Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ISLAMABAD664
2008-02-14 09:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:
PAKISTAN: CJCS MULLEN MEETS WITH GENERAL TARIQ
VZCZCXRO7896 OO RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHIL #0664/01 0450909 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 140909Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5113 INFO RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 8943 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 4813 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 3508 RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000664
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MASS MOPS PHUM PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: CJCS MULLEN MEETS WITH GENERAL TARIQ
MAJID
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000664
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MASS MOPS PHUM PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: CJCS MULLEN MEETS WITH GENERAL TARIQ
MAJID
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. On February 9, Admiral Michael Mullen,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),met with
General Tariq Majid, Pakistan's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Committee. Admiral Mullen offered to assist
Pakistan in enhancing its counterterrorism and
counter-insurgency capabilities. Majid welcomed this offer,
noting the Pakistan military was stretched thin and U.S.
assistance was critical. In addition to military assistance,
he cited the need for increased economic and infrastructure
development in at-risk areas, as well as building up local
law enforcement capabilities. Majid also highlighted the key
role Coalition Support Funds played in enabling Pakistan to
continue robust operations and stressed the need for timely
reimbursements. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) General Majid emphasized the need for an even more
robust security relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.
He noted the relationship had been "episodic" at times, but
both countries needed to work closely together to pursue
shared objectives. Admiral Mullen agreed, stressing the U.S.
commitment to continuing and expanding military cooperation
with Pakistan in the war on terror. He also stated he was
personally committed to promoting security cooperation with
Pakistan and would convey the critical importance of
supporting this relationship to the U.S. leadership,
including Congress.
3. (C) These were difficult times, Admiral Mullen observed,
for Pakistan, the region and the world. The U.S. wanted to
support Pakistan in its own efforts. "It's your country and
we want to assist you, not attempt to do it for you." The
U.S. has learned a lot about counter-insurgency (COIN)
strategy over the last few years and would like to share that
knowledge with Pakistan to enhance the effectiveness of its
counterterrorism (CT) efforts.
4. (C) Majid said he looked forward to discussing these
issues with Admiral Fallon during the Chiefs of Defense
Conference at CENTCOM the week of February 11. Admiral
Mullen said he expected to see Majid there as well. (Note:
Majid plans to travel to Washington, D.C. following the
CENTCOM conference for meetings with Deputy Secretary of
Defense England, Under Secretary for Defense Edelman, and
Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte. End Note.)
5. (C) Majid asserted Pakistan is currently going through a
turbulent political, social and economic transformation,
while simultaneously fighting the war on terror. Majid hoped
there would be increased political stability following the
February 18 elections. However, regarding the war on terror,
he stressed there are "no quick fixes," addressing it
successfully would require "strategic patience." Majid cited
Swat as an example of the complexity inherent in the war
Pakistan was now facing. Admiral Mullen agreed.
6. (C) Majid said the successful operations Pakistan launched
last year against militant groups had resulted in desperate
measures by the extremists, including increased suicide
bombings and the attacks in Swat. This was the inevitable
result of "squeezing" the insurgency; however, Pakistan
forces had risen to these new challenges, resulting in
significant gains against the militants. The situation in
South Waziristan was improving and the local population had
become increasingly active in opposing foreign fighters.
There were recent reports of Waziris hanging Uzbek fighters.
Even in North Waziristan, Majid had heard tribal leaders were
telling foreign militants to get out.
7. (C) Nonetheless, all was not well. Majid said extremists
continued to use a distorted version of Islam to gain support
among people in isolated areas. These people were often
vulnerable to militant propaganda because they were largely
uneducated and fearful that progress represented a threat to
their traditional way of life. Majid stated that military
force would continue to be necessary to contain the
insurgency, but alone did not represent a long-term solution.
People in tribal areas needed improved social services,
education and economic opportunities to join Pakistan's
mainstream. Majid welcomed initiatives by the U.S. and other
donor nations to answer this critical humanitarian need.
ISLAMABAD 00000664 002 OF 002
8. (C) Another vital element in denying sanctuary to
extremists was to build the capacity of local law enforcement
by expanding, training and equipping police and paramilitary
forces (such as the Frontier Corps). The Army was stretched
incredibly thin and would not be able to sustain current
operational tempo indefinitely.
9. (C) Majid said Admiral Mullen would be fully briefed on
Pakistan's protective measures to safeguard its nuclear
assets. Admiral Mullen replied he appreciated the briefing
but had heard no responsible leader express serious concerns
in this area. Majid observed that reports the U.S. military
was developing contingency plans to secure Pakistan's nuclear
weapons were of great concern. Such reports affected
Pakistani public opinion, making it difficult for the
Pakistan military to engage the U.S. at a time when working
together had never been more important.
10. (C) Majid said Pakistan needed U.S. assistance in
building capabilities in airlift, sigint and Special
Operations Forces (SOF). Additionally, he noted the Pakistan
Navy had requested frigates and a destroyer. Admiral Mullen
asked if the Pakistan Navy's P-3 patrol aircraft had been
used in CT operations in FATA. Majid said they had not.
Admiral Mullen advised Majid the U.S. had found P-3s to be
very effective in support SOF and ground operations,
especially in Iraq.
11. (C) Regarding Coalition Support Funds (CSF),Majid urged
a timely release of reimbursements, noting Pakistan was
struggling to support large and extended operations. He
described the wear and tear on equipment as an example where
he felt CSF was not providing sufficient reimbursement. He
also spoke strongly not just about the toll the
counterterrorism effort was taking on the military as an
organization, but how it was affecting both military
personnel and civilians physically and psychologically. He
said CSF should also cover compensation packages for families
of military personnel killed or wounded in action, as well as
for civilians who lost family or property in collateral
damage incidents.
12. (C) Majid suggested Admiral Mullen consider restructuring
CSF reimbursement based on the UN peacekeeping model.
Admiral Mullen said the U.S. would consider whether some
standard formula for reimbursement was possible. Meanwhile,
he would see about moving claims through the bureaucracy more
quickly. Concerns surrounding CSF accountability would
continue to arise, but the U.S. would continue to work
closely with Pakistan on this issue.
13. (U) U.S. Participants:
Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, U.S. Embassy
Major General Ron Helmly, Office of the Defense
Representative, Pakistan, U.S. Embassy
Stacy Nichols (notetaker)
Pakistan Participants:
General Tariq Majid, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee
Lieutenant General Athar Ali, Director General, JCS Committee
Major General Bilal Umar, Director General, Plans and
Operations, JCS Committee
14. (U) CJCS Mullen cleared this cable.
PATTERSON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MASS MOPS PHUM PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: CJCS MULLEN MEETS WITH GENERAL TARIQ
MAJID
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. On February 9, Admiral Michael Mullen,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),met with
General Tariq Majid, Pakistan's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Committee. Admiral Mullen offered to assist
Pakistan in enhancing its counterterrorism and
counter-insurgency capabilities. Majid welcomed this offer,
noting the Pakistan military was stretched thin and U.S.
assistance was critical. In addition to military assistance,
he cited the need for increased economic and infrastructure
development in at-risk areas, as well as building up local
law enforcement capabilities. Majid also highlighted the key
role Coalition Support Funds played in enabling Pakistan to
continue robust operations and stressed the need for timely
reimbursements. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) General Majid emphasized the need for an even more
robust security relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.
He noted the relationship had been "episodic" at times, but
both countries needed to work closely together to pursue
shared objectives. Admiral Mullen agreed, stressing the U.S.
commitment to continuing and expanding military cooperation
with Pakistan in the war on terror. He also stated he was
personally committed to promoting security cooperation with
Pakistan and would convey the critical importance of
supporting this relationship to the U.S. leadership,
including Congress.
3. (C) These were difficult times, Admiral Mullen observed,
for Pakistan, the region and the world. The U.S. wanted to
support Pakistan in its own efforts. "It's your country and
we want to assist you, not attempt to do it for you." The
U.S. has learned a lot about counter-insurgency (COIN)
strategy over the last few years and would like to share that
knowledge with Pakistan to enhance the effectiveness of its
counterterrorism (CT) efforts.
4. (C) Majid said he looked forward to discussing these
issues with Admiral Fallon during the Chiefs of Defense
Conference at CENTCOM the week of February 11. Admiral
Mullen said he expected to see Majid there as well. (Note:
Majid plans to travel to Washington, D.C. following the
CENTCOM conference for meetings with Deputy Secretary of
Defense England, Under Secretary for Defense Edelman, and
Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte. End Note.)
5. (C) Majid asserted Pakistan is currently going through a
turbulent political, social and economic transformation,
while simultaneously fighting the war on terror. Majid hoped
there would be increased political stability following the
February 18 elections. However, regarding the war on terror,
he stressed there are "no quick fixes," addressing it
successfully would require "strategic patience." Majid cited
Swat as an example of the complexity inherent in the war
Pakistan was now facing. Admiral Mullen agreed.
6. (C) Majid said the successful operations Pakistan launched
last year against militant groups had resulted in desperate
measures by the extremists, including increased suicide
bombings and the attacks in Swat. This was the inevitable
result of "squeezing" the insurgency; however, Pakistan
forces had risen to these new challenges, resulting in
significant gains against the militants. The situation in
South Waziristan was improving and the local population had
become increasingly active in opposing foreign fighters.
There were recent reports of Waziris hanging Uzbek fighters.
Even in North Waziristan, Majid had heard tribal leaders were
telling foreign militants to get out.
7. (C) Nonetheless, all was not well. Majid said extremists
continued to use a distorted version of Islam to gain support
among people in isolated areas. These people were often
vulnerable to militant propaganda because they were largely
uneducated and fearful that progress represented a threat to
their traditional way of life. Majid stated that military
force would continue to be necessary to contain the
insurgency, but alone did not represent a long-term solution.
People in tribal areas needed improved social services,
education and economic opportunities to join Pakistan's
mainstream. Majid welcomed initiatives by the U.S. and other
donor nations to answer this critical humanitarian need.
ISLAMABAD 00000664 002 OF 002
8. (C) Another vital element in denying sanctuary to
extremists was to build the capacity of local law enforcement
by expanding, training and equipping police and paramilitary
forces (such as the Frontier Corps). The Army was stretched
incredibly thin and would not be able to sustain current
operational tempo indefinitely.
9. (C) Majid said Admiral Mullen would be fully briefed on
Pakistan's protective measures to safeguard its nuclear
assets. Admiral Mullen replied he appreciated the briefing
but had heard no responsible leader express serious concerns
in this area. Majid observed that reports the U.S. military
was developing contingency plans to secure Pakistan's nuclear
weapons were of great concern. Such reports affected
Pakistani public opinion, making it difficult for the
Pakistan military to engage the U.S. at a time when working
together had never been more important.
10. (C) Majid said Pakistan needed U.S. assistance in
building capabilities in airlift, sigint and Special
Operations Forces (SOF). Additionally, he noted the Pakistan
Navy had requested frigates and a destroyer. Admiral Mullen
asked if the Pakistan Navy's P-3 patrol aircraft had been
used in CT operations in FATA. Majid said they had not.
Admiral Mullen advised Majid the U.S. had found P-3s to be
very effective in support SOF and ground operations,
especially in Iraq.
11. (C) Regarding Coalition Support Funds (CSF),Majid urged
a timely release of reimbursements, noting Pakistan was
struggling to support large and extended operations. He
described the wear and tear on equipment as an example where
he felt CSF was not providing sufficient reimbursement. He
also spoke strongly not just about the toll the
counterterrorism effort was taking on the military as an
organization, but how it was affecting both military
personnel and civilians physically and psychologically. He
said CSF should also cover compensation packages for families
of military personnel killed or wounded in action, as well as
for civilians who lost family or property in collateral
damage incidents.
12. (C) Majid suggested Admiral Mullen consider restructuring
CSF reimbursement based on the UN peacekeeping model.
Admiral Mullen said the U.S. would consider whether some
standard formula for reimbursement was possible. Meanwhile,
he would see about moving claims through the bureaucracy more
quickly. Concerns surrounding CSF accountability would
continue to arise, but the U.S. would continue to work
closely with Pakistan on this issue.
13. (U) U.S. Participants:
Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, U.S. Embassy
Major General Ron Helmly, Office of the Defense
Representative, Pakistan, U.S. Embassy
Stacy Nichols (notetaker)
Pakistan Participants:
General Tariq Majid, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee
Lieutenant General Athar Ali, Director General, JCS Committee
Major General Bilal Umar, Director General, Plans and
Operations, JCS Committee
14. (U) CJCS Mullen cleared this cable.
PATTERSON