DEFMIN REVIEWS MIL-TO-POLICE TRAINING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001311 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, PM NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR KNAR PGOV ID SUBJECT: DEFMIN REVIEWS MIL-TO-POLICE TRAINING REF: A. JAKARTA 1278 ¶B. JAKARTA 749 JAKARTA 00001311 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM John A. Heffern, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 2, the Ambassador asked Indonesian DefMin Sudarsono to reconsider the Defense Ministry's request that U.S. military forces cease providing counternarcotics training to the Indonesian police. Sudarsono said he would review the matter. The two also discussed U.S. assistance related to the establishment of an Indonesian National Defense University. Sudarsono noted the installation of General Edhie Wibowo--brother-in-law to President Yudhoyono--as the new commander of the Army Special Forces (Kopassus) and characterized him as a reformer. END SUMMARY. U.S. MILITARY TRAINING OF INDONESIAN POLICE ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono on July 2. Reviewing Sudarsono's April request that training of the Indonesian police by U.S. military forces cease (ref b),the Ambassador said he understood the reasons behind the Indonesian request that the training of police be done by civilian forces. The Ambassador related that he had asked the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) to suspend such training and had informed Sudarsono of the suspension by letter in June. PACOM had subsequently asked that a counternarcotics exercise scheduled for the fall be able to proceed, for which planning would begin this summer. The Indonesian police had also asked that the training resume. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador related that he had spoken to Secretary General Imron Cotan of the Department of Foreign Affairs (effectively the Deputy Foreign Minister) about the same issue a week earlier (see ref a) and Cotan had suggested that a few Kopassus (Army Special Forces) officers be included in the scheduled police training exercise. The Ambassador said he had checked and found that legal restrictions on the assistance did not allow this. The Ambassador further explained that the approach used by PACOM with Indonesia and other countries in the region was based on a template developed in working with America's Latin American neighbors to interdict narcotics production and trafficking in the Caribbean Sea region. Alternatives existed, but they were not of the same quality as the training provided by PACOM. 
 GOI PREFERS CIVILIAN TRAINING ¶4. (C) In response, Sudarsono said a key thrust of Indonesia's democratic reforms had been the principle of separating civilian and military forces. He noted that the United States had supported such reforms. Consistent with this, Indonesia wanted its civilian forces trained by civilian forces. Sudarsono said he understood that PACOM had the skills and the funding to provide the training, but such a cross-force pairing was an anomaly for Indonesia. ¶5. (C) Sudarsono said he understood from his discussions in Washington in April 2006 that U.S. engagement with Kopassus required time. That said, some in Washington still seemed to view Indonesia as it was ten years ago and allowed the "overhang of the past" to influence their views on Indonesia. Several Indonesian military officers had been barred from attending peacekeeping exercises in Mongolia and Thailand, and Indonesians had been barred from other events due to requests from Washington. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador explained that concerns in Congress were really the focal point of the problem and that they must be addressed. There were other problematic issues in the relationship, he pointed out, some of them more of Jakarta's doing. Again, both sides needed to keep the focus on allowing the bilateral relationship to continue to improve. Clear signals must be given on both sides to avoid false JAKARTA 00001311 002.2 OF 002 expectations. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged that U.S. vetting requirements were difficult but expressed confidence that the difficulties eventually could be overcome. Both sides should remain focused on the broader fact that the bilateral U.S.-Indonesia relationship was on a positive track. Further cooperation at whatever level would be constructive and should be encouraged. SUDARSONO AGREES TO REVIEW MATTER ¶8. (C) Reviewing the options, the Ambassador said he could cancel all further counternarcotics training of the Indonesian police by PACOM but thought this would be the wrong decision. He pressed Sudarsono to reconsider the reasons and said he would ask that the DATT contact Sudarsono in the following week for a final decision. Sudarsono agreed to this request. NEW KOPASSUS CHIEF ¶9. (C) Shifting focus, Sudarsono related that General Edhie Wibowo, brother-in-law to President Yudhoyono, had been installed on July 1 as the new commander of Kopassus. The change was part of the annual promotions that were currently working their way through the system (septel). Sudarsono said Wibowo was committed to reform of Kopassus and had trained at Fort Bragg (prior to the imposition of U.S. sanctions in the 1990's). Wibowo's father had been commander of Kopassus in the 1960s. NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY ¶10. (C) Wrapping up, the Ambassador said he had received the Minister's proposal to create an Indonesian National Defense University modeled on NDU in Washington and wanted to see that vision become a reality. Welcoming the Minister's request for U.S. assistance, the Ambassador said he wanted to be as helpful as possible. He noted that several NDU administrators were slated to arrive in late July to start the process. Sudarsono thanked the Ambassador for the assistance. HUME