AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH ANP LEADER WALI KHAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000835

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PK PREL
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH ANP LEADER WALI KHAN

Summary
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1. (C) In a February 22 meeting with the Ambassador, Awami
National Party (ANP) Chairman and Member of National
Assembly-elect (MNA) Asfundyar Wali Khan, whose name has
come up as potential Prime Minister, eschewed any desire to
head a national coalition government. The ANP leader is
counseling a pragmatic approach toward President Musharraf
that looks ahead rather than dwelling on past grievances.
His focus at the national level will be working on the
political, development, and security issues confronting the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the tribal areas.
Critical of deals with militants such as Baitullah Mehsud,
the ANP leader is arguing for a political approach that
wins back the confidence of community tribal leaders and a
border policy that encompasses close cooperation with
Afghanistan and Coalition forces. After five years of
Islamist party obstruction, ANP's recognition of, and
determination to, tackle militancy in the tribal areas is a
breath of fresh air. End Summary.


No Prime Ministerial Ambitions
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2. (C) Ambassador and CG Peshawar met the evening of
February 22 with ANP leader Asfundyar Wali Khan, whose
party had just won ten seats in the national assembly, a
majority in the provincial assembly, and routed the
religious parties. Wali Khan acknowledged that Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) leader Asif Ali Zardari had pitched
the idea of serving as Prime Minister in a national
coalition government. However, the ANP leader had
declined. With only ten seats in the National Assembly,
ANP would be in a weak position vis-a-vis other coalition
partners. Wali Khan preferred to remain simply a member of
the National Assembly, leaving him free to focus at the
national level on issues associated with the NWFP and the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Wali Khan said
that his father and Asif Zardari's father had been close
friends, a relationship which was clearly influencing his
discussions with Zardari.

Able to Work with Musharraf
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3. (C) Wali Khan emphasized the need to look forward rather
than back -- counsel that he was providing to Zardari and
PML's Nawaz Sharif. He was ready to work for peace in the
NWFP and FATA with President Musharraf, and the two had met
on February 21. Wali Khan saw little purpose in picking
fights with Musharraf over former Chief Justice Chaudry or
presidential/parliamentary powers at a moment when Pakistan
had other more important priorities. He told Nawaz that no
one was asking the PLM leader "to socialize" with
Musharraf, but the business of governing had to proceed.
Over time, issues such as an independent judiciary could be
addressed, but "let's clip one feather at a time."

Governing the NWFP
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4. (C) The ANP leader expected his party to be in a
position to form the NWFP's next provincial government in
coalition with PPP. Wali Khan had pledged ANP's strong
support to PPP at the national level in return for a
similar pledge from PPP at the provincial level. (Comment:
Between ANP's 33 seats and PPP's 17 seats, an ANP-PPP
coalition would hold a slim simple majority out of the 99
seats that were up for election. We understand that ANP is
also reaching out to independents to improve its margin.
End Comment.)


5. (C) Wali Khan emphasized the need for a "two-pronged"
approach where political, development, and security
initiatives in the NWFP and the FATA complemented one
another. Administrative isolation of the FATA was a
colonial policy that made no sense for a modern Pakistan
and needed to be redressed through a series of steps
beginning with extension of the Political Parties Act to
the FATA and reform of the Frontier Crimes Regulation
(FCR). The legal presence of all political leaders/parties

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and redress of some of the most egregious provisions of the
FCR, particularly collective responsibility, would mitigate
against the presence and activities of the militants.
Ultimately, Wali Khan envisioned FATA becoming a part of
the NWFP.

Peace in the Tribal Areas
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6. (C) Wali Khan called for greater use of political
solutions, drawing on Pashtun customs and traditions, for
bringing peace to the tribal areas. The Ambassador
commented that, given Baitullah Mehsud's sponsorship of
suicide bombings including the attack on Benazir Bhutto,
reports of a recent "peace agreement" with South
Waziristani militants were deeply troubling. The ANP
leader responded that these agreements made him "even more
nervous." Baitullah Mehsud and North Waziristan's
Jalaluddin Haqqani were the source of much of the violence
and instability in the FATA and going after them, he said,
must be a top priority. Action was also needed against
"clean-shaven fundamentalist" enablers such as retired ISI
General Hamid Gul and former Pakistani Ambassador Rustam
Shah Mohmand.


7. (C) Restoring confidence in the government's capacity
and will to protect tribal community leaders was paramount.
Public perception that the assassination of nearly 150
tribal elders in the Waziristan area had gone unanswered
had deeply damaged the government's standing among those
who might otherwise be expected to support the government's
priorities. Countering the flow of "Arab money" to the
militants was equally important. Wali Khan maintained that
training camps in Mohmand agency which had launched suicide
attacks against former Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao and
ANP in the NWFP's Charsadda district had been paying
recruits $3,000 per month. The 171 illegal radio stations
operating in the FATA and areas such as Swat, he said, also
required more a forceful response from the government.


8. (C) Wali Khan criticized the intelligence agencies for
failing to rotate personnel out of the tribal areas. Some
had spent long years in the FATA from the time of the jihad
against the Soviets and had built up close, difficult-to-
break relations with militants. Despite warnings, the ANP
leader insisted that ISI had failed to act on information
that his party had provided about training camps and
dangerous individuals. Not until General Kayani's tenure
as ISI Director General, he said, had there been
improvement in taking action.

Working with Afghanistan
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9. (C) Wali Khan who has maintained close relations with
President Karzai participated in the August 2007 Peace
Jirga in Kabul. The ANP leader expressed support for a
"cohesive" security policy that included the governments of
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Coalition forces. Ambassador
noted that while cross-border attacks were down, the volume
of violence inside Pakistan was surging. This trend, Wali
Khan argued, made tackling the Taliban as opposed to the
warlords the highest security priority.

Comment
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10. (C) After five years in the political wilderness, Wali
Khan sees ANP's dramatic comeback in the NWFP as his
greatest political achievement. Thoughtful, articulate,
and an ardent Pashtun nationalist, he sees the election
results as validation that Pashtuns are by and large a
moderate and peaceful people who have been unfairly tagged
as synonymous with terrorism. Although short on specifics
of how a more political approach would work in the tribal
areas, he gives no sign of being interested in peace deals
that appease committed sponsors of violence in the NWFP and
FATA. Wali Khan offered to share with us a series of
policy papers that ANP is preparing on how the new national
and provincial governments should proceed on NWFP and FATA
issues. While the hard part is about to begin for ANP, its
recognition and determination to tackle the deterioration
of security in the tribal areas is a breath of fresh AIR

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after five years of Islamist party obstruction of
addressing growing militant violence.
PATTERSON