Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08JAKARTA1600
2008-08-25 05:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:
GEORGIA -- REVIEWING POINTS RE ABKHAZIA/SOUTH
how-toVZCZCXRO7655 OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHTRO DE RUEHJA #1600 2380556 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 250556Z AUG 08 FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9871 INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0037 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0151 RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0003 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0014 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0060 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2941 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2144 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4841 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2403 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2982 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001600
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR TFGG01, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EUR, EUR/RUS
(SZPILA),EUR/CARC, IO, IO/UNP (MARIZ)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018
TAGS: UNSC PREL ID GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA -- REVIEWING POINTS RE ABKHAZIA/SOUTH
OSSETIA WITH INDONESIA
REF: A. STATE 90980
B. STATE 90978
C. JAKARTA 1590
D. STATE 89769
E. JAKARTA 1532
Classified By: Pol/C Joseph L. Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001600
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR TFGG01, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EUR, EUR/RUS
(SZPILA),EUR/CARC, IO, IO/UNP (MARIZ)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018
TAGS: UNSC PREL ID GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA -- REVIEWING POINTS RE ABKHAZIA/SOUTH
OSSETIA WITH INDONESIA
REF: A. STATE 90980
B. STATE 90978
C. JAKARTA 1590
D. STATE 89769
E. JAKARTA 1532
Classified By: Pol/C Joseph L. Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).
1. (C) SUMMARY -- Mission has reviewed Ref B points with the
GOI regarding Abkhazia/South Ossetia. Pol/C underscored that
Russian recognition of the two entities as separate countries
would be a serious mistake, setting a dangerous precedent
that would lead to further instability. Department of
Foreign Affairs contact took USG points on board. Worried
about its own territorial integrity, we think that Indonesia
would ultimately strongly oppose any effort by Russia to
recognize the two separatist regions. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) REVIEWING LATEST POINTS -- Pol/C reviewed Ref B
points with Indonesian contacts on August 25, including with
contacts in the President's Office, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, and the Indonesian legislature. Pol/C underlined
that the GOI should urge Russia not to recognize the two
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Pol/C
noted that doing so would only further inflame tensions in an
already unstable region. Pol/C emphasized that the move
would amount to the using of military force to try to redraw
post-Soviet boundaries and undermine the territorial
integrity of one of Russia's neighbors.
3. (C) Pol/C stressed that Kosovo was a unique case and not
a precedent for any other conflict. Unlike in Kosovo, there
is no UN-sanctioned international administration in the two
regions. There are no security guarantees to protect the
different ethnic communities and Russia has not helped create
the conditions for the return of refugees. All in all,
Russia has failed to use available avenues to bring
resolution to this matter.
4. (SBU) Pol/C also reviewed Ref A points related to
Russia's spurious claims re the ceasefire agreement.
5. (C) GOI RESPONSE -- Bunyan Saptomo, the Director of the
Americas Desk at the Department of Foreign Affairs, took our
points on board. He noted that any effort by Russia to
recognize the two separatist regions would be a mistake and
agreed that it would make the situation worse. That said,
the GOI needed to review the matter more closely. The
Department of Foreign Affairs looked forward to further
consultations on the matter in New York.
6. (C) TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY KEY FOR GOI -- A key concern
for Indonesia is the country's very own territorial integrity
in light of the historical problems it has had in such places
as Aceh and elsewhere. This is one of the key reasons that
Indonesia has not yet recognized the independent status of
Kosovo, for example (despite the desire of some local Muslim
groups that it do so).
7. (C) Given this, we think that Indonesia would ultimately
strongly oppose any effort by Russia to recognize Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. As we lobby Indonesia on Georgia-related
matters, it is important that we continue to distinguish
between the two situations, so we do not undermine our effort
to get them on board re Kosovo.
HUME
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR TFGG01, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EUR, EUR/RUS
(SZPILA),EUR/CARC, IO, IO/UNP (MARIZ)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018
TAGS: UNSC PREL ID GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA -- REVIEWING POINTS RE ABKHAZIA/SOUTH
OSSETIA WITH INDONESIA
REF: A. STATE 90980
B. STATE 90978
C. JAKARTA 1590
D. STATE 89769
E. JAKARTA 1532
Classified By: Pol/C Joseph L. Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).
1. (C) SUMMARY -- Mission has reviewed Ref B points with the
GOI regarding Abkhazia/South Ossetia. Pol/C underscored that
Russian recognition of the two entities as separate countries
would be a serious mistake, setting a dangerous precedent
that would lead to further instability. Department of
Foreign Affairs contact took USG points on board. Worried
about its own territorial integrity, we think that Indonesia
would ultimately strongly oppose any effort by Russia to
recognize the two separatist regions. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) REVIEWING LATEST POINTS -- Pol/C reviewed Ref B
points with Indonesian contacts on August 25, including with
contacts in the President's Office, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, and the Indonesian legislature. Pol/C underlined
that the GOI should urge Russia not to recognize the two
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Pol/C
noted that doing so would only further inflame tensions in an
already unstable region. Pol/C emphasized that the move
would amount to the using of military force to try to redraw
post-Soviet boundaries and undermine the territorial
integrity of one of Russia's neighbors.
3. (C) Pol/C stressed that Kosovo was a unique case and not
a precedent for any other conflict. Unlike in Kosovo, there
is no UN-sanctioned international administration in the two
regions. There are no security guarantees to protect the
different ethnic communities and Russia has not helped create
the conditions for the return of refugees. All in all,
Russia has failed to use available avenues to bring
resolution to this matter.
4. (SBU) Pol/C also reviewed Ref A points related to
Russia's spurious claims re the ceasefire agreement.
5. (C) GOI RESPONSE -- Bunyan Saptomo, the Director of the
Americas Desk at the Department of Foreign Affairs, took our
points on board. He noted that any effort by Russia to
recognize the two separatist regions would be a mistake and
agreed that it would make the situation worse. That said,
the GOI needed to review the matter more closely. The
Department of Foreign Affairs looked forward to further
consultations on the matter in New York.
6. (C) TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY KEY FOR GOI -- A key concern
for Indonesia is the country's very own territorial integrity
in light of the historical problems it has had in such places
as Aceh and elsewhere. This is one of the key reasons that
Indonesia has not yet recognized the independent status of
Kosovo, for example (despite the desire of some local Muslim
groups that it do so).
7. (C) Given this, we think that Indonesia would ultimately
strongly oppose any effort by Russia to recognize Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. As we lobby Indonesia on Georgia-related
matters, it is important that we continue to distinguish
between the two situations, so we do not undermine our effort
to get them on board re Kosovo.
HUME