U.S. MILITARY TRAINING OF INDONESIAN POLICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001278 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, T, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, PM, ISN SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/AP P.IPSEN NSC FOR E.PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2018 TAGS: PREL MASS KNAR PTER ID SUBJECT: U.S. MILITARY TRAINING OF INDONESIAN POLICE REF: JAKARTA 749 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On June 27, the Ambassador and Imron Cotan, the second-highest ranking official in the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU),discussed the training of Indonesian police by U.S. military (special) forces. Mission has suspended such training, most of it counternarcotics training sponsored by the Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W),subsequent to the Indonesian decision to reject the training of the police by the U.S. military. While acknowledging the benefits of such training, Cotan noted that the inclusion of a token number of Indonesian special military force members in such training might help to resolve the issue within the GOI. The Ambassador said the USG would explore options and get back to the GOI on possible ways forward. END SUMMARY. TRYING TO RESTART MILITARY TRAINING OF POLICE ¶2. (C) On June 27, the Ambassador met DEPLU Secretary General Imron Cotan, the second-highest ranking official in DEPLU. The two reviewed the issue of training of Indonesian police by U.S. military forces. The Ambassador noted that he had received several requests from senior Indonesian civilian and military officials in recent months to stop the training of Indonesian police forces by U.S. military units (mostly JIATF-W-sponsored counternarcotics training, such as the BAKER IRON series). The Ambassador said he had informed U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) of the request and PACOM had canceled several events scheduled for the remainder of FY-2008. Indonesian police officials, on the other hand, had expressed support for the training of police by the U.S. military and had urged that it continue. PACOM likewise wanted to see the training continue. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador emphasized the benefits of the training to Indonesia and urged that the GOI reconsider its decision to stop the U.S. military from training Indonesian police. The Ambassador explained that the U.S. military offered the training because it had the necessary skill sets and funding to provide the assistance. Since the GOI had assigned the counternarcotics mission to the police, this training went to the police. Alternative programs had a smaller scope and were less effective. GOI WANTS TRAINING BUT THERE IS RESENTMENT ¶4. (C) Cotan said Indonesia definitely benefited from such counternarcotics training and confirmed that the Indonesian police wanted to continue receiving it. The Indonesian military, however, also wanted training. Yet the Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS),which had unique capabilities in the event of a security crisis, e.g., a terrorist attack, was excluded from U.S. training. This caused resentment. ¶5. (C) Cotan noted that the issue of military-to-police training was important and that failure to resolve it would limit the bilateral military-to-military relationship. He said he would talk to Defense Minister Sudarsono to see whether a compromise could be found. One possibility, Cotan suggested, might be to include several KOPASSUS members from time to time in the training of police units. It might be possible to build up from this modest start to a point where the Indonesian military would no longer object to the U.S. military's training of Indonesian police. Cotan noted that Australia, which had also suspended engagement with KOPASSUS in the past, had begun to reengage through small steps and now had an effective training program involving KOPASSUS. (As Mission understands it, U.S. law would prohibit U.S. military training of Indonesian police units if any KOPASSUS soldiers, even as few as three, were included.) NEXT STEPS JAKARTA 00001278 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) The Ambassador said the USG was also looking for creative solutions. The Executive Branch had to be careful to proceed with Congressional support, as any engagement with KOPASSUS was a sensitive issue. He noted that the next available opportunity for reinstating military-to-police training would be the BAKER IRON marijuana eradication exercise scheduled for October 2008 near Medan, Sumatra. Planning for that exercise would need to begin several months in advance. HUME