BURMA -- SPECIAL ENVOY GAMBARI ON HIS LATEST TRIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001629

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, EAP/MTS (COPE)
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM UNSC ID BM
SUBJECT: BURMA -- SPECIAL ENVOY GAMBARI ON HIS LATEST TRIP

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari reported
that during his August 18-23 visit to Burma he pressed key
regime figures on the need for progress on reforms. He
acknowledged disappointment with being unable to meet
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and Senior General Than
Shwe. He said the UN would continue to seek ways to press
for progress in Burma, including through Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon's possible travel by the end of 2008. END
SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) United Nations Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari
visited Jakarta August 26-27--his only Southeast Asia stop
after leaving Burma--for consultations on his recent trip to
Rangoon. He will meet President Yudhoyono on August 27.
Gambari plans to return to New York early next week,
following a stop in Turin, Italy, for UN Secretariat
meetings. Ambassador Hume met Gambari on August 26.

GAMBARI'S READOUT


3. (C) Ambassador Hume asked for an update on Gambari's
August 18-23 visit to Rangoon. Gambari voiced some
frustration with observers who had, he said, focused only on
whom he did not meet during his visit. Gambari noted that he
had had a number of key meetings with regime figures,
including:

--Prime Minister Thein Sein;
--Foreign Minister Nyan Win;
--Culture Minister Khin Aung Myint;
--Information Minister Kyaw Hsan;
--Health Minister Kyaw Myint;
--The referendum coordinating committee; and
--The regime's senior official responsible for relations with
ASSK.

He had met twice with the main opposition group, the National
League for Democracy (NLD),and conducted two briefings for
the diplomatic corps.


4. (C) Gambari explained that he delivered a comprehensive
five-point message of steps the regime must take:


A. release all political prisoners;

B. resume dialogue with ASSK;

C. begin a dialogue with the UN on conditions for the
proposed 2010 elections;

D. convene a national economic forum to address economic and
development issues; and

E. support a regular dialogue with the UN and agree to the
stationing of UN staff in Rangoon to support Gambari's
mission.

NLD leaders told Gambari they supported all but point C.
Their reservations about this point stemmed from their
objection to the flawed constitutional referendum process as
a basis for the upcoming elections.


5. (C) a mbari reported an improved atmosphere in his
mettings with regime officials. They had appeared willing to
consider his points, he said. They also a d appeared willing
to look for specific issues hhere they could cooperate with
the opposition. a mbari said he had delivered a firm
message--tha the regime must produce concrete results on the
road to reform. The window of opportunity for delie ring
those results was disappearing. Progress would have to come
soon. He had also told the regime that he would brief the
SYG on his return to New York and would also have to brief
the UNSC.

NO MEETINGS WITH ASSK AND THAN SHWE


6. (C) Gambari acknowledged disappointment with the fact

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that he had not been able to meet Aung San Suu Kyi or Senior
General Than Shwe. He underscored that he had tried several
tactics to obtain such meetings. He had sent his staff to
ASSK's house with a personal letter asking her to meet him.
The letter had also included a message from Secretary General
(SYG) Ban Ki-moon that had outlined the UN's relief efforts
following Cyclone Nargis and had discussed Burma's recent
constitutional referendum. ASSK refused to accept the
letter. Gambari also proposed a series of meetings between
regime officials, the NLD, ASSK and himself. This had also
come to naught. Gambari was frustrated with his inability to
meet ASSK and noted this was the first time he had been
unable to meet her. He reiterated that he had no idea why
she had refused to meet.


SYG BAN'S POSSIBLE TRAVEL


7. (C) Noting reports that SYG Ban would travel to Burma
before the end of 2008, Ambassador Hume urged that the SYG
consider the trip carefully. It could be quite negative to
attach the prestige of the SYG to a visit that did not
produce any concrete outcomes. Countries around the world
would watch such a trip closely.


8. (C) Gambari said SYG Ban still planned to visit Burma,
but he would want to be assured of a positive outcome before
making the trip. The SYG had said his visit to inspect
cyclone relief operations would only address
humanitarian--not political--issues, which would instead be
the subject of a later trip. Part of Gambari's recent
mission was to prepare for Ban's trip. Gambari had told the
regime that the SYG wanted to "deepen and broaden" the UN
envoy's role in Burma. Gambari said he expected to visit
Rangoon several more times to prepare for Ban's trip. He
assured the Ambassador that the SYG understood the importance
of a successful trip that delivered results.

UPDATE ON UN ACTION


9. (C) Gambari assured Ambassador Hume that the UN would
continue to press for progress in Burma. A Focus
Group--consisting of China, India, Indonesia, Burma and the
UN Secretariat--had already met several times at the PermRep
level in New York. Gambari said the SYG would try to
organize a meeting of this same group at the ministerial
level on the margins of the UNGA in September. He also said
the larger Group of Friends continued to meet on Burma.
(Note: The Secretary General's Group of Friends on Burma
includes key UNSC members, regional leaders and major
donors.) This group also could meet on the margins of the
UNGA. Gambari also said he would continue engaging key
countries bilaterally to secure their support for his mission.


HUME