PAKISTAN: CJCS MULLEN MEETS WITH GENERAL TARIQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000664 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MASS MOPS PHUM PK SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: CJCS MULLEN MEETS WITH GENERAL TARIQ MAJID Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On February 9, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),met with General Tariq Majid, Pakistan's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Admiral Mullen offered to assist Pakistan in enhancing its counterterrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities. Majid welcomed this offer, noting the Pakistan military was stretched thin and U.S. assistance was critical. In addition to military assistance, he cited the need for increased economic and infrastructure development in at-risk areas, as well as building up local law enforcement capabilities. Majid also highlighted the key role Coalition Support Funds played in enabling Pakistan to continue robust operations and stressed the need for timely reimbursements. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) General Majid emphasized the need for an even more robust security relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. He noted the relationship had been "episodic" at times, but both countries needed to work closely together to pursue shared objectives. Admiral Mullen agreed, stressing the U.S. commitment to continuing and expanding military cooperation with Pakistan in the war on terror. He also stated he was personally committed to promoting security cooperation with Pakistan and would convey the critical importance of supporting this relationship to the U.S. leadership, including Congress. ¶3. (C) These were difficult times, Admiral Mullen observed, for Pakistan, the region and the world. The U.S. wanted to support Pakistan in its own efforts. "It's your country and we want to assist you, not attempt to do it for you." The U.S. has learned a lot about counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy over the last few years and would like to share that knowledge with Pakistan to enhance the effectiveness of its counterterrorism (CT) efforts. ¶4. (C) Majid said he looked forward to discussing these issues with Admiral Fallon during the Chiefs of Defense Conference at CENTCOM the week of February 11. Admiral Mullen said he expected to see Majid there as well. (Note: Majid plans to travel to Washington, D.C. following the CENTCOM conference for meetings with Deputy Secretary of Defense England, Under Secretary for Defense Edelman, and Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte. End Note.) ¶5. (C) Majid asserted Pakistan is currently going through a turbulent political, social and economic transformation, while simultaneously fighting the war on terror. Majid hoped there would be increased POLITICAL stability following the February 18 elections. However, regarding the war on terror, he stressed there are "no quick fixes," addressing it successfully would require "strategic patience." Majid cited Swat as an example of the complexity inherent in the war Pakistan was now facing. Admiral Mullen agreed. ¶6. (C) Majid said the successful operations Pakistan launched last year against militant groups had resulted in desperate measures by the extremists, including increased suicide bombings and the attacks in Swat. This was the inevitable result of "squeezing" the insurgency; however, Pakistan forces had risen to these new challenges, resulting in significant gains against the militants. The situation in South Waziristan was improving and the local population had become increasingly active in opposing foreign fighters. There were recent reports of Waziris hanging Uzbek fighters. Even in North Waziristan, Majid had heard tribal leaders were telling foreign militants to get out. ¶7. (C) Nonetheless, all was not well. Majid said extremists continued to use a distorted version of Islam to gain support among people in isolated areas. These people were often vulnerable to militant propaganda because they were largely uneducated and fearful that progress represented a threat to their traditional way of life. Majid stated that military force would continue to be necessary to contain the insurgency, but alone did not represent a long-term solution. People in tribal areas needed improved social services, education and economic opportunities to join Pakistan's mainstream. Majid welcomed initiatives by the U.S. and other donor nations to answer this critical humanitarian need. ISLAMABAD 00000664 002 OF 002 ¶8. (C) Another vital element in denying sanctuary to extremists was to build the capacity of local law enforcement by expanding, training and equipping police and paramilitary forces (such as the Frontier Corps). The Army was stretched incredibly thin and would not be able to sustain current operational tempo indefinitely. ¶9. (C) Majid said Admiral Mullen would be fully briefed on Pakistan's protective measures to safeguard its nuclear assets. Admiral Mullen replied he appreciated the briefing but had heard no responsible leader express serious concerns in this area. Majid observed that reports the U.S. military was developing contingency plans to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons were of great concern. Such reports affected Pakistani public opinion, making it difficult for the Pakistan military to engage the U.S. at a time when working together had never been more important. ¶10. (C) Majid said Pakistan needed U.S. assistance in building capabilities in airlift, sigint and Special Operations Forces (SOF). Additionally, he noted the Pakistan Navy had requested frigates and a destroyer. Admiral Mullen asked if the Pakistan Navy's P-3 patrol aircraft had been used in CT operations in FATA. Majid said they had not. Admiral Mullen advised Majid the U.S. had found P-3s to be very effective in support SOF and ground operations, especially in Iraq. ¶11. (C) Regarding Coalition Support Funds (CSF),Majid urged a timely release of reimbursements, noting Pakistan was struggling to support large and extended operations. He described the wear and tear on equipment as an example where he felt CSF was not providing sufficient reimbursement. He also spoke strongly not just about the toll the counterterrorism effort was taking on the military as an organization, but how it was affecting both military personnel and civilians physically and psychologically. He said CSF should also cover compensation packages for families of military personnel killed or wounded in action, as well as for civilians who lost family or property in collateral damage incidents. ¶12. (C) Majid suggested Admiral Mullen consider restructuring CSF reimbursement based on the UN peacekeeping model. Admiral Mullen said the U.S. would consider whether some standard formula for reimbursement was possible. Meanwhile, he would see about moving claims through the bureaucracy more quickly. Concerns surrounding CSF accountability would continue to arise, but the U.S. would continue to work closely with Pakistan on this issue. ¶13. (U) U.S. Participants: Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, U.S. Embassy Major General Ron Helmly, Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan, U.S. Embassy Stacy Nichols (notetaker) Pakistan Participants: General Tariq Majid, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Lieutenant General Athar Ali, Director General, JCS Committee Major General Bilal Umar, Director General, Plans and Operations, JCS Committee ¶14. (U) CJCS Mullen cleared this cable. PATTERSON