SCENESETTER FOR CHAIRMAN MULLEN'S VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001030

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR P, T, EAP, PM, ISN, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP
NSC FOR E.PHU
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/AP TOOLAN/IPSEN
JOINT STAFF FOR P.CLEMMONS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV ID
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CHAIRMAN MULLEN'S VISIT

Classified By: CDA John A. Heffern, reasons 1.4(b+d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Admiral Mullen's May 28-30 visit to Jakarta
builds on solid progress in our bilateral military-military
relationship over the past two years. Democratic reforms
have made Indonesia a different country from Suharto's
military-dominated fiefdom. Dramatic TNI reform since 1998
has put the military under civilian control, taken the
military out of politics and separated the military from the
domestic police. There is no longer a trade-off between
human rights and security in our bilateral cooperation. Our
engagement and cooperation with Indonesian security services
advance both goals. Indonesia, therefore, ought to be a
natural strategic partner in the region, in the war on
terrorism and among democratic countries.


2. (C) SUMMARY (Con'd): There are limits, however, and both
capitals have decisions to make about the importance of the
security relationship. The Indonesians remain unsure of U.S.
reliability as an arms supplier and seek to remain true to
their non-aligned tradition. Nationalist and Islamic
sensitivities color Indonesian perceptions of U.S. foreign
policy, especially in the Middle East, and the U.S. security
presence in the region. On our side, the key impediment to
expanded engagement remains the failure of the GOI to press
for accountability for past human rights abuses by security
forces. The accountability issue stopped our planned
engagement with the elite Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS) dead
in its tracks and can be felt in other mil-mil activities.
Mission believes it is time for a high level inter-agency
meeting in Washington to determine next steps on military
cooperation with Indonesia, including engagement with
KOPASSUS, and hopes this visit will contribute to that
outcome. END SUMMARY

MESSAGES


3. (C) Mission encourages the Chairman to emphasize the
following themes during his meetings in Jakarta:

-- The United States is committed to Southeast Asia's
security and our deepening relationship with Indonesia is
irreversible.

-- We applaud Indonesia's political and security sector
reforms and want to work with Jakarta in a broad range of
security and non-security areas for cooperation.

-- TNI reforms since 1998 have been dramatic. Now Jakarta
needs to decide how much farther it will go to
professionalize its armed forces to fulfill Indonesia's
security needs, consistent with international standards,
including accountability for past human rights violations.

-- As Jakarta deepens its commitment to reform and its
program to professionalize its armed forces, Washington will
continue to seek opportunities to enhance our bilateral
cooperation.

-- Specifically, we will continue to reassess our policy on
engagement with KOPASSUS and would welcome information on
Indonesia's plans to deepen reforms and professionalize
further its security forces.

-- The planned reform of military justice and the gradual
liquidation of TNI-related businesses would help demonstrate
the TNI's commitment to reform. In addition, Indonesia must
take seriously and follow up on the conclusions of the
Indonesia-Timor-Leste Commission on Truth and Friendship.

-- Regardless of U.S. election results, there is no turning

JAKARTA 00001030 002 OF 003


back on our commitment to Indonesia and the region.

MOVING FORWARD


4. (C) Since the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Indonesia in
2005, the relationship has rebounded and is now showing the
hallmarks of normality. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
IMET have risen to $15.7 million and $1 million,
respectively. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are on the rise as
Indonesia seeks to restore existing U.S. equipment to
operability ($49 million since 2005). The annual bilateral
Strategic Dialogue is a serious, substantive exchange, and
USPACOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan is full of
meaningful activities that represent an agreed road-map for
cooperation and growth. Both we and the Indonesians see this
as a promising partnership that holds great potential for
future development.


5. (C) Washington, USPACOM and Mission Jakarta have worked
hard to move the relationship forward, including via C-l30
transfers, a $45 million maritime surveillance program, and
an important long-term area of cooperation, called the
Defense Resource Management Study, which will increase
transparency in the Indonesian Department of Defense. The
GOI is exploring an important F-16 purchase as well, but
stagnant budgets and competing priorities make such a sale
difficult in the near term. Another potential area for
cooperation in establishment of a National Defense University
here, which would contribute to professionalization of the
TNI.

TNI REFORM


6. (C) In a sea change from its first forty years, the TNI
has abandoned political office, subordinated itself to
civilian leadership, and re-focused its mission on external
threats, leaving internal security to the police. In taking
these steps, the TNI has demonstrated its commitment to
democracy and civilian rule. It has supported the Aceh peace
process based on the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding.
It has cleaned up its human rights record since the end of
the Aceh conflict in 2004 and provides human rights training
for its soldiers. The next key step is for the TNI to
operate and procure equipment using a transparent government
budget.


7. (C) Two important developments under way would advance
Indonesia's agenda for military reform. The Indonesian
government is preparing legislation to make the Indonesian
military subject to civilian trials for non-military
offenses. President Yudhoyono, a former general, has
endorsed this step, and all major parties in the legislature
support the legislation, which could pass this summer. The
change would mark a major departure from the culture of the
Suharto era, where the military was seen as operating above
the law. Although this reform will not be the same as
putting generals behind bars for past human rights abuses,
its positive long-term impact is cited by key international
human rights NGO leaders in Jakarta as key to future
accountability for Indonesia's armed forces.


8. (C) The Indonesian government is also preparing to sell
off military-related businesses -- a long-standing practice
that led to corruption and abuse in the armed forces.
Legislation, passed in 2004, requires that all commercial
assets be liquidated within five years. The government has
taken some genuine steps to accomplish this reform, including
creation of an inventory of all businesses and appointment of
a national team, headed by a reputable civilian reformer, to
lead the effort. The major impediment to this reform,
however, remains the inadequate defense budget, which in 2008

JAKARTA 00001030 003 OF 003


amounts to a mere $3.5 billion, barely one percent of its GDP
and a fraction of what Singapore and Malaysia spend. It is
also about 15 percent less than the 2007 budget, due to
across-the-board cuts. Commodity price increases and the
resulting massive government subsidies make it unlikely that
defense will receive significant budget boosts in the near
term.

KOPASSUS AND ACCOUNTABILITY


9. (C) Resumption of ties with KOPASSUS is the right thing to
do because this unit is key to Indonesia's national security
and the protection of U.S. personnel here in the event of a
crisis. Human rights training for KOPASSUS is a key
ingredient of this re-engagement. We have moved forward in a
deliberate manner, first assessing how KOPASSUS has changed
since 1998, then planning to re-engage using non-lethal joint
training exercises on human rights, the military
decision-making process and treatment of non-combatants on a
battlefield. This re-engagement would help KOPASSUS in its
on-going effort to break ties with the past and become a
modern, professional force compatible with democracy.


10. (C) Although we note in our discussions here that
accountability would strengthen Indonesia's democracy, most
Indonesians view it differently. Most Indonesians today view
accountability for past abuses through the lens of
nationalism and view the TNI as the defender of Indonesia's
territorial integrity. For our current policy to have a
chance of success, Indonesians themselves will have to
recognize that accountability matters, and that achieving it
will be a mark of maturity of Indonesia's democracy and a
guarantee of justice for its people.


11. (C) The recent USG decision to stop all engagement with
KOPASSUS, including individual IMET training, has been a
significant blow to our overall program with the Indonesian
military, and we expect that the Panglima (CHOD) and the
Minister of Defense will raise this issue during the visit.
Non-engagement with KOPASSUS, we believe, will slow reform of
that institution and force it to look elsewhere for needed
support.


12. (C) The USG's exclusion of KOPASSUS personnel from U.S.
training and assistance (even from international peacekeeping
operations, where we solicit Indonesian military
participation) is beginning to have broader repercussions on
the Indonesian side. International engagement with KOPASSUS
is a top GOI priority, as shown by Minister of Defense
Sudarsono's visit to Washington in April 2007, during which
he sought U.S. engagement with KOPASSUS in meetings with
Secretary Rice and Deputy Defense Secretary England. More
directly, in the last month, shortly after we informed the
GOI of the exercise cancellation, senior Indonesian civilian
and military officials asked that the U.S. military,
especially the special forces, cease training the Indonesian
police force. Given that the Indonesian police are key
partners in the War on Terrorism, the termination of U.S.
military assistance to those forces has significant
implications for broader U.S. global and regional security
policy objectives.

HEFFERN