THE IRANIAN MFA'S THINK-TANK DIRECTOR ON IRAN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 000287 SIPDIS LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR HAUGEN; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV IR TU SUBJECT: THE IRANIAN MFA'S THINK-TANK DIRECTOR ON IRAN AND REGIONAL SECURITY REF: (A) ISTANBUL 85 (B) ISTANBUL 146 Classified By: Acting Consul General Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Dr. Rasoul Mousavi, the director of the Iranian MFA's think-tank, claimed at a conference on Asian security held in Istanbul on May 21 that Iran stands ready to help resolve outstanding regional security challenges; has the most to lose from continued instability and sectarianism in Iraq; seeks improved relations with its neighbors (in part to prevent US military action against Iran); is pursuing a peaceful nuclear program that presents no threat to the region or to Israel; and wants to cooperate with any states in the region to combat terrorism, including from Al Qaida and the Taliban. Comment: Mousavian's presentation was a surprising blend of candor and dissimulation: candor in admitting Iran sees its neighbors as a vital hedge against U.S. military action, and dissimulation in denying the past violations and outstanding concerns associated with Iran's nuclear program. Mousavi is a savvy veteran of the global NGO and think-tank circuit; his presentation serves as a reminder that Iran still has at its disposal a cadre of smooth and sophisticated career diplomats willing to play "good cop" to the Ahmadinejad team's "bad cop" in support of largely the same foreign policy goals. End summary and comment. ¶2. (SBU) Dr. Seyyed Rasoul Mousavi, a former Iranian Ambassador who now heads the Iranian MFA's think-tank, the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), gave a presentation on Iran's views of regional security at a May 21 conference in Istanbul on security cooperation in Asia. "Asia needs a more effective security framework" -------------- --- ¶3. (SBU) Asia is not well-served by its multilateral organizations: Asia lacks an effective single security, political, and economic multilateral framework, Mousavi told the conference. Reasons include Asia's size, regional diversity, and political complexity, as well as the willingness of many Asian states "to allow the United States to enjoy strategic predominance there." Mousavi catalogued the numerous multilateral organizations operating in Asia -- including ASEAN, ARF, APEC, SARC, SCO, ECO, and several others -- and underscored that the proliferation of limited-mission organizations had weakened the ability of Asian states to take effective action on multi-faceted challenges. In an unscripted aside, Mousavi noted that Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan had been at the forefront of efforts to create a regional Asian cooperation organization in the 1970s, promoting the idea that later became the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (ref A). He said Iran has always sought to integrate itself constructively with regional partners, and urged regional partners to give more support to the ECO, which he acknowledged still fell short of its mission. Let us handle Asian security for you... -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Mousavi argued that Asian states would be better served by identifying the regional challenges and sub-contracting resolution of those challenges to the regional players best positioned to resolve them. "Asian security is still in its primary development phase, so it is better for now to talk about Asian sub-regional security." Not surprisingly, Mousavi identified Iran as "a vital linchpin for Asia, linking Asia to the Caucuses, central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, the sub-continent via Pakistan, and Europe via Turkey." He noted that after Russia and China, Iran has the most neighbors (fifteen, counting Russia and Kazakstan as neighbors across the Caspian). Since we have the most to lose -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Mousavi further asserted that "Iran is caught up between the two centers of greatest instability in the area -- Iraq and Afghanistan, where the failed policies of major western powers have ended up promoting sectarianism, separatism, and radicalism. Iran stands to gain or lose the most of anyone over future developments in those two countries." He offered a pedestrian critique of events in Afghanistan, arguing that seven years after Kabul was liberated from the Taliban, they have returned with a significant presence throughout the country, that Al Qaida is once again operating out of Afghanistan, and that opium ISTANBUL 00000287 002 OF 004 production has soared, with over 9000 tons of annual production, "much of it coming to Iran." ¶6. (SBU) Turning to Iraq, Mousavi asserted that "five years after Saddam's fall, Iraq's future remains unpredictable. Partition along ethnic lines has become an unfortunate and unofficial reality. Whether these lines of partition are permanent, or whether Iraq can still function as a true multiethnic state, is uncertain." Mousavi insisted that instability in Iraq is bad for Iran, and that Iran's overarching goal with regard to its western neighbor is to support ethnic, tribal, and sectarian peace and political stability throughout Iraq. Our neighbors are our best defense -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Playing the neighbors off the U.S.: Mousavi added candidly that "the best balance against U.S. aggression towards Iran is for us to keep up good relations with our neighbors, even those who are U.S. allies, like Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq. The United States cannot invade or attack Iran without neighboring assistance, so our neighboring countries are our best line of defense against the U.S." Mousavi acknowledged that Iran's policies differ in some areas from its neighbors' policies, but reaffirmed that "Iran looks for, and expects, the friendliest possible relations with all its neighbors. We will listen to our neighbors concerns. We hope the U.S. will listen to their concerns as well" (comment: presumably Mousavi meant their concerns about the risks of military action against Iran. End comment.) Iran's Nuclear Program: The usual rhetoric -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Mousavi admitted that an Iranian expert could not address a forum on regional security without raising the issue of Iran's nuclear program. He offered three arguments to claim that Iran is not seeking a nuclear weapons capability: (1) Ayatollah Khamenei issued some years ago a fatwa against the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons; (2) "A nuclear bomb cannot guarantee Iran's security, and in fact would be a new source of national, regional, and international insecurity"; and (3) After investigating Iran's nuclear program more rigorously than it has investigated any other member state's nuclear program, the IAEA confirmed that Iran is not diverting nuclear material, and found only that it cannot verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material in Iran, "which puts Iran in the same category in the IAEA's eyes as 45 other member states, including Germany." ¶9. (SBU) Mousavi laid out Iran's efforts "starting 50 years ago" to develop a nuclear program with U.S., Canadian, French, and West German assistance, and following its ratification of the NPT in 1970, its receipt of widespread international nuclear assistance. He claimed the U.S. had even offered to support a nuclear fuel-cycle program for the Shah, but that after the 1979 Iranian revolution, all western aid stopped. He noted that under U.S. pressure, China cancelled its uranium conversion cooperation with Iran, and Russia "slowed down a hundred-fold" its cooperation on the Bushehr light-water reactor. According to Mousavi, this forced Iran to pursue a peaceful nuclear program indigenously, but that in doing so, "Iran never violated any rules, as we were not obliged to allow the IAEA into Natanz until six months before nuclear material is introduced into it, which we did." ¶10. (SBU) Mousavi claimed that Iran is playing a constructive, transparent, role as it pursues its nuclear program. "Iran has resisted the temptation to withdraw from the NPT despite the unrelenting and unjustified pressure against us. Iran has invited western companies, including American companies, to participate in a consortium to develop our civilian nuclear program. We are about to resolve all remaining outstanding issues with the IAEA. Uranium enrichment technology is our inalienable right. Even when we did engage in good faith negotiations with the EU3 over our program, the package they offered us to make us give up our program was nothing more than an empty box of chocolates." Mousavi acknowledged that the UNSC has adopted three Chapter VII sanctions resolutions against Iran, but described those UNSCRs as "incorrect decisions." ¶11. (SBU) Iran's nuclear program and its neighbors: Mousavi insisted that Iran has "no specific dispute with our neighbors that can be resolved with a nuclear weapon. The ISTANBUL 00000287 003 OF 004 same should be insisted of the United States, which is arming our neighbors with its own destabilizing, high-technology weapons." Iran's nuclear program "is also not intended to threaten Israel. Iran could never attack Israel with a nuclear bomb. This would be impossible, and also suicidal, because Iran cannot defend itself from a nuclear response by the United States in defense of Israel." Mousavi pointed to Russia as a guarantor of Iran's nuclear transparency: "Russia has always demanded our transparency as a condition for its cooperation on Bushehr. We have given Russia that transparency, and now Bushehr will be ready to start up in September. Russia has been far more effective than the U.S. or EU in gaining our cooperation and transparency. Russia's bilateral approach with us is working; let it keep working." ¶12. (SBU) Regional nuclear cooperation: Mousavi pressed back against claims that a hydrocarbon-rich nation has no need for a nuclear program, pointing to Middle East neighbors who are in earlier stages of pursuing basic nuclear research and energy options. Iran's nuclear program, he added, was not a threat to the region but indeed an opportunity; Iran would be willing to share its technological advances on nuclear energy with its neighbors, including by offering them participation in a uranium enrichment consortium in Iran. The "real threat" to the region -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Mousavi identified "separatism, radicalism and terrorism", including from Al-Qaida and the Taliban, as the greatest threat to regional security, and reiterated Iran's willingness to assist regional and Asian states to confront these threats. "States of the region must cooperate more effectively against these common threats. Regional engagement, rather than deferring to American hegemony, is the best way to secure our security." Strengthening Asian security, Mousavi summed up, is a complex challenge that requires sub-regional bilateral and multilateral efforts, and requires key states in the region ("with the most to lose as well as the most to offer") to step up and take leadership. "Iran is ready to help." Comment and bio note -------------- ¶14. (C) Mousavi's presentation was a surprising blend of candor and dissimulation. As a career Iranian diplomat, he is willing and able to speak reassuringly (especially to an audience willing to give the benefit of the doubt) about Iran's desire for improved relations with its neighbors. He was also forthright in acknowledging that the primary reason for Iran's efforts to improve neighborly relations is to prevent the U.S. from taking military action against it, a goal shared by most of Iran's neighbors. Mousavi was also smart enough to recognize the need to try to portray Iran's nuclear program in similarly reassuring light, though even a smooth-talking diplomat like Mousavi could not avoid having to resort to the "big lie" approach ("Iran has never violated any IAEA rules") to put a peaceful, non-threatening face on Iran's nuclear activities. He was also seemingly pragmatic in explaining that Iran would be "suicidal" to ever attack Israel in light of a likely devastating U.S. response. Mousavi's presentation is consistent with other signs we have seen in Istanbul of Iran trying to raise its diplomatic profile in Turkey and the region, including via such regional multilateral organizations as the ECO and the D-8 (reftels). ¶15. (C) Mousavi, a former Iranian Ambassador to several central Asian countries, has been director of the Iranian MFA's think-tank since 2002. As such, he is clearly a savvy veteran of the European and Asian think-tank circuit, having given at least a dozen presentations on Iranian foreign and security policy at conferences outside Iran since 2005 (according to a Google search). He gave this presentation in fluent English, and handled questions from the audience smoothly. When Istanbul "Iran watcher" approached Mousavi after his presentation to ask for a hard-copy, Mousavi enthusiastically agreed, and also invited the USG to send a participant to an IPIS conference in Tehran June 16-17 to speak on Persian Gulf cooperation and security. (We accepted a copy of his presentation, but declined the offer to go to Tehran.) Mousavi's presentation is a reminder that despite the sometimes clumsy, extremist foreign policy rhetoric from Ahmadinejad and his close supporters, the Iranian regime also still has at its disposal a cadre of sophisticated, English-speaking, career diplomats who -- despite the recent espionage case in Iran against one of their own (former ISTANBUL 00000287 004 OF 004 Ambassador and nuclear negotiator Mousavian) -- remain willing and able to play the "good cop" to the Ahmadinejad team's "bad cop", in support of largely the same foreign policy goals. End comment. OUDKIRK