THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 11 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 003819 E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018 TAGS: OVIP PGOV PREL PTER IN PK SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 11 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZARDARI Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Deputy Secretary and Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, joined by Foreign Minister Qureshi, met December 11 in Islamabad. Zardari pledged his interest in cooperating with the government of India to prosecute those implicated in the Mumbai terror attacks. The GOP has detained 12 important suspects, informed Zardari, and will bring domestic legislation before parliament to strengthen its effort against Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Zardari asked for help from the USG in providing evidence, including from wire taps, that could be used in court against those detained. He also requested the USG speak with Saudi Arabia to ask that oil at concessionary prices be granted to Pakistan. Zardari asked the Deputy Secretary to convey his message to the GOI that Pakistan wants to cooperate with India and seeks peace. End Summary. Mumbai Terror -------------- ¶2. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked President Zardari what had been the goal of the terrorists responsible for Mumbai. Zardari replied that India's disenfranchised Muslims were the target audience and they were meant to react. Zardari was grateful that thus far this population had not been radicalized. However, he did not discount the longer-term psychological impact the attacks would have on the Muslim population in India. GOP Actions -------------- ¶3. (C) Zardari and Foreign Minister Qureshi informed the Deputy Secretary that "twelve big fish, not three" had been caught in GOP operations to detain suspects implicated in Mumbai. In addition, Zardari told the Deputy Secretary, Pakistan has lifted its objections in the UN Security Council's 1267 Committee. His government intends to bring similar legislation before Pakistan's own parliament in order to strengthen the government's position against Jamaat-ud-Dawa. The President mentioned his OP-ED in the New York Times as another GOP action post-Mumbai. ¶4. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked whether it would be hard to separate a terrorist wing from an organization which could also be viewed as providing social services. Zardari acknowledged JUD was well regarded for its humanitarian relief efforts. Ongoing operations were further complicated because individuals had to be separated from the civilian population in Punjab. The general population in Pakistan was not educated to understand the events, or to understand what the government's obligations are in the circumstances. Nor was the media helpful. ¶5. (C) Zardari said he needed help in gathering evidence against the perpetrators that could be used in a court of law. He will use Pakistani evidence, but where the USG had proof of complicity, including in wiretaps, this should be made available for use in the courts. Zardari said, for example, that the tapes should be checked against the voice of the detainee held in India, and that the same could be done with those held by the GOP. He was agnostic as to whether this needed to happen in Pakistan, or could be done in India and suggested it might be done jointly with the participation of both the GOI and the GOP (though his thoughts on the matter did not sound fully formed). Pakistan/India Relations -------------- ¶6. (C) Probing the depths of GOP/GOI communications, the Deputy Secretary asked if the terrorists had been successful in opening "a communication gap" between the two countries. "Yes," said Zardari. They have inflamed talk of "India and Kashmir," the touchstone nationalist issues for Pakistan's military. Qureshi defended his own efforts, noting he had been in New Delhi when the attacks occurred and had stayed for three days. The GOP has proposed sending a senior level delegation to India led by Qureshi to offer full cooperation. So far, said Qureshi, the Indians have not responded. ¶7. (C) Immediately after the attacks, Zardari spoke with Sonja Ghandi and with PM Singh. The Deputy Secretary asked the President what he thought the Indians wanted from Pakistan, and whether this was condemnation of the attacks. "We have condemned them," said Zardari. He and Qureshi viewed Pakistan's reaction as moderate (not counting the inflammatory nature of the press in both countries). The Deputy Secretary urged Zardari to do more to explain to the Indians, and to the world, what actions it has taken. ¶8. (C) Pakistan and India share a common enemy, said Zardari. Non-state actors are perpetrating terrorism on Pakistani soil. He has directed the Army to turn F-16s carrying 1,000 ton bombs on his own country, in the knowledge there will be collateral damage. The spread of extremism is a danger to Pakistan and a threat to Zardari's own government. He had made statements even before taking office that demonstrated he did not seek war with India. A week before the attacks, he had been on Indian television making the historic statement that Pakistan would have a "no first use" nuclear weapons policy. ¶9. (C) The attacks on Mumbai are an opportunity, said Zardari, for India and Pakistan to find common cause to fight terrorism and the expansion of extremism. Zardari was skeptical of speculation the attacks were timed to derail GOP efforts to improve relations with India. He and the Deputy Secretary agreed that the level of planning indicated the attacks had been planned months, if not a year or more, in advance. Economic Crisis Averted? -------------- ¶10. (C) The Deputy Secretary inquired whether Mumbai had distracted from Pakistan's other great challenges, including an economy on the brink of collapse. Zardari said Pakistan had been on the brink, and he had willingly entered into talks with the IMF when he saw this was necessary to reassure allies and donor countries. He was convinced more could be done in the energy sector with public/private investment and that the same could be done with corn in the Tribal Areas. He agreed with the Deputy Secretary that economic activity had to be generated there in order to stem the influence of the Taliban. ¶11. (C) Zardari and his Ministers have published a wheat purchase price for the next harvest season. It will come too late for farmers this year, but they hope it will aid in future harvests by guaranteeing a price, effectively subsidizing wheat production. Pakistan Donor Conference -------------- ¶12. (C) Secretary Rice supports holding a Donor's Conference for Pakistan in January, so long as there is interest from other donor nations, the Deputy Secretary told Zardari. Zardari said he believed there had been a groundswell of support for his government as it came into office. He shared the Deputy's concern that the attacks in Mumbai may have deflated international interest. Help with Saudi Arabia? -------------- ¶13. (C) Zardari said he had tried "begging and borrowing" to shore up Pakistan's economic position. "Pakistan can't live on aid, however," he said. As with the fight on terrorism in Pakistan, in the end Zardari's government would stand or fail based on his own actions. Zardari asked for USG assistance in gaining a lower-than-market price for oil from Saudi Arabia. Pakistan would be a big customer (10 billion USD/annum) and was seeking a long-term (ten year) contract but at below market rates he understood could be made available from Saudi Arabia, as it has a surface oil surplus. Acknowledging that opposition leader Nawaz Sharif has very strong ties to Saudi Arabia, Zardari pressed for U.S.G. aid in convincing Saudi Arabia to provide oil assistance. Message to Mumbai -------------- ¶14. (C) Reminded the Deputy Secretary's next stop was New Delhi, Zardari asked a message be conveyed: -- We mean no harm to India; -- We want to be friends; -- Let's not let non-state actors set the agenda; -- Even if ISI were implicated, it does not help for them to blame my army (or call my army "rogue"); that is counter- productive. ¶15. The Deputy Secretary's party cleared this cable. - PATTERSON