ISTANBUL BANKERS PAINT PESSIMISTIC PICTURE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000187 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS TREASURY FOR J.ROSE USDOC FOR 4200/ITA/MAC/EUR/PDYCK/CRUSNAK E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN ECON PGOV TU SUBJECT: ISTANBUL BANKERS PAINT PESSIMISTIC PICTURE REF: A. ANKARA 654 ¶B. ANKARA 642 ¶C. ANKARA 527 ¶D. ANKARA 473 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Istanbul-based investment analysts describe a much more fragile picture than six months ago -- including stubborn inflation, a weakening lira, slowing growth and the possibility of an interest rate hike that would further hammer the real economy. External factors, in particular the economic slow down in the United States and the tight global credit market, are most important but internal factors are making a bad situation worse. Rumors of a policy shift at the Central Bank are becoming more prevalent as analysts see little choice but for the Central Bank to abandon the 4% inflation target in the face of expectations in the high single digits and an inflation rate that has stubbornly refused to converge over the past two years. Privatizations and the $18 billion FDI target appear optimistic given market conditions with one analyst predicting significant FDI deceleration. End summary. External Factors -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Turkey is highly dependant on international capital flows to finance its $52 billion current account deficit. The global credit crunch therefore hits Turkey harder than many other emerging markets. EFG Istanbul Securities chief economist Baturalp Candemir argued that unless global credit markets suddenly improve, Turkey's monetary policy makers will have to choose between hiking interest rates, thereby sacrificing growth, and permitting further currency depreciation. So far this year the lira is already down by approximately 15% against an equally weighted dollar-euro basket and Candemir believes the lira has further to fall. Comment: Given a net private sector foreign debt mismatch in the $50-70 billion range (ref D) a significant decline in the lira's value would put pressure on Turkish companies that have borrowed abroad to take advantage of lower interest rates, but lack foreign currency earnings to back up the debt. End Comment. ¶3. (SBU) Murat Gulkan, Deutsche Securities chief strategist, sees an increased probability of rate hikes both to maintain external financing and to signal Central Bank resolve should the Central Bank revise upward its 4% inflation target. Inflation is continuing to drift away from the 4% plus or minus 2 target, which all market observers agree will be impossible to meet again this year. For the last two years, inflation expectations, although higher than the target, have consistently underestimated actual inflation. If the market decides the target is not credible, forward looking inflation expectations could spiral upward quickly and getting expectations back under control would likely prove difficult, Gulkan explained. If the Central Bank re-sets the inflation target at a higher level, an interest rate hike accompanying the announcement would telegraph the Central Bank's commitment to meet the new target "at any cost." ¶4. (SBU) Privatizations will also be relatively difficult this year (ref B). Deutsche Securities is handling the Turk Telekom deal and it is proving to be a hard sell. The Halkbank sale may be postponed due to unfavorable market conditions - "Why buy Halkbank at a share price higher than Citibank's?" Gulkan asked rhetorically, noting the IPO sale price was a psychological floor below which the GOT was unlikely to accept. Electricity distribution sales will be broken up by region and although some regions are likely to attract strong local interest, other regions are much less attractive. Candemir believes foreign direct investment is unlikely to meet the 2008 target of $18 billion given market conditions and sees $13-14 billion as a more realistic level. He argues that FDI cannot be sustained at current levels and will decelerate to a sustainable annual range of $8-10 billion now that mergers and acquisitions in the financial sector are complete and privatization is winding down. Internal Problems -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Candemir contrasted the current situation with the initial six to eight months of the first AKP government, when the economy was facing a serious debt crisis and the GOT made a number of important decisions in quick succession. He argues current performance is lacking both on economic policy and on EU (political) reforms. Noting the length of time it ISTANBUL 00000187 002 OF 002 took for the GOT to announce a relatively straightforward electricity price increase last fall, he claims the economic decision making process is "clearly flawed" in comparison to the former government. The most likely culprit is Cabinet composition, possibly exacerbated by overconfidence or lack of understanding of how serious the economic problems facing Turkey are on the part of the Prime Minister. He notes the GOT's failure to carry through on any subject - political or economic - and argues the GOT appears to be "disorganized to the point of chaos." (See Ankara 198 on this.) ¶6. (SBU) Additional reforms, including judicial reform, are necessary but will be seen as political retaliation in today's tense climate, Candemir noted. The market would applaud a precautionary stand-by agreement with the IMF (ref A),but he doubts the IMF would be able to convince the GOT to take steps that it would not otherwise take on its own. The EU, while still playing a vocal role, has squandered good will and done lasting damage to the accession process by being perceived as biased against Turkey, argued Gulkan. ¶7. (SBU) Both Gulkan and Candemir echo the received wisdom in Istanbul financial circles - "Turkey's entrenched secular elite are complete economic illiterates, unable to comprehend either how global trends affect Turkey or how domestic Turkish politics are perceived by markets." Gulkan argues the judiciary, with support from the military, prompted current political tensions by bringing a closure case against the ruling AKP but failed to anticipate how markets would react and lacks a clear idea of how to move forward. For its part, the ruling party is constrained by unforgiving external circumstances and internal opponents who don't understand the nature of the problem. Gulkan however sees a one in three chance the two sides will be able to work out some sort of compromise that could result in the AKP being cautioned rather than disbanded. Comment -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Candemir and Gulkan's analysis is significantly less positive than it was in the pre-sub prime melt-down environment. Much of the problem is not of the GOT's making, and cannot be solved from Ankara, but some of it could have been headed off or reduced if the GOT had moved forward on its economic reform agenda at the start of the second AKP government. When political tensions erupted in April 2007, the global credit environment was much more benign, international investors were focused on relative interest rate differentials and largely discounted early elections and related political turmoil. The external environment is now much less forgiving and may force economic policy makers to make decisions, such as hiking interest rates or allowing the lira to weaken significantly, that would have a significant negative impact on the real economy. WIENER