IRAN/P5+1 OFFER: LOCAL EXPERTS PESSIMISTIC,

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISTANBUL 000361 SIPDIS LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR MCRENSKY; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KNNP EU IR TU SUBJECT: IRAN/P5+1 OFFER: LOCAL EXPERTS PESSIMISTIC, PREDICT IRANIAN STALLING REF: DUBAI 39 Classified By: Deputy principal officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In discussions with several well-informed contacts over the past two weeks regarding the updated P5 1 offer to Iran and the regime's likely response, Consulate Istanbul "Iran Watcher" was told that the regime would most likely claim to be responding to the offer in good faith -- by agreeing to a temporary "freeze-for-freeze" period -- as it stalls for time. Although several elements of the new package got the regime's attention, one expert claimed, the incentives still do not address Iran's real economic need -- helping its hydrocarbon sector -- and are not enough to persuade the Supreme Leader to abandon the most fundamental aspect of Iran's nuclear policy since 2003 -- preserving the enrichment program. Only the advent of new "political realities on the ground" (possibly some combination of new administrations in the U.S. and Iran, or a truly debilitating turn to the Iranian economy) could compel this "strait-jacketed" regime to come to the table on the P5 1's terms, according to well-informed contacts. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Following Javier Solana's presentation to Iranian officials on June 14, 2008 of the P5 1's updated package of incentives as part of a proposed negotiation to resolve international concerns over Iran's nuclear program, Consulate Istanbul's "Iran Watcher" probed a range of Iranian and local contacts for their assessment the likely Iranian government response. "They will keep stalling for time, nothing more." -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) According to a western correspondent (protect) who travels to Iran frequently and who spoke recently about the P5 1 offer with outgoing SNSC Deputy Javad Vaeedi, three recent personnel moves within the top echelons of the regime will impact the regime's response to the P5 1 offer, and indeed already signal the likely reply: Javad Vaeedi's replacement on June 29 by former MFA DG Ali Bagheri as Deputy for international affairs at Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the announcement by Supreme Leader Khamenei on June 28 of the appointment of SNSC Secretary Saeed Jalili as his personal representative to the SNSC (replacing current Majles speaker Ali Larijani) "strengthen the already-dominant hand of the Supreme Leader" in guiding the SNSC's discussion of a response. In his new capacity, Jalili will report directly to Khamenei, and the SNSC will correspondingly reflect Khamenei's personal views even more precisely. Khamenei's additional decision on June 28 to appoint outgoing Majles speaker Haddad-Adel as a senior advisor "locks in another top so-called hard-liner under Khamenei's direct supervision." ¶4. (C) According to the correspondent, who has been covering Iran's politics for over fifteen years, these moves reinforce the Supreme Leader's office as "the center of gravity in deciding how to act and react on the nuclear file" even as incoming Majles Speaker Larijani maneuvers to give the Majles more of a role on that key issue. Asked to predict what that response would be, he suggested the most likely response, in keeping with Khamenei's personal and political style, will be to buy as much time as possible in "reviewing the offer", while ruling out in strong rhetorical terms (largely for domestic consumption) any suspension of the enrichment program. "Ultimately", he predicted, "Khamenei will not commit Iran to a new approach on the nuclear file, at least until after U.S. presidential elections in November." Moreover, he also suggested that the June 30 New Yorker article asserting that the USG is pursuing a USD 400 million covert action program against Iran, which has received widespread media coverage in Iran, pre-empts Khamenei from even the appearance of giving in to western pressure. "They will keep stalling for time, nothing more." Two P5 1 elements got their attention, but not enough -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) A Tehran-based Iranian-American analyst for an independent conflict-prevention organization (please protect),who occasionally travels to Turkey, struck a similar note, telling Istanbul's "Iran Watcher" that Solana's presentation did prompt some internal debate, "though it was largely muted once the EU announced additional sanctions, and especially with the announcement of Israeli military preparations for an attack on Iran." He assessed that President Ahmadinejad is leading the charge internally against any accommodating response, as he is looking ahead to June 2009 Presidential elections and believes he stands the best chance of re-election if he is seen by the Iranian public as taking the strongest stand within the regime's constellation of leaders. As a corollary, the analyst felt that Ahmadinejad was feeling increasing political pressure as a result of the worsening economy, and has concluded that to win re-election, he needs to keep public discussion focused on "external threats" rather than on his own government team's managerial incompetence. ¶6. (C) The analyst indicated the two aspects in particular of the P5 1 offer that have "gotten the Iranian government's attention": First, language in the proposal stating that Iran may pursue "R&D in nuclear energy as international confidence is restored" is being interpreted some in the regime (comment: presumably wrongly) as a signal that Iran may eventually resume its centrifuge enrichment program after a suspension is completed and the Additional Protocol is implemented. Second, the fact that Secretary Rice had actually signed the proposal was welcomed as a small but noteworthy gesture showing the regime that the USG "accepted its legitimacy as an equal and sovereign counterpart." He noted, however, that "the offer now gives Iran an additional lever to buy time": posturing over the "freeze-for-freeze" idea which itself precedes the "suspension-for-suspension" idea that would signal the start of real negotiations. "Expect Iran to react positively to the freeze-for-freeze aspect of the offer, drawing out discussions on that aspect of the offer for as long as Iran can get away with that." He said that SNSC Secretary Jalili was the Iranian official who was pushing most strongly for a positive response to that aspect of the offer. On the other hand, his Iranian government contacts have also pointed out to him that the updated P5 1 offer still does not include the removal or suspension of the most damaging US sanctions on Iran -- on the hydrocarbon industry. Overall, the analyst agreed with other experts that "while some symbolic progress may develop from the freeze-for-freeze condition, major movement will have to wait for future U.S. and Iranian Presidents to pursue." Interests Section proposal "threw them on their back heels" -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) A Turkish professor based in Istanbul (protect) who maintains close contacts with the Iranian Expediency Council's think tank, the Center for Strategic Research, noted that his CSR contacts were guardedly positive about the revised P5 1 offer, as it showed them that Iran's approach of holding firm was working. The lesson the CSR's "pragmatic Rafsanjani-oriented conservatives" are drawing is that, absent any indication of a much stronger UNSC sanctions resolution being prepared in New York in coming months, Iran should continue the enrichment program, continue its "reinvigorated regional diplomacy", and continue to benefit from rising oil prices, while not outright rejecting the P5 1 offer. The one wild card that appeared to "throw them on their back heels" were recent press reports suggesting that the USG was considering asking Iran for permission to open an Interests Section in Tehran, staffed by U.S. diplomats. "The system is quickly coming to consensus on how to respond to the P5 1 offer, because its contents were predictable and telegraphed. But the system is unsure about how to respond to a genuine USG request for a diplomatic presence in Iran." Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Istanbul "Iran Watcher" considers these three sources to be among our best-informed local contacts regarding internal political developments in Iran, based on their own regular contacts with influential Iranian players and power centers. The consensus view from these experts, which tracks with further views from other Iranian contacts, is that the Iranian regime is unlikely to change significantly its approach to the nuclear file -- i.e., accepting a requirement to suspend its enrichment program -- even in response to the updated P5 1 package or the threat of further sanctions. The Iranian regime, because of its "strait-jacketed decision-making complexity" in the words of one Iran-based contact, is locked into a stasis on the nuclear file. Even if Supreme Leader Khamenei wanted to genuinely accept the P5 1 offer, these experts agree, he cannot do so until "new political conditions on the ground" are in place, conditions that only the advent of new presidencies in the U.S. and Iran -- or a debilitating turn to the Iranian economy -- could produce. In the meantime, they cautioned, the USG should not expect anything but "mixed messaging, parsed rhetoric, and the same old stalling." End comment. WIENER