CJCS MAJID HOSTS CENTCOM CMDR PETRAEUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003595

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK
SUBJECT: CJCS MAJID HOSTS CENTCOM CMDR PETRAEUS

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary. During a November 3 meeting and lunch,
CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Tariq Majid discussed bilateral
relations, the need to improve military-military cooperation,
and Pakistan's efforts to combat extremism. End Summary.


2. (C) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Majid
met with and hosted lunch November 3 for Ambassador and
CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus. Also attending
were State Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia
Richard Boucher, Office of Defense Representative Pakistan
Rear Admiral LeFever, CENTCOM J-3 MG Jones, CENTCOM POLAD
Gfoeller, CENTCOM Colonel Bell, and polcouns (notetaker).


3. (C) Chairman Majid began with a review of what he termed
positive developments in these "eventful times." They
included improved Pakistani relations with India despite an
increase in Line of Control violations in Kashmir, the joint
parliamentary resolution against extremism, the Pak-Afghan
mini-jirga that took place October 27-28 in Islamabad, the
meeting in Turkey between PM Gilani and President Karzai, and
the success of the ongoing military action in Bajaur. Still,
he assessed, Afghanistan remained in a worrisome state of
flux.


4. (C) Petraeus reviewed recent progress in the CENTCOM
area of operations. Four years ago, Saudi Arabia faced an
existential threat from militants but has made enormous
strides in bringing extremism under control. There had been
no major attacks on the U.S. or Europe on the scale of those
that occurred on 9/11. There were better controls on one-way
travel by military age males from North Africa, Libya,
Morocco, and Egypt to Damascus, Syria. The situation in Iraq
had improved significantly. Petraeus said he had been
encouraged by Chief of Army Staff General Kayani's briefing
on the Pakistani military campaign plan against extremists in
the border region. He warned, however, that as the Pakistani
military had more success against militants, there would be
repercussions from Baitullah Mehsud and others; things would
get harder before they got easier.


5. (C) Petraeus explained the challenges the U.S. military
had faced in the effort to change its doctrine, training and
tactics to learn COIN and develop stabilization capabilities
while preserving its fighting capability. He highlighted the
need for integrated intelligence operations that allowed
everyone to share intelligence critical to the battlefield.
As an example, he explained the complex inter-cooperation of
intelligence and forces used to support operations in Sadr
City, Iraq, in March and April 2008. Majid agreed on the
importance of shared intelligence and noted that Pakistan
still suffers from compartmentalized intelligence collection;
it takes, he said, at least four hours from collection to
action to launch an AIR attack against a target, even if the
Pakistan AIR FORCE is ready in advance.


6. (C) Petraeus recognized that Iraq and Pakistan were very
different situations, but there were lessons learned there
that could apply in Pakistan. Majid responded that the scope
and magnitude of the problems in Pakistan were much greater,
and Pakistan had been suffering from the "spillover" effects
of 9/11. In analyzing the current situation, Majid felt
that: (1) there was no cohesive, regional approach being
applied in South Asia; and (2) the U.S. and Pakistan suffered
from bilateral mistrust and misperceptions. Popular
legitimacy, which was crucial to extend military operations,
was different from the legality of such actions. (Note:
Presumably, Majid was referring to recent remarks by DHS
Secretary Chertoff that the U.S. had the legal right to
launch unilateral cross-border attacks in self-defense.)
Majid stressed the need for bilateral transparency and
synchronization of efforts. Petraeus agreed that the new
Pakistani civilian and military leadership and a new
administration in the United States presented opportunities
for both sides.


7. (C) Majid again expressed a desire for improved
civilian-military coordination between the U.S. and Pakistan.
He noted that the Pakistani military could not go ahead with
military operations against militants ahead of the support
from the new civilian leadership because they needed civilian

ISLAMABAD 00003595 002 OF 002


ownership of the battle against extremism. Over lunch, Majid
praised the emergence of lashkars (tribal militias) that
demonstrated popular support for Army operations in the
tribal areas and voiced continued confidence in the ability
of the Pakistani Army to attract volunteers for its ranks.
PATTERSON