IRAN/ENERGY: THE IRANIAN DEPUTY OIL MINISTER'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 000320 SIPDIS LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR HAUGEN; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2018 TAGS: ENRG PREL PGOV ECON IR TU SUBJECT: IRAN/ENERGY: THE IRANIAN DEPUTY OIL MINISTER'S WISHFUL THINKING ON IRAN'S NATURAL GAS REF: (A) 2007 ISTANBUL 1015 (B) ISTANBUL 85 (C) ISTANBUL 146 Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk; reason 1.5 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Iran's Deputy Oil Minister responsible for natural gas, Seyed Reza Kasaezadeh Mahabadi, gave a detailed overview of Iran's current and future natural gas capacities, plans, and needs at the May 30 "8th International Energy Arena" hosted by a consortium of Turkish public and private energy companies in Istanbul, Turkey. Mahabadi noted that the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) must steadily expand its gas transmission and processing infrastructure to respond to Iran's growing domestic natural gas demands, while also improving its capacity to export natural gas. Mahabadi described Iran's plans to increase natural gas production dramatically starting in 2010, up to 277 billion cubic meters (bcm) by 2012 (based on wildly optimistic projections of natural gas production from the South Pars field),and outlined Iran's plans to build/extend nine more natural gas trunk-lines and seven more natural gas refineries between 2009 and 2014. ¶2. (C) Summary and comment, continued: Mahabadi avoided any foray into politics or diplomacy, preferring to let his (overly optimistic) projections speak for themselves, hoping an audience that included key industry representatives would similarly overlook the international community's serious concerns about Iran. Embassy Ankara's Economic Officer reminded the audience of the international community's strong concerns about Iran's continuing violations of UNSC Chapter VII obligations relating to its nuclear program, while noting that the P5 1 was prepared to cooperate with Iran in a range of economic and commercial areas if Iran complies. This prompted an Iranian Embassy Econ Counselor to denounce the U.S. comments as "inappropriate and personal." (On the margins of the conference, Iran Watcher approached Mahabadi's deputy merely to ask for a copy of the presentation; the deputy tried to engage substantively, asserting that oil and gas investment and technology from the U.S. was more important to Iran than anything in the current P5 1 offer. Iran Watcher did not engage substantively.) End Summary and comment. Iranian Natural Gas: The bureaucracy -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Mahabadi began his presentation (emailed to NEA/IR) by describing how Iran's Oil Ministry is organized, explaining that the Oil Ministry directs four State-owned subsidiary hydrocarbon companies: the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC),National Iranian Petroleum Company (NPC), National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC),and the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC),of which Mahabadi is Managing Director. ¶4. (SBU) The NIGC in turn directs 44 "sub-companies," including eight gas refinery companies, 30 provincial gas distribution companies, an underground gas storage company, an engineering and development company, a natural gas transmission company, a "technical materials" company, a commercial company, and a compressed natural gas (CNG) company. Iranian Natural Gas: Current Refineries and Projected Production -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Mahabadi identified seven natural gas refineries in operation: Hashemi-nejad in northeastern Iran; Sarkhon on the southern central Persian Gulf coast; South Pars and Fajr on the southwest Persian Gulf; Parsian near the southwest Persian Gulf coast; Masjed Soleyman in southwestern Iran; and Bidboland I near the southwestern Iran-Iraq border. Iran also has five operating natural gas dehydration units: Shorijeh and Gonbadly in northeastern Iran; Sarajeh near Tehran; Dalan near the southwestern Persian Gulf coast; and Gavarzin on the southern Persian Gulf coast. ¶6. (SBU) Citing NIOC statistics, Mahabadi identified recent Iranian natural gas annual production volumes, indicating that Iran produced 117 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2006, 132 bcm in 2007, and will produce 180 bcm in both 2008 and ¶2009. Post-2009, Mahabadi predicted significant, steady growth in annual natural gas production, to 195 bcm in 2010, 247 bcm in 2011 (tied to Iran's expectation of several South Pars gas field coming online),and 274 bcm in 2012. Tempering his optimistic projections, Mahabadi acknowledged that despite Iran's vast natural gas reserves, Iran is only ISTANBUL 00000320 002 OF 004 fourth in the world in terms of natural gas production (behind Russia, the United States, and Canada, and ahead of Norway). ¶7. (SBU) Turning to Iran's "domestic natural gas sales" figures (encompassing domestic consumption),Mahabadi noted that Iran in 2007 consumed 123 bcm (leaving only nine bcm available for export) and predicted significantly increased demand, estimating 155 bcm domestic consumption in 2008, 174 bcm in domestic consumption in 2009, 205 bcm consumption in 2010, 245 bcm consumption in 2011, and 277 bcm consumption in ¶2010. As one observer pointed out to Iran Watcher, Mahabadi's projections indicate that in 2010-2012, Iran may actuaQ consume slightly more natural gas than it produces. Iran's rate of natural gas consumption in 2007 ranked it as the third leading natural consumer in the world, behind the United States and Russia. ¶8. (SBU) Showering the audience with statistics, Mahabadi indicated that Iran currently has 28,000 kilometers of high-pressure gas transmission pipelines, with an additional 150,000 of gas distribution networks that extend to Iran's 660 natural gas-consuming cities and 5700 natural gas consuming rural areas. According to Mahabadi, 76% of Iran's population, as well as over 18,000 Iranian companies, rely on natural gas for their energy needs. Highlighting the current production vs. consumption imbalance, Mahabadi noted that in 2007, Iran exported 5.6 bcm while importing 6.2 bcm, a noteworthy imbalance given Iran's estimated 28 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of gas reserves, which rank second in the world behind Russia's 48 tcm. Iranian Natural Gas: Pipelines, Storage, Future Refineries, and LNG -------------- -- ¶9. (SBU) Mahabadi spelled out Iran's plans for extending its primary natural gas transmission systems, focusing on nine key pipelines under construction: -- Final segment of IGAT (Iranian Gas Trunk-line) III: This pipeline segment will complete the Saveh-Qazvin pipeline to Rasht in central western Iran, running 237 kms with a diameter of 56 inches, at a cost of USD 500 million and with a start date for construction of 2009. -- IGAT V: This pipeline will run northwest from South Pars (phases 6-8) along Iran's southwest Persian Gulf coast to Khuzestan (primarily for injection into Khuzestan's oil field),a total length of 504 kms, with five compressor stations, with diameter of 56 inches, and a capacity of 95 million cubic meters per day (MCM/D). Iran anticipates investing USD 2 billion, and a construction start date of late 2008. -- IGAT VI: This pipeline will run parallel to IGAT V from South Pars along Iran's southwest Persian Gulf coast but will extend farther northwest than IGAT V, primarily to service the gas needs of Bushehr and Khuzestan provinces. The pipeline will have a total length of 510 kms, with five compressor stations, a diameter of 56 inches, and a capacity of 95 MCM/D. Iran anticipates investing USD 900 million, and a start date of 2010. -- IGAT VII: This pipeline will run eastward along Iran's southern provinces from South Pars (phases 9 and 10) towards the province of Sistan-o-Baluchistan near Iran's border with Pakistan, for a length of 902 kms, with two compressor stations planned (and eight more needed in order to send natural gas into Pakistan and India),a 56 inch diameter, and 110 MMCM/D capacity. Iran anticipates investing USD 2 billion and a start date of 2009. -- IGAT VIII: This pipeline will run northward for 1050 kms from South Pars at Iran's southwest Persian Gulf coast to the Parsian gas plant and then to Tehran, with a diameter of 56 inches and a capacity of 100 MCM/D. This pipeline will require 10 compressor stations, an investment of USD 3.3 billion, and will start in 2009. -- IGAT IX: This pipeline will run northwest for 1860 kms from South Pars to Iran's border with Turkey, with a diameter of 56 inches, and a capacity of 110 MCM/D. It will require 17 compressor stations, some USD eight billion in investment, and will start in 2014. -- IGAT X: This pipeline will run northward 824 kms from Iran's southern Persian Gulf coast to central Iran, with a diameter of 56 inches, four compressor stations, and a capacity of 65 MMCM/D. Iran requires USD 635 million in investment, and anticipates starting in 2009. -- North-Northeast Pipeline: This pipeline will run from Tehran northeaster for 895 kms to Mashhad and beyond, with diameters of 48 inches (to Mashhad) and 42 inches (east of Mashhad). This pipeline will need six compressor stations and ISTANBUL 00000320 003 OF 004 will cost some USD 1.5 billion. Iran is planning for a start date of 2009. -- Northwest pipeline: This pipeline will run from Tehran northwest to Tabriz, 280 kms from Tehran to Tabriz and extend 190 kms beyond Tabriz. The diameter of the pipeline will be 48 inches to Tabriz and 40 inches beyond Tabriz. The pipeline will require three compressor stations, for a total cost of USD 3 billion, to start in 2008. ¶10. (SBU) Turning to Iran's underground natural gas storage projects, Mahabadi admitted that Iran suffers from a lack of capacity. He noted Iran has three underground gas storage projects under construction, intended to give Iran an operating underground storage capacity of 60 million metric standard cubic meters per day (MMSCMD),at a cost of USD 560 million. ¶11. (SBU) Mahabadi also addressed Iran's lack of refinery capacity, pointing out that Iran is trying to address that problem by building seven modern refineries between 2008 and 2014, including: -- Ilam refinery expansion project (central western Iran near the Iraqi border) to start in 2010 with a capacity of 3.4 MMSCMD -- Bidboland II (southwestern Iran, 14 kms southeast of the currently operating Bidboland I plant),to start in 2011 with a capacity of 57 MMSCMD -- South Pars (phases 6-8) to start in 2008 with a capacity of 100 MMSCMD -- South Pars (phases 9-10) to start in 2008 with a capacity of 50 MMSCMD -- South Pars (phases 15-18) to start in 2012 with a capacity of 100 MMSCMD -- South Pars (phases 19-21) to start in 2013 with a capacity of 80 MMSCMD -- South Pars (phases 22-24) to start in 2014 with a capacity of 40 MMSCMD ¶12. (SBU) Regarding Iran's LNG projects, Mahabadi described three production facilities: "Iran LNG" at South Pars Phase 12, with a capacity of 10 metric tons/year (mt/y),projected to start production in 2011; "Pars LNG" at South Pars phase 11, with a capacity of 10 mt/y, projected to start production in 2012, and "Persian LNG" at South Pars phases 13-14, with a capacity of 16.2 mt/y, projected to start in 2013. ¶13. (SBU) Long-term investment needs: Mahabadi shared Iran's long-term goals for investing in its natural gas infrastructure: Iran is seeking USD 129 billion in total investment by 2025, including some USD 30 billion distribution networks; USD 55 billion in pipelines and compressor stations; USD 20 billion in refinery and underground storage capacity; and USD20 billion in staff costs, for a total of over USD 125 billion. Back to reality -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Speaking shortly after Mahabadi, an Embassy Ankara Economic Officer reminded the audience that Iran continues to violate its obligations under three Chapter VII UNSC resolutions to suspend its uranium enrichment program. She cautioned about the risks of investing in Iran, and underscored that the US, with the P5 1 governments, has made a generous offer to Iran of economic, commercial, and energy incentives to induce it to meet its UNSC obligations, injecting a needed dose of geopolitical reality into the conference discussions. Following her speech, Iranian Economic and Commercial Counselor Ahmed Noorani complained to the conference organizers about the political nature of the U.S. remarks, which he deemed were not appropriate for a technical conference. In the last session the day, Noorani took the floor to denounce U.S. remarks calling them "inappropriate and personal." Noorani's comments were not picked up by the press, most of whom had left the conference earlier. ¶15. (C) Following Mahabadi's presentation, Iran Watcher approached NIGC's Acting Director for External Affairs, Mohammed Reza Bonakdar-Hashemi, merely to ask for a copy of Mahabadi's briefing (as is permissible under current "no-contact" guidelines). Bonakdar-Hashemi nevertheless tried to engage Iran Watcher, claiming that the most effective way to help reform Iran would be via direct bilateral cooperation between US and Iranian oil companies, creating an Iranian dependency on hydrocarbon cooperation with U.S. companies. "Iran needs this American technology. This is more important than anything from the P5 1." Iran ISTANBUL 00000320 004 OF 004 Watcher briefly noted that such cooperation was not possible and then politely disengaged from the conversation. Comments -------------- ¶16. (C) As with other recent delegations from Iran's oil and gas sectors (reftels),Mahabadi and his team came to preach the commercial and energy benefits of investing in a country that has undeniably vast hydrocarbon resources, especially natural gas. Mahabadi, a technocrat, avoided any foQy into politics or diplomacy, preferring to let his (overly optimistic) projections about future gas production from South Pars speak for themselves, hoping an audience that included representatives from British Petroleum, OMV, and other industry players would similarly overlook the international community's serious concerns about Iran. Indeed, Iran's projections of natural gas production rates starting in 2011 are based on the assumption that foreign investors will put aside all political risks -- including risks related to the current UN and other multilateral sanctions efforts -- and invest aggressively in South Pars. ¶17. (C) Possibly also motivating Mahabadi to deliver the most optimistic and commercially attractive presentation possible is that, according to a well-informed contact of Embassy London's Iran Watcher (with thanks to Embassy London for passing along the insight),Mahabadi is facing imminent firing over charges that he mishandled the Iranian government's response to last winter's gas crisis. End comments. WIENER