BURMA -- SPECIAL ENVOY GAMBARI ON HIS LATEST TRIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001629 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, EAP/MTS (COPE) NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM UNSC ID BM SUBJECT: BURMA -- SPECIAL ENVOY GAMBARI ON HIS LATEST TRIP Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari reported that during his August 18-23 visit to Burma he pressed key regime figures on the need for progress on reforms. He acknowledged disappointment with being unable to meet opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and Senior General Than Shwe. He said the UN would continue to seek ways to press for progress in Burma, including through Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's possible travel by the end of 2008. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) United Nations Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari visited Jakarta August 26-27--his only Southeast Asia stop after leaving Burma--for consultations on his recent trip to Rangoon. He will meet President Yudhoyono on August 27. Gambari plans to return to New York early next week, following a stop in Turin, Italy, for UN Secretariat meetings. Ambassador Hume met Gambari on August 26. GAMBARI'S READOUT ¶3. (C) Ambassador Hume asked for an update on Gambari's August 18-23 visit to Rangoon. Gambari voiced some frustration with observers who had, he said, focused only on whom he did not meet during his visit. Gambari noted that he had had a number of key meetings with regime figures, including: --Prime Minister Thein Sein; --Foreign Minister Nyan Win; --Culture Minister Khin Aung Myint; --Information Minister Kyaw Hsan; --Health Minister Kyaw Myint; --The referendum coordinating committee; and --The regime's senior official responsible for relations with ASSK. He had met twice with the main opposition group, the National League for Democracy (NLD),and conducted two briefings for the diplomatic corps. ¶4. (C) Gambari explained that he delivered a comprehensive five-point message of steps the regime must take: ¶A. release all political prisoners; ¶B. resume dialogue with ASSK; ¶C. begin a dialogue with the UN on conditions for the proposed 2010 elections; ¶D. convene a national economic forum to address economic and development issues; and ¶E. support a regular dialogue with the UN and agree to the stationing of UN staff in Rangoon to support Gambari's mission. NLD leaders told Gambari they supported all but point C. Their reservations about this point stemmed from their objection to the flawed constitutional referendum process as a basis for the upcoming elections. ¶5. (C) a mbari reported an improved atmosphere in his mettings with regime officials. They had appeared willing to consider his points, he said. They also a d appeared willing to look for specific issues hhere they could cooperate with the opposition. a mbari said he had delivered a firm message--tha the regime must produce concrete results on the road to reform. The window of opportunity for delie ring those results was disappearing. Progress would have to come soon. He had also told the regime that he would brief the SYG on his return to New York and would also have to brief the UNSC. NO MEETINGS WITH ASSK AND THAN SHWE ¶6. (C) Gambari acknowledged disappointment with the fact JAKARTA 00001629 002 OF 002 that he had not been able to meet Aung San Suu Kyi or Senior General Than Shwe. He underscored that he had tried several tactics to obtain such meetings. He had sent his staff to ASSK's house with a personal letter asking her to meet him. The letter had also included a message from Secretary General (SYG) Ban Ki-moon that had outlined the UN's relief efforts following Cyclone Nargis and had discussed Burma's recent constitutional referendum. ASSK refused to accept the letter. Gambari also proposed a series of meetings between regime officials, the NLD, ASSK and himself. This had also come to naught. Gambari was frustrated with his inability to meet ASSK and noted this was the first time he had been unable to meet her. He reiterated that he had no idea why she had refused to meet. SYG BAN'S POSSIBLE TRAVEL ¶7. (C) Noting reports that SYG Ban would travel to Burma before the end of 2008, Ambassador Hume urged that the SYG consider the trip carefully. It could be quite negative to attach the prestige of the SYG to a visit that did not produce any concrete outcomes. Countries around the world would watch such a trip closely. ¶8. (C) Gambari said SYG Ban still planned to visit Burma, but he would want to be assured of a positive outcome before making the trip. The SYG had said his visit to inspect cyclone relief operations would only address humanitarian--not political--issues, which would instead be the subject of a later trip. Part of Gambari's recent mission was to prepare for Ban's trip. Gambari had told the regime that the SYG wanted to "deepen and broaden" the UN envoy's role in Burma. Gambari said he expected to visit Rangoon several more times to prepare for Ban's trip. He assured the Ambassador that the SYG understood the importance of a successful trip that delivered results. UPDATE ON UN ACTION ¶9. (C) Gambari assured Ambassador Hume that the UN would continue to press for progress in Burma. A Focus Group--consisting of China, India, Indonesia, Burma and the UN Secretariat--had already met several times at the PermRep level in New York. Gambari said the SYG would try to organize a meeting of this same group at the ministerial level on the margins of the UNGA in September. He also said the larger Group of Friends continued to meet on Burma. (Note: The Secretary General's Group of Friends on Burma includes key UNSC members, regional leaders and major donors.) This group also could meet on the margins of the UNGA. Gambari also said he would continue engaging key countries bilaterally to secure their support for his mission. HUME