SCENESETTER FOR CHAIRMAN MULLEN'S VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001030 SIPDIS SECSTATE FOR P, T, EAP, PM, ISN, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP NSC FOR E.PHU SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/AP TOOLAN/IPSEN JOINT STAFF FOR P.CLEMMONS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV ID SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CHAIRMAN MULLEN'S VISIT Classified By: CDA John A. Heffern, reasons 1.4(b+d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Admiral Mullen's May 28-30 visit to Jakarta builds on solid progress in our bilateral military-military relationship over the past two years. Democratic reforms have made Indonesia a different country from Suharto's military-dominated fiefdom. Dramatic TNI reform since 1998 has put the military under civilian control, taken the military out of politics and separated the military from the domestic police. There is no longer a trade-off between human rights and security in our bilateral cooperation. Our engagement and cooperation with Indonesian security services advance both goals. Indonesia, therefore, ought to be a natural strategic partner in the region, in the war on terrorism and among democratic countries. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY (Con'd): There are limits, however, and both capitals have decisions to make about the importance of the security relationship. The Indonesians remain unsure of U.S. reliability as an arms supplier and seek to remain true to their non-aligned tradition. Nationalist and Islamic sensitivities color Indonesian perceptions of U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, and the U.S. security presence in the region. On our side, the key impediment to expanded engagement remains the failure of the GOI to press for accountability for past human rights abuses by security forces. The accountability issue stopped our planned engagement with the elite Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS) dead in its tracks and can be felt in other mil-mil activities. Mission believes it is time for a high level inter-agency meeting in Washington to determine next steps on military cooperation with Indonesia, including engagement with KOPASSUS, and hopes this visit will contribute to that outcome. END SUMMARY MESSAGES ¶3. (C) Mission encourages the Chairman to emphasize the following themes during his meetings in Jakarta: -- The United States is committed to Southeast Asia's security and our deepening relationship with Indonesia is irreversible. -- We applaud Indonesia's political and security sector reforms and want to work with Jakarta in a broad range of security and non-security areas for cooperation. -- TNI reforms since 1998 have been dramatic. Now Jakarta needs to decide how much farther it will go to professionalize its armed forces to fulfill Indonesia's security needs, consistent with international standards, including accountability for past human rights violations. -- As Jakarta deepens its commitment to reform and its program to professionalize its armed forces, Washington will continue to seek opportunities to enhance our bilateral cooperation. -- Specifically, we will continue to reassess our policy on engagement with KOPASSUS and would welcome information on Indonesia's plans to deepen reforms and professionalize further its security forces. -- The planned reform of military justice and the gradual liquidation of TNI-related businesses would help demonstrate the TNI's commitment to reform. In addition, Indonesia must take seriously and follow up on the conclusions of the Indonesia-Timor-Leste Commission on Truth and Friendship. -- Regardless of U.S. election results, there is no turning JAKARTA 00001030 002 OF 003 back on our commitment to Indonesia and the region. MOVING FORWARD ¶4. (C) Since the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Indonesia in 2005, the relationship has rebounded and is now showing the hallmarks of normality. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and IMET have risen to $15.7 million and $1 million, respectively. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are on the rise as Indonesia seeks to restore existing U.S. equipment to operability ($49 million since 2005). The annual bilateral Strategic Dialogue is a serious, substantive exchange, and USPACOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan is full of meaningful activities that represent an agreed road-map for cooperation and growth. Both we and the Indonesians see this as a promising partnership that holds great potential for future development. ¶5. (C) Washington, USPACOM and Mission Jakarta have worked hard to move the relationship forward, including via C-l30 transfers, a $45 million maritime surveillance program, and an important long-term area of cooperation, called the Defense Resource Management Study, which will increase transparency in the Indonesian Department of Defense. The GOI is exploring an important F-16 purchase as well, but stagnant budgets and competing priorities make such a sale difficult in the near term. Another potential area for cooperation in establishment of a National Defense University here, which would contribute to professionalization of the TNI. TNI REFORM ¶6. (C) In a sea change from its first forty years, the TNI has abandoned political office, subordinated itself to civilian leadership, and re-focused its mission on external threats, leaving internal security to the police. In taking these steps, the TNI has demonstrated its commitment to democracy and civilian rule. It has supported the Aceh peace process based on the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding. It has cleaned up its human rights record since the end of the Aceh conflict in 2004 and provides human rights training for its soldiers. The next key step is for the TNI to operate and procure equipment using a transparent government budget. ¶7. (C) Two important developments under way would advance Indonesia's agenda for military reform. The Indonesian government is preparing legislation to make the Indonesian military subject to civilian trials for non-military offenses. President Yudhoyono, a former general, has endorsed this step, and all major parties in the legislature support the legislation, which could pass this summer. The change would mark a major departure from the culture of the Suharto era, where the military was seen as operating above the law. Although this reform will not be the same as putting generals behind bars for past human rights abuses, its positive long-term impact is cited by key international human rights NGO leaders in Jakarta as key to future accountability for Indonesia's armed forces. ¶8. (C) The Indonesian government is also preparing to sell off military-related businesses -- a long-standing practice that led to corruption and abuse in the armed forces. Legislation, passed in 2004, requires that all commercial assets be liquidated within five years. The government has taken some genuine steps to accomplish this reform, including creation of an inventory of all businesses and appointment of a national team, headed by a reputable civilian reformer, to lead the effort. The major impediment to this reform, however, remains the inadequate defense budget, which in 2008 JAKARTA 00001030 003 OF 003 amounts to a mere $3.5 billion, barely one percent of its GDP and a fraction of what Singapore and Malaysia spend. It is also about 15 percent less than the 2007 budget, due to across-the-board cuts. Commodity price increases and the resulting massive government subsidies make it unlikely that defense will receive significant budget boosts in the near term. KOPASSUS AND ACCOUNTABILITY ¶9. (C) Resumption of ties with KOPASSUS is the right thing to do because this unit is key to Indonesia's national security and the protection of U.S. personnel here in the event of a crisis. Human rights training for KOPASSUS is a key ingredient of this re-engagement. We have moved forward in a deliberate manner, first assessing how KOPASSUS has changed since 1998, then planning to re-engage using non-lethal joint training exercises on human rights, the military decision-making process and treatment of non-combatants on a battlefield. This re-engagement would help KOPASSUS in its on-going effort to break ties with the past and become a modern, professional force compatible with democracy. ¶10. (C) Although we note in our discussions here that accountability would strengthen Indonesia's democracy, most Indonesians view it differently. Most Indonesians today view accountability for past abuses through the lens of nationalism and view the TNI as the defender of Indonesia's territorial integrity. For our current policy to have a chance of success, Indonesians themselves will have to recognize that accountability matters, and that achieving it will be a mark of maturity of Indonesia's democracy and a guarantee of justice for its people. ¶11. (C) The recent USG decision to stop all engagement with KOPASSUS, including individual IMET training, has been a significant blow to our overall program with the Indonesian military, and we expect that the Panglima (CHOD) and the Minister of Defense will raise this issue during the visit. Non-engagement with KOPASSUS, we believe, will slow reform of that institution and force it to look elsewhere for needed support. ¶12. (C) The USG's exclusion of KOPASSUS personnel from U.S. training and assistance (even from international peacekeeping operations, where we solicit Indonesian military participation) is beginning to have broader repercussions on the Indonesian side. International engagement with KOPASSUS is a top GOI priority, as shown by Minister of Defense Sudarsono's visit to Washington in April 2007, during which he sought U.S. engagement with KOPASSUS in meetings with Secretary Rice and Deputy Defense Secretary England. More directly, in the last month, shortly after we informed the GOI of the exercise cancellation, senior Indonesian civilian and military officials asked that the U.S. military, especially the special forces, cease training the Indonesian police force. Given that the Indonesian police are key partners in the War on Terrorism, the termination of U.S. military assistance to those forces has significant implications for broader U.S. global and regional security policy objectives. HEFFERN