(S) POSSIBLE SALE OF GLOBAL HAWK (UAV) TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001574 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, T, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, PM, ISN, ISN/C, PM/RSAT, ISN/CPI, ISN/MTR SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP/APSA D.WALTON NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2018 TAGS: PREL PARM MASS ID SN SUBJECT: (S) POSSIBLE SALE OF GLOBAL HAWK (UAV) TO SINGAPORE--INDONESIAN REACTIONS REF: SINGAPORE 834 Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Mission appreciates reftel's solicitation of comment on a possible sale of the Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to Singapore and has reviewed the implications of the proposed sale. In terms of the GOI's response, the Indonesian military's reaction is likely to be muted, although civilian officials would be critical, given their focus on multilateral arms control. Indonesia's vocal and highly nationalistic parliament would probably criticize the deal. ¶2. (S) SUMMARY (Con'd): The proposed sale, if it moved forward, would complicate our efforts to convince Indonesia to support some key USG nonproliferation priorities. Such reactions from Indonesia should be considered in making any decision on this matter. END SUMMARY. MILITARY REACTION PROBABLY MUTED ¶3. (S) Regarding the Global Hawk's implications for military capabilities in the region, the Indonesian Military's (TNI) reaction is likely to be relatively muted. The TNI acknowledges that the Republic of Singapore Armed Forces (RSAF) possesses vastly superior military capabilities, including airborne surveillance. The sale of Global Hawk would not substantially change the balance of forces in the region. While unhappy that Indonesia continues to lag far behind its neighbors, the TNI would probably not make an issue of Singapore's possession of Global Hawk. Indonesia has no prospect in the near future of purchasing Global Hawk and may not have the necessary infrastructure to support it for some time. The TNI knows this. POLITICAL FALLOUT LIKELY ¶4. (S) The potentially significant downside of a Global Hawk sale to Singapore lies elsewhere. The sale would almost certainly complicate our efforts to engage Indonesia on nonproliferation priorities. This is an area where major U.S. policy priorities are at stake and a considerable amount of time and energy has been invested. ¶5. (S) Although Indonesia is not a signatory to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),GOI officials would see the sale as undermining that regime and, by implication, other arms control areas. Indonesian officials often criticize what they see as inconsistent U.S. support for multilateral arms control regimes. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) has a long-standing commitment to multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts and has enormous influence on the GOI's interagency nonproliferation agenda. DEPLU would probably view the introduction of this new technology into the region as an act of proliferation. ¶6. (S) DEPLU's proliferation concerns would be increased if the USG actively worked to reclassify Global Hawk as an MTCR Category II item in order to allow the sale to proceed. The GOI has criticized the United States-India Civil Nuclear Agreement and claimed that it undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They have charged that the U.S. has a double standard on nuclear issues--opposing Iran's nuclear program while doing nothing about Israel's alleged program. Indonesian officials pointed to these concerns when they explained their decision to abstain on UNSCR 1803 regarding Iran's nuclear program. The sale would open the United States to claims that it is selective in its application of arms control principles. ¶7. (S) The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the JAKARTA 00001574 002 OF 002 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) would be the two most immediate concrete USG nonproliferation priorities that would suffer from the impact of a Global Hawk sale. Indonesia has been only marginally helpful regarding the Iranian nuclear program matter, stressing that Iran has a "right" to develop (peaceful) nuclear technology while downplaying Iran's clear duties to the international community. That perspective would become much harder to shape, particularly if the sale were perceived as a sign of U.S. double standards. Indonesia chairs the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Disarmament Working Group, and frequently speaks for the NAM on this issue in multilateral fora, including in the United Nations. Additionally, it would become more difficult to convince Indonesia to endorse PSI, an important global and regional priority. LEGISLATURE A WILD CARD ¶8. (S) Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR),which is playing an increasingly prominent role in foreign policy, could be expected to react critically to the proposed Global Hawk sale. DPR members have blocked the proposed Indonesia-Singapore Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) on nationalist grounds. They argued that the DCA favored Singapore, particularly the provisions allowing RSAF exercises in Indonesian territory. A Global Hawk sale would associate the United States with the hostility directed toward the Singapore DCA, increasing resistance to U.S.-Indonesia relations in the security sector and elsewhere. ¶9. (S) At least some DPR members would grasp the full implications of Singapore's possession of a UAV that could traverse Indonesian airspace without the GOI's knowledge and conduct surveillance deep into Indonesian territory. Many legislators are prone to stoking nationalist sentiments, and the United States and Singapore are favorite targets. Genuine nationalists would seize on Global Hawk's capability to violate Indonesian territorial integrity. As the country that provided the technology to Singapore, the United States would likely receive a fair share of their wrath. BOTTOM LINE ¶10. (S) Although Singapore is an important partner in the region, the United States needs to weigh the potential benefits of this sale, as proposed, against the likely negative consequences regarding USG arms control priorities and U.S.-Indonesia relations. HUME