DEPUTY SECRETARY MEETS WITH PAKISTAN PRIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003823 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PK SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY MEETS WITH PAKISTAN PRIME MINISTER GILANI Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani told Deputy Secretary Negroponte December 11 of Pakistan's commitment to cooperate fully with India in the investigation of the Mumbai attacks. He welcomed UNSCR 1267, which gave Pakistan face-saving cover under which to act against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) members, and he described Pakistani actions against LeT and its charity arm, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD),including: arrests of key LeT members, freezing of assets, closing of offices, a travel ban, banning of JuD publications, and a surveillance order against second and third tier figures. Gilani also expressed deep concern about the public reaction to government moves against the popular JuD, which delivers public services, runs schools and hospitals, and was a key provider of assistance following the earthquake in 2005. Pakistani officials expect there to be violence, especially in Punjab, and Gilani reiterated earlier requests to the Ambassador for US assistance in building Pakistani law enforcement capacity. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Deputy Secretary Negroponte, accompanied by Ambassador Patterson and SCA Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Camp, called on Prime Minister Gilani December 11 to discuss next steps following the Mumbai attacks. Gilani was accompanied by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defense (the senior civil servants in those ministries),and his chief of staff. GoP Working to Defuse Tensions with India -------------- ¶3. (C) Gilani reviewed for the Deputy Secretary the positive relationship with the Indian government that he and President Zardari had been working to establish, and expressed frustration that they would have to start anew. He described efforts he had made in the wake of the attacks to communicate Pakistani willingness to cooperate with the Indians, including appeals through a number of interlocutors, among them, the Prime Ministers of Germany, Turkey, Italy (in its G-8 capacity),the Czech Republic (in its EU capacity), and the Foreign Minister of the UAE. Pakistan wants the issue resolved as soon as possible, he said, so that the two countries can get back to business. ¶4. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked whether more direct interactions with India might be appropriate, including law enforcement to law enforcement. Gilani said the government's intention had been to defuse the tension first, before direct intervention, in order to create the right environment. Once the situation normalizes, Pakistan could send its Foreign Minister to India. He noted that the Chairman of the Pakistan Criminal Board (PCB) had departed for India that day. ¶5. (C) Gilani also reviewed efforts to bring all Pakistani political parties on board with the government's commitment to cooperate fully in bringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice. The government had called the first meeting in ten years of the Cabinet's Defense Coordinating Committee, and the result had been broad support for the government's position. Gilani noted that, in the past, such issues would have been handled by the National Security Council, a Musharraf creation which did not answer to the Parliament and which did not have active participation of the opposition. Gilani was confident that the mandate conferred by the Cabinet committee, which included even regular critics of the government, boded well for the GoP,s coming efforts to resolve the crisis. ¶6. (C) Gilani said the responsibility for decision-making lay with the federal government, but he pointed out that implementation of many of the actions required would fall to the provincial government. He had spoken with Shabbaz Sharif, the Chief Minister of Punjab Province (and Nawaz Sharif's younger brother) the day before (Dec. 10),as many of the activities of LeT and JuD take place there. Shabbaz had said that if the Prime Minister ordered action, he would do it, but he wanted to have the order issued. Gilani said he told Shabbaz he should consider himself having been ordered. ISLAMABAD 00003823 002 OF 002 Concrete Steps Taken Against LeT and JuD -------------- ¶7. (C) Gilani agreed that Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),banned in Pakistan in 2001, and its self-styled charity arm Jamaat-ud-Dawa, were effectively one in the same. He and the Interior Secretary laid out specific measures the GoP has taken to date: -- Implementation of what was required by UNSCR 1207, including closing of JuD offices, freezing JuD assets, instituting a travel ban, revocation of arms licenses, and the arrests of a number of key members, including LeT leader Hafiz Muhammed Saeed, and the expected imminent arrest of another top leader later in the day (NFI). -- banning of all JuD publications and seizure of printing presses and other media; and -- a surveillance order against second and third tier figures. ¶8. (C) Shah said he had ordered the preventive detention of those arrested, using the Maintenance of Public Order law, which allows detention without charge for three months. The Anti-Terrorism law allows preventive detention for up to a year, and the Interior Secretary said the basis for the order against the LeT members might be changed later to Anti-terrorism. Gilani agreed the passage of UNSCR 1267 would make things easier for the GoP, because the demand was coming from an internationally-respected body and not from India. It also helped provide legal authority for GoP actions, since UNSCRs are considered legally binding. Likelihood of violent response to actions against LeT/JuD -------------- ¶9. (C) Gilani reiterated the commitment of the Pakistani government to fight terrorism, which he accepted had become a threat to the internal stability of Pakistan and not just to external actors. Pakistani actions against extremists in the FATA and NWFP had provoked a wave of terrorist attacks, he said, and the growing instability and lack of basic law and order in that region was damaging the economy. Gilani said he had earlier spoken to the Ambassador, but he wanted to reiterate his request for USG assistance on law enforcement capacity building. He maintained that the GoP had the determination and the will to fight terrorists and extremists, but lacked the capability, and needs USG help. ¶10. (C) LeT was a small organization, the Interior Secretary pointed out, but JuD is broadly present in Punjab, Sindh, and Kashmir Provinces. It is extremely popular because it has been delivering services, including running hospitals and clinics, schools, and community centers, and it played a significant role in responding to the 2005 earthquake, which also helped build its popularity. As a result, there was likely to be a violent backlash against strong government action against the group. Gilani said he and Zardari are both from Punjab, which he said would be the battleground, since so much of the JuD presence is there. He expressed deep concern about the government's ability to sustain efforts against JuD. He recalled the Red Mosque episode of last year and how difficult that was, and asked &how many Red Mosques are out there? There are so many we have to close.8 ¶11. (C) Gilani agreed with the Deputy Secretary that strategic communications to explain GoP actions were necessary, though he did not specify how the government planned to handle this. Gilani and the Interior Secretary also discussed possibilities for ensuring that the much-needed public services now being offered by JuD continued under government management, oversight, and financial support. The Interior Secretary expressed skepticism that the GoP had the financial resources to do this, but Gilani was confident that would not be a problem. ¶12. (U) The Deputy Secretary's party cleared this cable. PATTERSON