CHIEFS OF DEFENSE CONFERENCE IN BALI --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002059

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, T, PM, EAP/MTS, EAP/RSP, EAP/MLS
NSC FOR E.PHU
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/APSA D.WALTON
JOINT STAFF FOR R.CARTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PGOV ID
SUBJECT: CHIEFS OF DEFENSE CONFERENCE IN BALI --
SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL KEATING

Classified By: DCM John A. Heffern, reasons 1.4(b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Admiral Keating's participation in the
Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference in Bali (November 11-14)
offers an opportunity to consolidate the mil-mil relationship
with Indonesia. On the margins of this multilateral event,
Admiral Keating will meet with Defense Minister Sudarsono and
Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Commander General Santoso.
Ambassador Hume will also participate.


2. (C) SUMMARY (Con'd): The relationship has reached a
stable plateau after a rapid ramping-up over the past three
years. Where we go from here depends largely on the new
administration and Congress. The Indonesians would welcome
assurances of the new administration's commitment to the
region. Key topics include security assistance and defense
cooperation (including a proposed agreement),accountability,
Kopassus (Army special forces),maritime security and China.
END SUMMARY.

A VITAL PARTNER


3. (C) By hosting the CHOD Conference, Indonesia is
signaling its commitment to regional security in Southeast
Asia. This is one of a growing list of steps that Indonesia
has taken since the lifting of U.S. sanctions in 2005 to
reintegrate itself into U.S.-sponsored cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific region. In 2009, Indonesia will host a
multilateral peacekeeping training exercise, GARUDA SHIELD,
as a PACOM Capstone event. Other important events in
Indonesia taking place this year include a Unified Engagement
Air Force Exercise, Tendon Valiant Medical Readiness
Exercise, an annual Maritime Tri-border Security Conference
and a Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS). These events
are deepening Indonesia's security cooperation with the
United States and Indonesia's neighbors.


4. (C) In 2007, Indonesia finally agreed to the U.S.
proposal for maritime surveillance systems in the Sulawesi
Sea and re-energized Indonesian efforts in the Strait of
Malacca using Section 1206 funding. Indonesian Defense
Minister Sudarsono, TNI Commander General Santoso and
then-Navy Chief, Admiral Sumarjono, were instrumental in
mobilizing support for this assistance. Over the next few
years, this project will improve Indonesia's ability to
monitor maritime activity in these strategic waters, to the
benefit of Indonesia, the United States and regional
partners. We will look for opportunities to expand this
capability to other maritime areas as well.


5. (C) Our annual Strategic Dialogue and Defense Discussions
are increasingly substantive, and the Theater Security
Cooperation Plan (TSCP) with the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
is running smoothly. Quantitatively, the TSCP agenda is at
full capacity, and any future growth should take the form of
qualitative improvements rather than quantity of events.


6. (C) We are reviewing an Indonesian draft text for a

defense cooperation agreement with a view to accepting as
much of it as possible. Such an agreement could document
current cooperation and provide a basis to expand cooperation
in the future. We seek an agreement that does not require
legislative approval in either capital (USG would notify
Congress) and a government-to-government agreement that
encompasses the role of non-defense agencies and policy in
mil-mil cooperation. An agreed text would be presented to
the next U.S. administration for approval.

GROWING ASSISTANCE NEEDS


7. (C) Indonesia is moving forward with its plans to create

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an Indonesian Defense University (IDU),modeled on NDU and
supported in part with modest FMF funding. The U.S.-funded
Defense Resource Management System (DRMS) project, which will
rationalize procurement and other resource needs, is slated
for completion in 2009. The Defense Department (DEPHAN)
still needs a systematic overhaul in policy, doctrine,
functional organization and operational guidelines, and we
plan to use some of our future FMF for this purpose.


8. (C) Our assistance to Indonesia under Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and
Training (IMET) has leveled off in 2007-2008. Currently
Indonesia receives $15.7 million in FMF (with some
conditions) and about $1 million in IMET. Indonesia is fully
utilizing the assistance we provide under these programs and
can absorb more. We need to work with Congress to boost
current funding levels.


9. (C) Indonesian plans to purchase U.S. fighter aircraft
have been put on hold owing to domestic fiscal constraints,
exacerbated by changes in the global economy over the past
six months. Indonesia has begun to refurbish its fleet of 23
C-130s, but will need significant U.S. assistance to make
real progress. A significant increase in FMF, in particular,
is necessary if we want to help Indonesia build its lift
capability with existing C-130s.

KEY BILATERAL MESSAGES


10. (C) These developments are all evidence of Indonesia's
importance for the United States (and vice versa) in
Southeast Asia and of the growing bilateral military
cooperation between our two countries. We expect that
cooperation to continue to grow. We suggest the following
key messages for use with Indonesian interlocutors:


11. (C) TRANSITION: We anticipate that the new
administration will build on the progress we have experienced
in bilateral security ties. Spokesmen for President-Elect
Obama have stressed his commitment to partners and friends in
this region.


12. (C) SECURITY COOPERATION: We are seeking ways to expand
our cooperation, including through a bilateral defense
cooperation agreement, more funding for FMF and IMET, IDU and
more advanced bilateral activities and exercises.


13. (C) ACCOUNTABILITY: The prosecution of Indonesian
security officials involved in the murder of human rights
activist Munir and of Indonesian Marine Corps in the shooting
incident in Pasuruan are positive steps in this direction,
but more needs to be done. The report by the Indonesia-Timor
Leste Truth and Friendship Commission was welcome, but the
Indonesian government needs to socialize the report's
findings within the Indonesian military and follow up on the
commission's recommendations. Secretary Rice announced after
bilateral talks with Foreign Minister Wirajuda that the
United States was committed to help. We continue to look for
ways to engage with all elements of the TNI, including
Kopassus.


14. (C) MARITIME SECURITY: Indonesia is an important partner
in maritime security. Indonesia's needs are still vast and
its resources are still limited, and we want to help where we
can. The maritime surveillance systems that we are
installing in the Malacca Strait and the Sulawesi Sea (under
Section 1206) are a start. As this capability grows,
Indonesia should think about how it will exercise its
jurisdiction over its waters and what objectives it wishes to
accomplish. Improved maritime capability will allow the
government of Indonesia to regain control of its waterways.

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Areas where increased regional and bilateral cooperation
would help include terrorism, illegal logging and fishing,
trafficking in humans and proliferation, particularly of
weapons of mass destruction.


15. (C) PEACEKEEPING: The United States welcomes
Indonesia's contributions to international peacekeeping
missions, exemplified in the Garuda XXIII deployment within
UNIFIL in Lebanon, now nearing the end of its second year,
and the Formed Police Unit (FPU) that recently deployed to
Darfur, Sudan as part of the UN-African Union forces there.
We were glad to be able to provide transport for the initial
Garuda XXIII deployment and stand ready to assist again where
possible. Peacekeeping is an area where we might look for
opportunities to engage with special forces.


16. (C) CHINA: Indonesia has shown increasing interest in
U.S. concerns regarding China's growing economic and military
clout in the region. During visits to Jakarta this year,
SecDef Gates and CJCS Mullen stressed, as you have, the need
for increased transparency by the Chinese military. In
October, a team from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
briefed DefMin Sudarsono on the Defense Department's annual
report to Congress on China's military power. The briefing
was well received and elicited substantive, if somewhat
skeptical, comment from Sudarsono. The exchange demonstrated
that Indonesia's civilian defense leadership is actively
grappling with China's rise and the implications for the
region. We need to make China's capabilities, role and
intentions a regular theme of our dialogue with Indonesia.

HUME