STRUGGLING TOWARDS A COALITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000762



SIPDIS



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PK, PHUM

SUBJECT: STRUGGLING TOWARDS A COALITION



REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 745 (B) LAHORE 84 (C) ISLAMABAD

676 (D) ISLAMABAD 505



Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)



1. (C) Summary. Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Asif

Zardari is in the driver's seat as he begins a complex series

of negotiations on forming a new government in Pakistan. But

in Nawaz Sharif he has an influential passenger who is

calculating when he can take the wheel. Zardari is trying to

balance electoral math and provincial power projection goals

while keeping the PPP together under his leadership. His

initial insticts are based on a practical power calculus that

an alliance with Nawaz is his strongest and most stable

option. However, this is just the first round in what may be

protracted negotiations to form a coalition government. END

Summary.



The Math

--------------



2. (C) Zardari told Ambassador February 20 (Ref A) that he

was considering a coalition with Nawaz Sharif's party and

proposed offering the Prime Minister position to either

Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) leader Javed Hashimi or

to Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfandyar Wali Khan.

This is only the first round of what likely will be

protracted negotiations to form a coalition. While it may be

surprising that Zardari would consider this alliance and

offer the PM post to another party, his rationale is based on

sound electoral math, national/provincial power calculations

and complicated party politics.



3. (U) A rough party breakdown of the election shows that

the PPP has 32%, Nawaz's party has 25% and Musharraf's party

has 15%. The rest is split among smaller parties with the

largest 7% share gong to the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)

that controls Karachi. The Awami National Party has about 4%.



4. (C) Zardari argued that a coalition based on the PPP

joining with Musharraf's party plus other smaller parties

would barely give him a majority share in the National

Assembly. Zardari told Ambassador, this would be a weak

coalition. Zardari fears that opposition within the PPP to

working with Musharraf's party after trouncing it in the

election would increase the likelihood that the PPP would

split into factions. There is a history of Musharraf

successfully splitting the PPP to deny them power.



5. (C) One rule of Pakistani politics is that voters and

politicians follow a winner, and Nawaz won big in this

election. Musharraf's party was formed with many of the

members of Nawaz's party who left when Musharraf overthrew

Nawaz in 1999. Many voters who deserted Nawaz to join

Musharraf in 1999 went back to Nawaz in this election. We

are seeing increasing reports that members of Musharraf's

party are following suit by switching back to Nawaz. Thus

the limited strength of a PPP coalition with Musharraf's

party is weakening daily.



6. (C) In comparison, Nawaz's numbers and strength are

growing. If Zardari forms a coalition with Nawaz and some

smaller parties, he could achieve a solid majority (perhaps

two-thirds) in the National Assembly. Nawaz has publicly set

some difficult conditions on a partnership--a commitment to

restore the 1973 constitution and restoration of the

judiciary. Zardari likely will agree to restoration of the

1973 Constitution because it reverses Musharraf-era

amendments and returns power from the President to the Prime

Minister. Zardari has indicated to us that he would prefer

that the next parliament wrangle with the complicated legal

issue of restoring the deposed judiciary. Again, these

conditions are only the opening gambit in what may be

protracted negotiations.



7. (C) Despite Zardari's optimism, Nawaz may not agree to

put Javed Hashimi in the PM chair. Nawaz expects more

defectors from Musharraf's party to join him and is

contemplating a possible chance to form a government himself

(Ref B) if the PPP rejects his conditions. If Nawaz can

attract enough Musharraf party members, he could pull close

to even with the PPP in terms of Assembly strength. Whether



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in government or in opposition, Nawaz will be a major player

that Zardari cannot afford to ignore.



Provincial Calculations

--------------



8. (C) Zardari must also consider how to expand PPP

influence in the four provincial assemblies and the National

Assembly through power sharing deals. The PPP won a sizable

victory in Bhutto's home province of Sindh and could agree to

work with MQM in a ruling coalition. It has a good chance of

working with the Pashtun ANP party to form a government in

the Northwest Frontier Province and could even choose to work

with Musharraf's party in Balochistan to govern there.



9. (C) The real prize is always the Punjab, where the PPP

and Nawaz are competing to exploit Musharraf's losses and

expand their political base. While Nawaz's party won a

majority in the provincial Punjab election, the PPP could

consider an alliance there with Musharraf's party as a means

to block Nawaz's growing national influence. Regardless of

whether Nawaz joins in a national coalition this time, his

long GAME will be to expand his power in Punjab as a stepping

stone to again becoming Prime Minister under his own

government.



Party Politics

--------------



10. (C) By offering the Prime Minister slot to PML-N,

Zardari is trying to avoid a leadership struggle within the

PPP. While Zardari publicly has taken himself out of the

running for PM, we suspect he will keep his options open by

going forward with plans to run in a by-election for his

sister's seat in Sindh. Zardari told Ambassador he continues

discussions with Musharraf because Musharraf will be key to

solidifying Army support for a PPP government. Zardari would

also like Musharraf to extend the National Reconciliation

Ordinance (NRO) that granted Zardari and others immunity from

prosecution on corruption charges. Although Zardari

ultimately will have to votes to extend the NRO in the next

Assembly, the optics of such a move could stir up ugly

Pakistani memories of "Mr. Ten Percent."



11. (C) With solid party credentials and significant rank

and file support (Refs C and D),PPP Vice Chairman Amin

Faheem is the most likely party choice for PM. But Zardari

considers Faheem to be weak and lazy. Each of the other

choices is also problematic. PPP Punjab President Shah

Mehmood Qureshi is a divisive figure within the party and is

probably too independent for Zardari. PPP Vice Chairman

Yousef Gilani is a possibility, but he too has corruption

baggage and is a Punjabi and his appointment could spark

Sindh-Punjab rivalries within the party. Former Defense

Minister (under Bhutto) Mirani lost in the election. PPP

barrister Aitzaz Ahsan remains very controversial within the

PPP; he also is ineligible because he withdrew from the

election.



Viability

--------------



12. (C) At this point, a PPP-Nawaz coalition looks the most

solid in terms of numbers. But long-standing rivalry between

the parties and their leaders may limit its effectiveness and

long-term viability. The PPP is a populist party founded on

socialist economics and a strong secular base. PML-N has

always appealed to a religiously conservative middle-class

business community. Both parties campaigned on

anti-Musharraf platforms which stressed the importance of

getting the military out of civilian politics, restoring the

power of the Prime Minister over that of the President, the

need for economic reform and increased spending on education,

a continued commitment to retaining Pakistan's nuclear

capability, and pledges to allow political parties to operate

in the tribal areas.



13. (C) Especially if Nawaz gains in strength, however,

political infighting among members of a PPP-Nawaz coalition

may preclude any effective governance. As Shahbaz Sharif has

already noted (Ref B),the next government faces some

difficult and unpopular decisions. These include weaning



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Pakistanis from excessive energy and food subsidies. Many

have predicted that the next government may have a short

shelf-life of 6-12 months.



GWOT Commitment

--------------



14. (C) While PPP is decidedly more vocal about the need to

fight extremism, the platform of both parties stresses their

preference for dialogue over military action in combating

militancy. Nawaz at every opportunity has reminded us that

he overrode his chief of staff to join the U.S. in the first

Gulf War and criticized Musharraf for allowing the growth of

talibanization in Pakistan.



15. (C) Nawaz returned from exile because the Saudis

refused to keep him any longer and reportedly wanted a

counterweight to the liberal, Shia-connected Benazir Bhutto.

The Saudis provided Nawaz with an armored car and reportedly

lots of campaign cash. There is at least one poster in

Lahore that features King Abdullah between pictures of Nawaz

and Shahbaz. Nawaz's wife reportedly is quite conservative,

but so is PML President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain's wife. It

is not clear that PML-N's ties to the religious parties are

any stronger or more significant than those of Musharraf's

party. Both PML leaders Chaudhry Shujaat and Chaudhry

Pervaiz Elahi have connections to conservative Deobandi

madrassas, and Musharraf was perfectly willing (as was

Bhutto) to deal with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party.



16. (C) Comment: Zardari's initial instincts are to find

practical solutions, and an alliance with Nawaz makes sense

from a pure power calculus. But this is round one of what

could be protracted negotiations.











PATTERSON