphasized that Indonesia did not question the Tribunal's legitimacy, but worried that the Tribunal might be "divisive." Percaya requested our assessment of the Tribunal's role in achieving the longer-term goal of national reconciliation and the formation of a unity government in Lebanon. JAKARTA 00000232 002 OF 002 ¶8. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Mission requests that the Department provide the following, as requested by Percaya, to be shared with the GOI: - a readout of U.S.-Syrian discussions on Lebanon; and - a statement of USG views on how the Special Tribunal relates to broader political processes in Lebanon, including national reconciliation. HUME