Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08JAKARTA1328
2008-07-10 08:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

PLAN FOR LEADERS TO RECEIVE TIMOR-LESTE/INDONESIA

Tags:  PREL PHUM PGOV TT ID 
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VZCZCXRO3612
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #1328/01 1920816
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100816Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9493
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2738
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2195
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2817
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 2998
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0883
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 1108
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 1069
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 2789
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 0940
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001328 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, DRL/AWH, EAP/MLS, EAP/ANP, EUR/WE
NSC FOR EPHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TT ID
SUBJECT: PLAN FOR LEADERS TO RECEIVE TIMOR-LESTE/INDONESIA
COMMISSION REPORT

REF: A. JAKARTA 825

B. JAKARTA 163 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: DCM John A. Heffern, reasons 1.4(b+d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001328 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, DRL/AWH, EAP/MLS, EAP/ANP, EUR/WE NSC FOR EPHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TT ID SUBJECT: PLAN FOR LEADERS TO RECEIVE TIMOR-LESTE/INDONESIA COMMISSION REPORT REF: A. JAKARTA 825 ¶B. JAKARTA 163 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: DCM John A. Heffern, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Leaders from Indonesia and Timor-Leste will meet in Bali on July 15 to receive official copies of the Timor-Leste and Indonesia Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) report, a senior Indonesian commissioner recently told the DCM. A joint statement has been prepared although the report is not expected to be publicly released that same day. For Indonesia, the report could have significant implications for security sector reform. The report also is likely to stir up political trouble for President Yudhoyono (SBY) as some retired generals and senior officials object to the report's placing of institutional blame on the Indonesian military for gross human rights violations. END SUMMARY. MEETING WITH KEY COMMISSIONER ¶2. (C) Indonesian CTF Co-Chair Lt. General (Ret) Agus Widjojo told the DCM that at the request of the two foreign ministers, the Indonesian President and Timor-Leste President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao will travel to Bali on July 15 to receive an official copy of the CTF report. Widjojo is a highly decorated retired army officer with a reputation of advocating for democratic reforms under the dictator Suharto. He is close to President Yudhoyono. Embassy Dili confirmed that the Timorese President and Prime Minister bth plan to fly to Bali that day, as will former rime Minister Mari Alkatiri. Widjojo confirmed tha the final report remains hard hitting in assignng institutional responsibility to the Indonesia military, police and the civilian government fo gross human right violations (as described in Rftels). ¶3. (C) According to another Indonesian Cmmi(ssioner, Wisber L*is, the leaders will meet at the Grand Hyatt Hotel e ach resort in Bali on July 15, followed by a meeting with commissioners, and a joint press confernnce. The Indonesian foreign ministry is scheduled to announce the upcoming release at a July 11 press conference in Jakarta. The report is not expected to be publicly released on that date but the two sides will issue a joint press release describing it. ¶4. (C) Widjojo said the draft of the joint leaders statement highlights the
violence and human rights violations which occurred and the institutional responsibility, which falls much more heavily on the Indonesian side. The statement expresses remorse from both sides and cites steps for implementation of CTF recommendations for collective reparation, reconciliation and reform. The one point which was removed from the joint statement--reportedly at the request of Timor-Leste--was explicit reference to gross human rights violations, although this element remains an integral part of the report itself. Widjojo speculated that the Timorese side wanted this reference out because they did not like the inference that their side was also guilty of violations. MIXED SUPPORT FOR CTF BY SBY CABINET ¶5. (C) Widjojo anticipated that the report will be poorly received by former armed forces commander Gen. Wiranto and some other retired and current military officers who question the entire premise that the military was institutionally responsible for violations. The Attorney General has legal doubts because of his lack of understanding of the CTF mandate, in Widjojo's view. The Defense Minister and Foreign Minister understand and accept the report. The President has been supportive but is worried about its release because of political implications. In a June 23 meeting with Embassy Dili Charge, Timor-Leste Commissioner Jacinto Alves said that some figures in the Indonesian leadership had challenged the legal validity of the concept of "institutional responsibility." JAKARTA 00001328 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Faced with a flurry of political difficulties over recent fuel hikes which resulted in politically orchestrated demonstrations and an inquiry by Parliament, SBY is concerned that the release of the report at this time could further goad his enemies to stir up trouble in the lead-up to 2009 elections, Widjojo acknowledged. ¶7. (C) The Commission's biggest concern is that the CTF will be pillaried by human rights groups as offering impunity. Some institutions might use the report to initiate criminal charges against individuals before an international tribunal in contradiction to the "spirit" of the CTF. Widjojo noted, however, that Indonesia has not ratified the Rome Convention and therefore is not a member of the International Criminal Court. He pointed out that the CTF met its mandate to reveal the causes, nature and extent of 1999 violations and in recommending collective reparations rather than retribution. Assigning individual blame for the violations will not help the two nations move forward, Widjojo asserted. The key result of the report will be lessons from past military abuses and its recommendations for systematic remedies, he said. U.S. TRAINING NEEDED TO SPUR REFORM ¶8. (C) Widjojo hopes the report will be a "wake up call" to the GOI to deepen on-going security sector reform. In particular, he said the mind-set of security forces using militias--the main cause of violence cited in the report--must change. It is essential that the U.S. provide more education and exchanges to create reform-minded officers, Widjojo emphasized. Without U.S. training, the old mindset of focusing on internal rather than external defense will be difficult to change. ¶9. (C) Public USG support for this report will be important to bolster the two governments' confidence to carry out recommended reforms. If the report is not made public on July 15, we suggest the following press guidance: --We have not yet read the report but we hope that it will result in accountability and institutional reform. --We encourage both governments to work together to institute meaningful reform, to achieve reconciliation and to strengthen bilateral ties. ¶10. (C) Once the report is made public, and if it is as credible as sources have told us it will be, we suggest the following points (per ref B): -- We welcome this effort as an important step toward justice and reconciliation. -- The report captures the political will of both governments to record and account for a tragic period in the history of Indonesia and Timor-Leste and to implement institutional reforms to prevent such atrocities in the future. -- We welcome recognition of institutional responsibility. -- We encourage both governments to implement the report's recommendations and to work to strengthen their bilateral relations and to demonstrate to the world the determination of both governments to bring about meaningful reform. We offer our support to help in that effort. HUME

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